ENGAGING NEW THAI FM SOMPONG AT UNGA: THE CURRENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002940

SIPDIS

DOJ FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM KJUS ETRD UNGA TH
SUBJECT: ENGAGING NEW THAI FM SOMPONG AT UNGA: THE CURRENT
U.S. AGENDA WITH THAILAND

REF: A. BANGKOK 2882 (AMBASSADOR MEETS PM)

B. BANGKOK 2854 (THAI-CAMBODIAN DISPUTE)

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Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason: 1.4 (b, d)

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Newly-inaugurated Deputy Prime Minister Sompong
Amornwiwat, who serves concurrently as Foreign Minister, will
make a short visit to UNGA/New York, arriving late September
27 with meetings on September 29-30. Post recommends an
appropriate USG high-level interlocutor meet with Sompong in
New York, given the wide range of important matters on our
agenda with Thailand, and in recognition of 175 years of
US-Siamese/Thai relations, our oldest formal relationship in
Asia. Issues which could be raised with Sompong include: the
extradition of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout; the
deployment of Thai troops to Darfur; pressing Thailand to
support reform in Burma; protection of Lao Hmong in Thailand
who seek refugee status; calming Thai-Cambodian tensions;
Thailand's chairmanship of ASEAN; support for Thai democracy;
and the southern separatist insurgency. We recommend U/S
Burns or A/S Hill meet with DPM/FM Sompong; Attorney General
Mukasey may wish to call Sompong on the Bout case, since the
two talked during Mukasey's June 10-11 visit to Bangkok, when
Sompong was Justice Minister. End Summary.

BOUT EXTRADITION
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2. (S) The Ambassador stressed to new PM Somchai September 22
that one of our top bilateral priorities is the extradition
of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, in Thai custody since
March. In his August visit to Bangkok, President Bush raised
this matter with then-PM Samak. Attorney General Mukasey
discussed the Bout case with then-FM Noppadol and officials
from the Office of the Attorney General in June. We are
concerned by a Thai court's recent denial of our request for
the extradition of Jamshid Ghassemi, an Iranian who conspired
to illegally obtain controlled technology from the United
States (ref A). We have noted our respect for Thai judicial
processes but believe firmly that Thailand should extradite
Bout, a notorious arms trafficker who had targeted Americans
and supported terrorists, once the judicial review concludes.


DARFUR DEPLOYMENT
--------------

3. (SBU) After the Thai pledged a battalion peacekeepers for
UNAMID in October 2007, the RTG has been waiting for Sudanese
government approval for Thai troops to deploy to Darfur. We
understand that Sudanese government recently told the UN that
Thai troops could deploy after Egyptian and Ethiopian
infantry battalions deploy to Darfur. Both the MFA and the
Peacekeeping Operations Center at the Royal Thai Armed Forces
Headquarters confirmed to us that they are planning to
fulfill the pledge to UNAMID. With the long interim since
the pledge was approved by the Cabinet, however, the RTG will
need to allocate a budget for the deployment, and the Thai
military will need to re-train troops. The latest estimate
from the Thai military is that they would not be ready to
deploy before February. (Note: Septel will provide further
detail on this issue.) We have urged the RTG to begin
preparations as soon as possible so that Thai troops are
ready when authorization has been provided by Sudan and the
UNDPKO.

BURMA
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4. (C) When the People's Power Party (PPP)-led governing
coalition first formed an administration in February 2008,
then-FM Noppadol advocated "neighborly engagement" with
Burma, with which Thailand shares a long porous border,
provides refuge for hundreds of thousands of displaced

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persons and employment for up to 2 million other Burmese, and
on which Thailand depends for a significant portion of its
energy needs. Thailand currently appears unwilling to press
the Burmese junta to carry out reforms, although in extreme
circumstances (such as the repression of the Saffron Uprising
last year) the Thais have been willing to criticize egregious
acts of the GOB. Thailand also helpfully pressed the GOB to
allow international aid for areas hit hard by Cyclone Nargis
and served as a platform for U.S. and UN aid deliveries into
Burma.


5. (C) The Thais are understandably concerned about the
negative impact on the Thai jewelry industry of the JADE
(Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act. Our hope is that
Thailand will do more to join the effort to pressure the
junta for change, and not simply see the Act as an unfair
trade matter to be taken to the WTO. We should encourage
Sompong to work with us towards a democratic transition in
Burma, while understanding their challenges in managing a
complex neighborly relationship and concerns about JADE Act
implementation.

LAO-HMONG
--------------

6. (SBU) Thailand has a long history of providing sanctuary
to people from neighboring states who are fleeing
persecution. In recent months, however, we have been
concerned by the RTG's return to Laos of 1400 Lao Hmong
awaiting screening for claims of refugee status. The RTG
claimed these individuals returned voluntarily, and that the
vast majority of the Hmong do not meet international criteria
as refugees, but the procedures the RTG used did not meet
UNHCR standards for voluntary movements. There was no
independent third party monitor to ensure that returnees sign
affidavits of voluntariness and had an opportunity to change
their minds. A closed government screening process to
identify those who might face persecution has been similarly
opaque. While thanking the Thais for their traditional
hospitality to neighboring populations, we have stressed the
need for transparency and proper third-party monitoring in
any return of Lao Hmong, as well as in the vetting process
undertaken without UNHCR involvement.

TENSION WITH CAMBODIA
--------------

7. (SBU) In July and August, Thai-Cambodian tension rose
substantially after the inscription of the Preah Vihear
temple on UNESCO's World Heritage list. The International
Court of Justice ruled in 1962 that the temple is situated in
Cambodia, a decision Thailand respects, but the two countries
dispute control of the surrounding territory, and the Thais
felt that the inscription provided recognition of Cambodian
claim to the area. With opposition forces in Thailand
seeking to put pressure on the RTG, and with elections
approaching in Cambodia, the issue became highly politicized
in both countries, and both governments built up their
military presence in the border area. Bilateral talks and
the passage of time helped reduce the tension, and both sides
drew down their forces at Preah Vihear, but focus has now
shifted to two other temples elsewhere along the border: Ta
Kwai and Ta Muen (see ref B). We have continually reminded
the RTG that we urge a bilateral diplomatic resolution to
this ongoing dispute.

THAI CHAIRMANSHIP OF ASEAN
--------------

8. (SBU) Thailand assumed the chairmanship of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations in July. If the ASEAN Charter is
ratified by all members and comes into force, Thailand will
hold the chairmanship until the end of 2009. During this
transition period for ASEAN, Thailand can play a more
critical than usual in leading on key regional issues, such
as the Southeast Asian policy toward reform in Burma,

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establishing an ASEAN human rights body, and empowering civil
society throughout ASEAN, not just in its leading
democracies. Thailand's domestic political turmoil has
limited its ability to launch its term as ASEAN Chair with
vigorous leadership, but we have nevertheless frequently
voiced our support for Thailand's chairmanship.

THAI DEMOCRACY - A SOCIETY DIVIDED
--------------

9. (SBU) The current coalition has been challenged by a group
of ardent protesters, the People's Alliance for Democracy
(PAD),which originally formed in 2006 to push for the ouster
of then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. (Thaksin is
currently in the U.K., having chosen to flee abroad rather
than to face court proceedings relating to alleged abuse of
power.) The PAD resumed its protests over the Samak
government in May in the wake of the Preah Vihear
controversy. PAD protesters stormed Government House, the
formal seat of government, August 26, and have been ensconced
there ever since, despite Samak stepping down September 9
after a conflict-of-interest court decision. The RTG has
been reluctant to use force to evict the protesters, fearing
a violent clash, which could prompt calls for military
intervention in politics. Despite widespread Thai
appreciation for democracy, there is also significant
sentiment favoring the use of undemocratic means to block
Thaksin and his allies from power or restructure the nature
of Thai elected government. We have consistently called for
the standoff between the RTG and PAD to be resolved
peacefully, within the framework of the constitution and the
rule of law, and, when appropriate, reminded interlocutors
that we would strongly oppose any military intervention in
politics.

THE SOUTHERN INSURGENCY
--------------

10. (C) An ethno-nationalist separatist insurgency by Malay
Muslims in Thailand's far south remains perhaps the country's
primary security challenge. Since January 2004, over 3000
people have been killed in the conflict; the violence is
having a growing influence on the local economy as tourism,
cross border trade, and investment have declined. The RTG
maintains the situation in southern Thailand is a purely
domestic issue and is wary of any outside involvement,
particularly from the U.S. Although there have been
inquiries from disparate RTG entities regarding assistance
and training specifically for the south, these appear to not
have been coordinated at the national level. The RTG has
been somewhat successful in managing the violence in the
southern provinces through more professional actions by
security forces, but we have no indication the RTG is ready
to address the core social justice issues or to offer
concessions necessary to end the insurgency. We remain
concerned about continuing allegations of human rights
abuses. Our message has been one of willingness to help when
asked, but understanding of Thai concerns about outside
involvement.
JOHN