SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: MEDIATOR HAS GOOD NEWS AND BAD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002808

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: MEDIATOR HAS GOOD NEWS AND BAD
NEWS, AND TRIES TO KEEP TALKS ALIVE

REF: A. CHIANG MAI 00141 (SEARCHING FOR WAYS AHEAD)

B. CHIANG MAI 00120 (IMPLEMENTATION STALLED)

C. BANGKOK 01210 (RTG TALKS WITH INSURGENTS STALLED)

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Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D)


Summary and comment:
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1. (S) Michael Vatikiotis from the Henri Dunant Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) provided the Ambassador and DCM
an update on September 11 on the status of the secret peace
process between the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and southern
Thai insurgents. While upbeat about the enthusiasm of many
of the process participants, Vatikiotis lamented the toll the
political turmoil in Bangkok was taking on the talks: there
was no political leadership in Bangkok on the issue, and Army
Commander Anupong Paochinda had declined to fill the vacuum.
Previously agreed-upon confidence building measure were
languishing, and the insurgents were questioning the
government's ability to follow through on commitments, he
assessed. On the positive side, Vatikiotis told us that
opposition MPs have now been brought into the process and
that he was trying to maneuver around the political vacuum by
establishing a second track of talks designed to broaden the
dialogue by involving a wider group of stakeholders. The
political, legal, and constitutional hurdles to progress
towards a peace deal, however, remain daunting.


2. (S) Comment: We are not sure whether HDC's efforts are
bringing the parties engaged in the conflict closer to a
peace deal, or whether HDC's efforts are merely helping
disparate insurgent groups consolidate and become unified
while the RTG continues to "manage" the problem. For a
negotiated settlement to be successful, the insurgents
clearly need to be unified under some form of political
leadership. The nature of this insurgency, however, is
elusive. Our understanding of which groups are involved,
their degree of unity, command and control, and leadership
structures all are vague. Although we believe any movement
towards reconciliation and settlement in this conflict is
positive, the overarching issue at stake, ie., the nature of
Thai identity and whether that identity includes Malay
Muslims, is not an issue either the RTG or the multiple
insurgent groups, are currently ready to resolve. We agree
with Vatikiotis that the lingering political crisis in
Bangkok means nobody in the RTG is focused on the south. End
comment.


3. (S) Michael Vatikiotis (protect) from the Henri Dunant
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) provided the
Ambassador and DCM with an update September 11 on the secret
dialogue between the Thai government and southern Thai
insurgents. Vatikiotis told us they had completed three
rounds of talks - all in Indonesia. One round was held in
Bali and two in Jakarta. He judged that Indonesia was a good
place for these meetings because it provided neutral ground
where the participants did not feel pressured. He said he
notified the Indonesian Foreign Ministry before each round of
talks; the Indonesians had been welcoming and even helpful.
As an example, he said one of the "movement" leaders coming
to Indonesia from Syria for a round of talks was traveling on
only a "hand written" Thai passport. The Indonesian Foreign
Ministry facilitated his entry after Singapore authorities
initially refused transit. (Note: Throughout the discussion
Vatikiotis referred to the insurgent groups participating in
the peace effort as "the movement." End note.)

Willing participants, but little political will
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4. (S) Vatikiotis told us there was both good news and bad
news. The good news was that the process was still alive in
the face of political turmoil in Bangkok; the two sides are
establishing trust and are committed to the peace process.
The bad news, he said, was that the political backing in
Bangkok for the process had withered. Although former

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interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont was still interested
in the talks, he now provided only moral support, since he
was reluctant to assume any formal role after having returned
to the Privy Council. Unfortunately, Vatikiotis told us,
Army Commander Anupong Paochinda had decided the political
process surrounding the dialogue was inherently too difficult
in the absence of political leadership, and that it was not
the army,s job to decide the fate of the peace process.
According to Vatikiotis, Anupong believes that the fate of
the peace process is a decision for the political leadership.
Vatikiotis characterized the current leadership of the
government committee responsible for moving the peace process
forward as less than helpful. He said National Security
Council Secretary General Siripong Boonpat was a major
stumbling block; Siripong had a simplistic view of the
situation and characterized all the militants as terrorists.
He wanted nothing to do with the talks and did not fund
government efforts to facilitate them.


5. (S) The political vacuum in Bangkok also was taking a toll
on the talks, according to Vatikiotis. The lack of movement
on confidence building measures has caused the movement to
begin questioning the government's credibility. He said
movement leaders on the ground had agreed to a halt in
operations in Yala for one month if the RTG agreed to release
some prisoners, but nothing had happened (reftel C). General
Anupong had refused to give the green light for the prisoner
release because he had no political guidance on the issue,
the same obstacle to a proposed "peace zone" in the South
(reftel A). Now, Vatikiotis lamented, no one is in charge.
"We are back to where we were a year ago."

Virasakdi brings the opposition onboard
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6. (S) On a positive note, Vatikiotis said the peace process
was not as secret as it had once been, and that opposition
Democrat Party MPs were now briefed on the dialogue. Foreign
Ministry Permanent Secretary Virasakdi Futrakul had reached
out to Vatikiotis, worried that the Democrat Party might try
to reinvent the wheel. Virasakdi requested Vatikiotis brief
the leader of the opposition, Abhisit Vejjajiva, to ensure
there was a unified approach to the situation and everyone
was "on the same page." Vatikiotis briefed Abhisit, who was
fully supportive, agreeing that there must be a political
solution to the insurgency, or it would never end.

Keeping the movement on-board
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7. (S) Vatikiotis did not think it likely that the insurgents
would walk away from the negotiations, regardless of the
political turmoil in Bangkok, because they had a strong stake
in the continuation of the dialogue. He said there was no
unity among the insurgent leaders, and they were not well
organized. The movement was not on its last legs, however.
The dialogue had benefited the movement by helping the
insurgents consolidate - they generally did not trust each
other, but now they were coming together more. They were
becoming more engaged in the talks, with greater involvement
from both religious leaders and "field commanders."


8. (S) Vatikiotis said he was trying to find ways to work
around the vacuum in political leadership that was plaguing
the process. He was currently focused on exploring a "track
two process" to bring a wider circle of people into a broad
discourse on the range of political issues that affect the
South. He said the goal would be to build support among this
wider group of stakeholders for a political settlement. HDC
would stay out of this separate track; Vatikiotis mentioned a
possible Norwegian interlocutor to move it forward.


9. (S) According to Vatikiotis, the insurgents taking part in
the process would settle for some type of special autonomy.
He said the problem with this was figuring out how to allow
for this kind of special political status under the Thai
constitution. He said that an academic working on this
problem believed that the closest thing to a special

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political status they could hope for under the current
constitution would be the establishment of a separate
Ministry for southern Thailand, with a "Southern Minister"
drawn from the group of elected southern MPs. While this
idea had merit, Vatikiotis stressed it would not meet one of
the basic demands for autonomy - an elected governor.

The fight drags on
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10. (S) Regarding the situation on the ground in the south,
Vatikiotis said the movement's leaders told him that the
army,s security grid had become tighter and more efficient.
He did not believe, however, that insurgent capabilities had
been significantly degraded. He said the leaders of the
insurgency told him that they had changed their tactics in
response to the army,s changes; they were staging fewer
attacks, but more confrontational and with a higher impact.
Vatikiotis admitted that the RKK "phenomena" was something
participants in the last round of meetings in the dialogue
process were trying to come to grips with. Without being
more specific, he said the insurgent leadership could not
control all the RKK cells. (Note: The RKK, or Runda Kumpulan
Kecil, is a name the RTG has given to commando-like cells
associated with insurgent groups. The command and control of
RKK cells remains unclear. End note.)

A role for outsiders: education
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11. (S) Vatikiotis said there may be a role for outsiders in
the conflict; he believed the RTG had become more open to
overtures of help. He said there was a clear need for
assistance on the educational front; he was often asked by
southern Thai Malay Muslims if there were a way to break the
cycle in education that too often forced kids from the south
to attend school in Middle Eastern countries because funding
from Islamic foundations was the only money available to
them. They receive degrees in religious studies, and then
return to the South to take low paying jobs like taxi drivers
and laborers. Vatikiotis said he did not have the impression
this kind of education had led to involvement with
extremists, but it did lead to a dead-end. Malay Muslims
wanted their children to be professionals -- doctors,
lawyers, etc., but had been forced to adopt limited horizons
because of limited educational opportunities. He believed
students would jump at the chance to learn English and gain
access to a different educational system.
JOHN