SAMAK UNDERCUT FOR REELECTION AS THAI PM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002778

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: SAMAK UNDERCUT FOR REELECTION AS THAI PM

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (C) One day after the People's Power Party (PPP) decided
to support former Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej for
reelection as Prime Minister, leading PPP figures engineered
a postponement (to September 17) of the vote. These PPP
officials sought to buy time to persuade Samak that he should
decline the opportunity to return to his former office. A
close ally of Samak told the Ambassador he hoped Samak would
step aside, but he was unsure what Samak would do. Former
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is reportedly helping from
abroad to shape PPP's policies, although his influence may be
waning, according to Thaksin loyalists. The Ambassador held
a series of private meetings with PPP leaders on September 11
and 12 to get a readout on the PM selection process. He also
continued to tell his interlocutors that the current
political stalemate is an internal Thai matter, but it should
be resolved in a peaceful and legal manner. Army Commander
Anupong publicly expressed support for the idea of forming a
government of national unity, according to media reporting.


2. (C) Comment: The political situation remains fluid; no
single figure seems able to control events. We take at face
value the accounts of Samak's determination to regain his
former office, but we cannot predict how he will react to
continued pressure from PPP factions and the party's
coalition partners. Should Samak decide to step aside, it is
unclear who would emerge to replace him. End Summary and
Comment.

PPP OFFERS SAMAK SUPPORT...
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3. (C) The Ambassador met separately on September 11 with two
close allies of former Prime Minister Thaksin: former House
Speaker Yongyuth Tiyapairath, and former Transportation
Minister Pongsak Ruktapongpisal. Both explained that a
majority of People's Power Party (PPP) MPs preferred that
former Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej not return to office.
They viewed Samak as unable to lead Thailand effectively and
unable to defuse the current crisis sparked by the People's
Alliance for Democracy takeover of Government House. Samak
received significant support from Thaksin ally Newin
Chidchob, however; Newin informally leads what most people
estimate to be the largest faction within PPP, and his
position appeared to prevail in intra-PPP deliberation on
September 11.


4. (C) Despite this PPP determination to offer support for
Samak's reelection, Yongyuth and former Thai Rak Thai Acting
Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng met with Samak for over two
hours on September 11 to try to persuade him that he ought
not to lead Thailand at this time. Yongyuth subsequently
told the Ambassador that Samak repeatedly insisted he
deserved to reprise his role as Prime Minister. (Note:
Although the Constitutional Court recently determined Samak
had to vacate office because he had violated a constitutional
provision regarding conflicts of interest, that ruling did
not bar Samak's reelection as PM. End Note.)

... THEN UNDERCUTS HIS REELECTION
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5. (C) In a September 12 call on the Ambassador, Justice
Minister (and PPP Deputy Leader) Sompong Amornwiwat explained
that PPP felt duty-bound to offer support for Samak, who had
played a critical role in founding the party in the wake of
the dissolution of Thai Rak Thai. Sompong said Thai cultural
norms made it extraordinarily difficult for the party to cast
aside the man who had fought ardently for PPP from the
party's birth, led it to victory in the 2007 election, and
then headed the government for seven months. Samak was owed
a measure of respect and should be given a face-saving way to
step down.


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6. (C) Sompong lamented that, instead of using PPP's public
show of support to gracefully step aside, Samak seemed
determined to return as PM, even though PPP's coalition
partners, the country's elite, and even members of Samak's
own family preferred that someone else lead the government.
Sompong explained that, in order to buy time for Samak to
change his mind, Sompong and like-minded politicians were
directing MPs from the governing coalition not to attend the
House session scheduled to elect the Prime Minister.
Sompong's efforts proved successful; lacking a quorum, the
House leadership rescheduled the session for Wednesday,
September 17.


7. (C) Sompong admitted that PPP could not wait too long to
elect a new PM, however. He said that PPP's coalition
partners were currently willing to defer to PPP to select its
nominee as PM. Should this process prove drawn out, and a
PPP leadership vacuum appear, the other parties' allegiance
could waver.

SAMAK ALLY HOPES HE'LL STEP ASIDE
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8. (C) The Ambassador met September 12 with Deputy Prime
Minister Sahas Bunditkul, one of the few political figures
who owes his primary allegiance to Samak rather than to
Thaksin or other former Thai Rak Thai figures. Sahas
explained Samak's perspective on the crisis, saying that it
would be undemocratic (and a bad precedent) for PPP to allow
the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) to push an elected
leader out of office. Nevertheless, Sahas hoped that Samak
would reconsider his decision and realize the time was not
right for Samak to return as PM. Sahas said he could not
predict what Samak would do, however.

THAKSIN'S ROLE
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador's interlocutors indicated that former
PM Thaksin, despite his flight to London and his public
renunciation of politics, was involved in the deliberation
over PPP's selection of the next Prime Minister. Sompong
claimed that he had spoken with Thaksin during the week of
September 1-5, and Thaksin at that time expressed support for
Samak because of Samak's role in founding the PPP. Pongsak
told the Ambassador that Samak had recently phoned Thaksin to
request his support, and Thaksin had pointed out the risks to
PPP's popularity if Samak returned to office but deferred to
Samak to make his own determination.


10. (C) Both Pongsak and Yongyuth told the Ambassador that
they had been in contact with Thaksin on September 11. They
claimed Thaksin was extremely frustrated with Samak's refusal
to step aside, and that Thaksin had found he could not
control Samak. According to Yongyuth, Thaksin was losing his
influence in Thailand; his political network was
deteriorating and he had significantly less money at his
disposal to support his allies. Indeed, he sold his
Manchester City Premier League soccer team in August because
he was in desperate need of cash.

ARMY COMMANDER DISCUSSES NEW GOVERNMENT
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11. (C) On September 11, Army Commander Anupong Paojinda, who
has consistently said the Army would not intervene in
political matters, told reporters that he considered the best
solution to the current standoff to be the formation of a
government of national unity (one including all political
parties). He acknowledged, however, that such a government
might prove difficult to form.

AMBASSADOR RESTATES USG POSITION
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12. (C) The Ambassador continued to explain to his
interlocutors that the USG viewed the resolution of the
current standoff as an internal Thai matter. However, he

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stressed that any solution should be both peaceful and legal,
and that the USG would oppose any effort to impose a solution
incompatible with Thailand's constitution.
JOHN