Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK2619
2008-09-03 10:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAILAND: SENIOR STATESMEN SEEKING THE KING'S

Tags:  PGOV PREL TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
S E C R E T BANGKOK 02619
CXBKKSVR:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: DATTLO AMB CHRON DAO DCM SA RSO

DISSEMINATION: POL1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:EJOHN
DRAFTED: POL:GKENT
CLEARED: DCM:JFENTWISTLE

VZCZCBKI306
OO RUEHC RUEHCHI RUEKJCS RHHMUNA RHEFDIA RUEAIIA
RHEHNSC
DE RUEHBK #2619/01 2471014
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031014Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4197
INFO RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 5569
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002619 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: SENIOR STATESMEN SEEKING THE KING'S
APPROVAL TO PUSH ASIDE PM SAMAK

REF: BANGKOK 2610

Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002619

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: SENIOR STATESMEN SEEKING THE KING'S
APPROVAL TO PUSH ASIDE PM SAMAK

REF: BANGKOK 2610

Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (S) Summary: Ambassador saw Privy Councilor ACM Siddhi
Savetsila September 3 to discuss the current political
impasse and Siddhi's views on the way forward. Siddhi laid
out a scenario which he said he would present to King
Bhumiphol in an audience at the Hua Hin Palace later in the
evening September 3. In short: PM Samak had to go. The best
replacement would be former PM Anand Panyarachun, bolstered
by "honest" figures to "rehabilitate democracy." The House
and Senate would stay in place; the Constitution would also
remain but needed to be amended to allow non-elected MP
figures to serve in the Cabinet. Ambassador repeatedly
stressed that any action in Thailand needed to stay within
the constitutional framework, and that the U.S. would react
negatively to developments which amounted to an
extra-constitutional coup. Anand subsequently confirmed to
Ambassador that he had been involved in related discussions
for the past week, but he refused to be involved "before the
fact," and would only discuss terms of any possible role
afterwards, focused on the least impact on the contents of
Thai democracy.


2. (S) Comment: Confirmation that a trusted Privy Councilor
and long-time friend of the U.S. is on his way to seek King
Bhumiphol's approval for the above scheme is disturbing news.
Siddhi suggested that matters might come to a head in the
next 48 hours (In a separate Sept. 3 converation with
Ambassador, Defense Ministry PermSec Winai said there could
be some "good signs" this evening). That said, Siddhi freely
acknowledged three crucial pieces to the plan are not yet in
place, and might not fall into place: first and foremost, the
King's assent; second, Anand has not yet agreed to
participate; third, Army Commander Anuphong, probably the
only person who could deliver the necessary message to Samak,
had so far refused to tell Samak it was time to go. We will
continue to press our message of staying within the
constitutional framework to all parties involved. Anand took
Ambassador's message on board, but made clear he did not
agree with the U.S. perspective. End Summary and Comment.

Samak has to go
--------------


3. (S) Privy Councilor ACM Siddhi Savetsila made clear to

Ambassador Sept. 3 that he viewed Thaksin and, by extension,
PM Samak as an existential threat to the Thailand he
supported, centered on the monarchy. Samak had lost his
legitimacy, beset by multiple court cases and the violence in
the streets of Udon Thani and Bangkok against civilians. The
only way out of the current political impasse was for Samak
to resign or the House to dissolve. But Samak refused to
leave; he had lied to coalition partners about his August 30
audience with the King, had dismissed Opposition Leader
Abhisit's suggestion during the August 31 parliamentary
debate to call new elections which pro-Thaksin forces would
win again, and had even rejected his own wife's and
daughter's prostrate entreaties to resign for the good of the
country. Samak therefore had to go.


4. (S) Stressing that Ambassador was the only foreigner he
would share the information with, Siddhi laid out a scenario
which he said he would present to King Bhumiphol later in the
day in an audience for the Privy Councilors in Hua Hin. The
solution was not by using force but to rehabilitate Thai
democracy. The same Constitution would remain, amended to
allow outsiders (non-MPs) to serve in the Cabinet. The House
and Senate would stay. Universally respected former PM Anand
should serve as the leader of the "project," which would
involve respected, "honest" ex-military and Ministry of
Interior officials, academics, one or two PAD members, and
perhaps some Democrat Party figures. The mandate would be to
initiate a wide array of reforms in the economic, social, and
political sphere. That in turn would "weed out" the bane
effects of Thaksinism from the system. Army Commander
Anuphong would have to deliver the message to Samak; no one
else could.

Who is behind the effort and why?
--------------


5. (S) Siddhi said that a group of prominent figures had
approached him with the plan, more than could fit in his
modest living room. The only one he named was Pramote
Nakorntab, a retired respected professor and political
scientist from Chulalongkorn University; others included a
high ranking Air Force officer and a Constitutional Court
Judge. Since, as a Privy Councilor, he was not supposed to
be involved in politics, only in advising the King, Siddhi
agreed to meet "as a former military leader" ready to do his
best for the country. He was willing to push forward and
present the project to the King in part to shield Privy
Council Chair Prem Titsulanonda, who had been heavily and
unjustly criticized for backing the PAD and trying to promote
a Democrat Party-led government. The stakes were high; it
was essential to rehabilitate the democratic system in
Thailand. "If we lose, Thaksin will come back, and if Thaksin
comes back, the monarchy will be lost," Siddhi explained.


6. (S) Siddhi acknowledged that neither Anand nor Anuphong
were on board yet. Anand said he would need to review a
proposal in detail before accepting. Even though Anuphong
thought Samak must go, Siddhi said Anuphong was reluctant to
push in part because he disliked the PAD, especially leaders
Sondhi and Chamlong. Siddhi said he had challenged Anuphong
- was he prepared to lose his principles in support of the
monarchy because he did not like 3-4 people? Most
importantly, it was up to the King to indicate what he
thought of the plan. Siddhi would brief; the King would stay
aloof, but provide his reaction. "What will happen will
happen."


7. (S) Ambassador repeatedly emphasized U.S. concerns with
non-elected systems of governance; the U.S. could not condone
any extra-constitutional change in government in Thailand,
since it would amount to a coup by another name. Ambassador
urged Siddhi to explore alternatives within the
constitutional framework: caretaker government prior to snap
elections; reconfigured coalition with a different PM; or a
national unity cabinet involving the Democrats. Leaders in a
democracy needed to be elected.


8. (S) Siddhi demurred, and said that Samak simply would not
listen to anyone. Ambassador stressed that PAD leader Sondhi
was just as stubborn as Samak, but that it was imperative to
push for a dialogue to begin to seek a political resolution
to the political crisis.

Anand more forthcoming the second time
--------------


9. (S) Ambassador engaged Anand after the Siddhi meeting for
the second time in 24 hours. More forthcoming this time than
on September 2 (reftel),Anand acknowledged he had been
listening to the group for the past week, but refused to get
involved directly in anything before the plan was put into
action. If the plan went forward, he was prepared to meet
with them at that point. It was imperative to ensure the
least impact on the contents of Thai democracy; even in the
case of non-elected persons of supposed quality, care needed
to be taken. Anand claimed that "I'm always my own man," and
that he had turned down many positions offered when he
thought others sought to control him.


10. (S) Ambassador underscored the critical importance of
developments in Thailand staying within the framework of the
constitution and rule of law; if that did not occur, the U.S.
would respond accordingly. Anand replied that he had
disagreed with the U.S. reaction to the 2006 coup and
frequently disagreed with western views of what constituted
democracy in various countries.
JOHN