THE THAKSIN RESTORATION: SAMAK SUNDARAVEJ ELECTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000282

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM KDEM KJUS TH
SUBJECT: THE THAKSIN RESTORATION: SAMAK SUNDARAVEJ ELECTED
AS THAILAND'S PRIME MINISTER

REF: A. BANGKOK 276 (SAMAK BIO)

B. 07 BANGKOK 4734 (WARY FRONTRUNNER)

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The House of Representatives elected People's Power
Party (PPP) leader Samak Sundaravej as Prime Minister on
January 28, and he will likely receive his formal appointment
by King Bhumibol in a few days, forming a cabinet soon
thereafter. Samak received full support from all political
parties except for the Democrat Party, which unanimously
opposed his candidacy. The victory of Samak, an abrasive
figure who could not have become Prime Minister without the
active support of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra,
reflects widespread dissatisfaction with the 2006 coup d'etat
and the interim government installed by the coup leaders.
Most politically aware Thais believe that Samak's principal
agenda is to roll back the steps taken since the coup against
Thaksin. We would not be surprised if he were to favor a new
round of elections within 1-2 years, after opening the door
to participation of disenfranchised former Thai Rak Thai
officials and possibly overseeing constitutional reforms. So
long as Thaksin continues to provide leadership and funding,
we see no reason why the current coalition centered around
PPP cannot remain united. The political environment makes it
less likely that ongoing investigations of improprieties by
Thaksin will bear fruit. End Summary.

SAMAK WINS
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2. (C) On January 28, the House of Representatives elected
People Power Party (PPP) leader Samak Sundaravej as Prime
Minister. (Ref A provides a bio of Samak.) Samak will
formally assume the position of Prime Minister in coming
days, after the King signs off on his appointment. After his
formal appointment as Prime Minister, Samak will form a
cabinet; we expect that most cabinet positions have already
been determined during recent coalition negotiations.


3. (SBU) Samak was elected with 310 votes; the only other
candidate, Democrat Party (DP) leader Abhisit Vejjajiva,
received 163 votes. The vote was strictly along party lines;
all Democrats voted for Abhisit, while all others voted for
Samak. (The House has 480 seats; three members elected in
recent re-run elections have not yet been certified, one
member was absent due to illness, and Samak, Abhisit, and
House President Yongyuth Tiyapairath abstained.)


4. (C) Samak's notoriously abrasive manner (see ref A) made
him a highly unlikely candidate for Prime Minister before he
assumed the leadership of PPP in August, at which time he
openly acknowledged he was a "nominee" of deposed Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Given the substantial plurality
that PPP won in December's election, it would have been
mathematically possible but, in practical terms, highly
difficult to block PPP from forming a government. PPP's
plurality flowed from the party's effective political
organization, the lingering genuine popularity of Thaksin in
many rural areas, and dissatisfaction with the interim
administration installed by the coup leaders. The
construction of the PPP-centered coalition, however,
reflected primarily the desire of party leaders to secure
government positions for themselves and/or their lieutenants.
Most political parties decided to throw their lot in with
PPP despite (rather than because of) Samak's leadership.

SAMAK'S AGENDA
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5. (C) In August 2007, Samak privately told the
then-Ambassador that he envisioned himself as a transitional

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figure who would help to pave the way for Thaksin's return to
Thailand (ref B). Samak has publicly advocated an amnesty
for the 111 members of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) executive
board, including Thaksin, who lost their political rights for
a period of five years following the Constitutional
Tribunal's May 2007 dissolution of TRT. We would also expect
that the authorities will soon move to release the funds of
Thaksin's -- worth well over one billion USD -- that have
been frozen since June 2007. While legal investigations into
Thaksin-era corruption (including by Thaksin himself) may
continue, the political environment is now hostile toward
such probes; witnesses may prove reluctant to come forward,
investigating authorities may find reason to drag their feet,
and judges may be more inclined to give Thaksin the benefit
of the doubt.


6. (C) We would expect many policies of the Samak
administration to resemble those of Thaksin's. Samak was not
affiliated with TRT -- in fact, he prevailed over one of
Thaksin's closest associates, then-TRT Deputy Leader Sudarat
Keyuraphan, in the race for Bangkok Governor in 2000 -- but
former TRT figures form the core of PPP, which openly
advocated continuation of Thaksin's populist policies. Samak
told us in August that he would take a tough line toward
secessionists in southern Thailand, and we expect little or
no accountability for Thaksin-era human rights abuses in the
southern border provinces (or elsewhere). PPP figures also
have spoken publicly of reviving the Thaksin-era
anti-narcotics campaign, which engendered violence but was
popular in some quarters. It remains unclear whether Samak
is likely to adopt a more accommodating stance toward the
junta in Burma, as many had criticized Thaksin for doing.

THE COALITION'S DURABILITY
--------------


7. (C) Thaksin and his agents have already achieved much by
assembling a coalition that includes former staunch opponents
and deserters from TRT, in the face of behind-the-scenes
pressure from powerful enemies -- such as Privy Council
President Prem Tinsulanonda, who shared a mutual antagonism
with Samak even before Samak joined Thaksin's camp. This
coalition has already proven its worth by supporting the
election of Samak as Prime Minister and of Yongyuth
Tiyapairath -- one of Thaksin's most hard-nosed dirty
tricksters -- as House President (commonly referred to as
Speaker). House members have so far shown tremendous party
discipline and, with the heaviest lifting already done,
Thaksin appears to have the resources to keep the coalition
together for the near future. Politicians who just emerged
from a relatively long hiatus are unlikely to want to rush
into another expensive campaign season. Also, the leaders of
relatively new parties that performed relatively poorly in
the December would likely worry that another election will
further reduce their presence in the House.


8. (C) The source of greatest pressure for a new round of
elections may be the desire of disenfranchised TRT
executives, who play a role in nearly all parties represented
in the House except for the Democrat Party, to return to the
game. If they regain their political rights after an amnesty
bill makes its way through the legislature, they may want an
opportunity to win election to the House, although they may
be satisfied with a reshuffle that provides them with cabinet
seats. (Of all the cabinet members, only the Prime Minister
needs to be an elected member of the House.) Many parties,
including the DP, have expressed interest in constitutional
reform, and the amendment process -- likely to take longer
than an amnesty -- may presage widespread calls for new
elections.


9. (C) While the above factors imply that the government
either will enjoy a relatively smooth ride or dissolve itself
in a voluntary or controlled manner, there are some
foreseeable developments that could prove highly disruptive:

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- Samak has been sentenced to two years' imprisonment on
defamation charges and is currently free on bail (ref A); he
could lose his appeal(s) and be compelled to report for
incarceration.

- PPP's former Deputy Leader Yongyuth Tiyapairath remains
under investigation for election improprieties, and a finding
that he violated election laws could lead to Constitutional
Court dissolution proceedings against PPP. (As noted in para
five, however, the political environment seems not to be
conducive to harsh measures against Thaksin's allies.)

- The Election Commission has disqualified executives of the
Chart Thai and Matchima Thipathai parties for election
improprieties, leaving them vulnerable to a Commission
request that the Constitutional Court dissolve the two
parties. Dissolution would have dramatic repercussions,
although by itself the dissolution would not deprive PPP of
majority support in the House.

- Some of PPP's junior partners are showing signs of
significant internal factionalism. The party discipline
displayed to date could weaken dramatically, with uncertain
consequences.

COMMENT
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10. (C) Samak's election means that only a few pro forma
steps need to occur before a democratically-elected
government is in place. Samak's election clearly signals
that Thaksin's return to influence is proceeding apace, in
part because of Thaksin's political skills and access to
wealth, but also because of a backlash against both the 2006
coup and the ineptitude of the interim government installed
by the coupmakers. It remains to be seen whether the
military intervention and its aftermath has either made
Thaksin more humble (we doubt it),or -- more likely -- left
segments of the elite and middle class too disheartened to
support once again sizeable anti-Thaksin protests like those
that took place in 2005-2006 and helped to legitimize the
coup.

JOHN