Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK2610
2008-09-02 12:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

MIDNIGHT BANGKOK CLASH LEADS TO EMERGENCY DECREE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6273
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 8975
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4848
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RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2380
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 5564
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002610 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: MIDNIGHT BANGKOK CLASH LEADS TO EMERGENCY DECREE

REF: A. BANGKOK2593 (POLICE UNABLE TO TAKE CONTROL)

B. BANGKOK 2575 (WARRANTS BUT NO ARRESTS)

C. BANGKOK 2555 (POLICE AND PAD COEXIST)

D. BANGKOK 2546 (PAD PROTESTS CHALLENGE PM SAMAK)

E. BANGKOK 2405 (TENSIONS ESCALATE AT STREET
PROTESTS)

BANGKOK 00002610 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002610

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: MIDNIGHT BANGKOK CLASH LEADS TO EMERGENCY DECREE

REF: A. BANGKOK2593 (POLICE UNABLE TO TAKE CONTROL)

B. BANGKOK 2575 (WARRANTS BUT NO ARRESTS)

C. BANGKOK 2555 (POLICE AND PAD COEXIST)

D. BANGKOK 2546 (PAD PROTESTS CHALLENGE PM SAMAK)

E. BANGKOK 2405 (TENSIONS ESCALATE AT STREET
PROTESTS)

BANGKOK 00002610 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: After a desultory 12 hour parliamentary
debate on the ongoing political crisis ended without
resolution after midnight early on September 1, action
returned to the streets in the early hours of September 2.
Violence erupted between pro and anti government street
factions near the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) rally
site at Makkhawan Bridge, resulting in one death and some 40
injured. In response, Prime Minister Samak invoked an
emergency decree at 0700, appointing Royal Thai Army (RTA)
Commander Anuphong to be in charge of restoring order. With
rumors of potential coups once again winding up the Bangkok
rumint mill, and a general strike by state enterprise unions
called for September 3, Anuphong gave a reassuring press
conference mid-afternoon regarding the minimalist role he
planned for the army, and reinforced it in private with
Ambassador: he would create enough security space for a
political solution; there would be no coup. Ambassador also
raised U.S. concerns with Parliamentary Opposition leader
Abhisit and elder statesman Anand and reiterated our message
to the media: we are listening to all sides while stressing
the need to resolve the crisis peacefully, within the
constitution, and upholding the rule of law.


2. (C) Comment: It is encouraging that as stable a hand as
Anuphong's is on the rudder as Thailand sails through
increasingly choppy waters, but it is unclear what political
resolution might be in the offing in the face of the current
deadlock. To have successful talks, both sides must be
willing to listen and engage, and we agree with former PM
Anand that Samak neither listens nor engages. Most

indications are that Samak's People's Power Party (PPP)
intentionally set loose their own street gang, known as the
United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD),to
create the bloody incident early September 2 that led to the
Emergency Decree. With cynical manipulators on both sides --
PAD and UDD/PPP -- willing to shed the blood of their own
foot soldiers and tactically seek out conflict for strategic
advantage, the September 2 clash will likely not be the last.
We will continue to emphasize our core message to all
parties in the coming days. End Summary and Comment.

There Will Be Blood
--------------

3. (SBU) A street brawl erupted shortly after 1 am September
2 between supporters of the PAD and its pro-government UDD
rival (Note: UDD is sometimes referred to as DAAD -
Democratic Alliance Against Dictatorship),leading to one
fatality and 44 injuries. An eye-witness told us that police
put almost no resistance when the UDD group, armed with metal
pipes and traveling via truck and motorcycles from their
initial Sanam Luang rally point, approached two lines of
police that separated them from the PAD's Makkhawan Bridge
rally point. Media eyewitnesses identified several MPs from
the ruling PPP party coordinating movements of the UDD group.
PAD supporters, with wooden wood clubs and other weapons,
then converged on the UDD once they had passed through the
police lines. The witness told us that the UDD demonstrators
retreated once gunshots were heard; both sides later denied
they were responsible.


4. (U) After two hours of consultations with security chiefs,
Prime Minister Samak Sundaravet declared a state of emergency
in Bangkok the morning of Sept. 2. The emergency decree
restricts public gatherings "for unlawful purposes" of more
than five people or dissemination of news likely to panic the
public or instigate violence, and bans unauthorized entry to
government facilities. Samak appointed RTA Commander
Anuphong to head the emergency decree enforcement team, with
DPM/Minister of Interior Kowit Wattana and First Regional
Army Commander Prayuth Chanocha as his deputies. The decree

BANGKOK 00002610 002.2 OF 003


also gives Anuphong the authority to shut down roads as he
sees fit. A subsequent MFA briefing (below) clarified this
proviso would only be invoked if demonstrators started to
enter Bangkok from the countryside.

MFA explains the Decree
--------------

5. (C) MFA PermSec Virasakdi Futrakul briefed the DCM and
other members of the diplomatic corps late Sept. 2 about the
state of emergency declaration. Virasakdi stressed that the
declaration was permitted by the constitution and that all
actions taken would conform to the rule of law. The Cabinet
had approved the declaration, which would be in force for
three months unless rescinded once the conflict had been
resolved. The government's goal in declaring the state of
emergency was to prevent further violence and maintain a
buffer between pro- and anti- government supporters.
Viraskadi stressed that the declaration would only be in
force in certain districts of Bangkok.


6. (C) Virasakdi said that the army's only role under the
state of emergency would be in support of the police and
would only utilize unarmed troops who had been trained as
peacekeepers. Soldiers would wear body armor and carry
shields for protection. Virasakdi said the Ministry of
Interior was working with provincial governors to try to
convince people from coming to Bangkok to join one of the two
sides in the conflict. He also said discussions would be
ongoing tonight with the state enterprises to attempt to
resolve the threatened strikes.

The prelude to violence
--------------

7. (U) The newly explosive events came after a relatively
quiet weekend marked by what observers called fruitless
parliamentary debate August 31 on ending the crisis. Buoyed
by a coalition expression of confidence in his leadership, PM
Samak rejected a call by Democrat Party Abhisit Vejjajiva to
dissolve the House to end the political crisis during the
marathon 12 hour joint session of the House and Senate.
Abhisit claimed that an election would put the Democrat Party
at a disadvantage, but the prime minister needed to take
responsibility for the current problems. Samak refused,
replying that House dissolution would be victory for the PAD.


8. (U) The early Sept. 2 clash followed a small explosion
inside a police booth near the Makkhawan Bridge 24 hours
earlier, at 1:15 am Sept. 1. Nobody was inside the booth
when the bomb exploded, but nearby windows were shattered.
PAD leadership immediately denied responsibility for the
bombing, with Chamlong Srimuang claiming the bomb was
designed to "paint a bad reputation of the PAD," and Somsak
Kosaiyasuk said he thought the bomb was intended to scare
people from joining the PAD rally.

Who sparked the latest clash?
--------------

9. (C) While we have no concrete evidence, there are several
indications that the ruling PPP may have been complicit in
the early Sept. 2 clash, goading their street fighters into
conflict in a similar dynamic which unfolded in Udon Thani in
July (ref E). An Australian diplomat told us that PPP MPs
canceled a series of scheduled meetings at the last moment
late September 1. Surasee Kosolnavin, Acting Commissioner of
the National Human Rights Commission, told us Sept. 2 that
PPP members had summoned Khon Rak Udon (KRU) members (Ref E)
to Bangkok to confront the PAD. He said that clash involved
KRU members who were led by impeached Human Rights
Commissioner Charan Dittha-aphichai and two other PPP
members; Nation journalist Kavi Chongkittavorn made the same
allegation. Various media observers on the scene identified
several PPP MPs from Si Sa Ket and Nakhon Ratchasima
coordinating the UDD movement from Sanam Luang to Makkhawan
Bridge. Palace liaison officer Anuporn Kashemsant alleged to
us that ministers had been involved; PAD cited deputy
Transportation Minister Songsak Thongsri as a guilty party.


10. (C) Surasee said he believed that the Samak government
was aware of the movement of KRU members to Bangkok and

BANGKOK 00002610 003.2 OF 003


confirmed the report that police had not made an effort to
prevent the violence; Deputy Police Commissioner Chong
Rakchuthanon had allowed them to march freely. Surasee cited
the July 24 Udon rally as the model of pro-government thugs
acting in complicity with police as model replayed in
Bangkok.

A hot and dry day to come, or something more serious?
-------------- --------------


11. (U) Even before the latest clash, the State Enterprise
Union Confederation (SEUC),with 43 unions and 200,000
members, announced a general strike for September 3 in
support of the PAD's announced goal of bringing down the
government. They threatened to cut water and electricity to
all government buildings and suspend most bus service in
Bangkok. Thai Airways unions announced a work slowdown for
the same day.


12. (C) Army General Anuphong, who in recent weeks has
thrown cold water publicly and privately on suggestions of a
possible coup, reiterated that message in a Sept. 2 press
conference and a subsequent joint meeting with Ambassador and
UK Ambassador Quayle. The Ambassadors expressed regret for
the imposition of a state of emergency, stressed the need to
respect Thailand's constitution and democratic institutions,
underscored the damage another coup would have for Thailand's
international reputation, tourism, and investment climate,
and warned the US and UK would be bound to impose measures in
response, as we had in 2006.


13. (C) Anuphong gave assurances that he shared the same
perspective; there would be no coup. He explained that he
defined his role under the decree as providing enough
security and space for a political resolution to the crisis.
He planned for minimal involvement of the army; the police
bore the chief responsibility of keeping order in the
streets.

14. (C) Ambassador underscored the same U.S. message in
subsequent meetings with Democrat Party Leader Abhisit
Vejjajiva, the leader of the parliamentary opposition, and
former PM Anand Panyarachun. Both agreed that a coup was not
the answer to Thailand's current political impasse, but both
seemed at wit's end to come up with political ways forward
out of the impasse. Anand said that there needed to be a
truce before negotiations could begin, but that Samak was
inclined neither to listen nor to engage, making a negotiated
solution a tall order. Abhisit claimed that, after the
middle of the night violence which he alleged was
orchestrated by the PPP, his parliamentary debate suggestion
that Samak dissolve parliament and call new elections might
not be enough, since that would leave Samak in place as
acting PM in the 60 day interim, and many people now felt
Samak must go.


15. (C) Earlier Sept. 2, Human Rights Commissioner Surasee
had told us that his military contacts had suggested a plan
was in the works to seek royal authorization for an action to
replace Samak with former PM Anand, who played a similar role
in 1991 and again in 1992. It would not be a real coup, his
contacts claimed, since the constitution would stay largely
intact, though needing an amendment to allow non-MP Anand to
serve as PM. Anand acknowledged to Ambassador that he had
received many visitors in recent days, including some who had
sought to involve him in the current drama; Anand claimed he
resisted such efforts and kept his distance. At the end of
the conversation, however, Anand circled back to the issue
unbidden: "I cannot rule out regime change, but it would not
be a traditional coup d'etat." "A coup is bad idea in any
form," Ambassador replied. Anand nodded.


16. (U) Note: After the Abhisit meeting, Ambassador
underscored our policy to the media waiting outside: we were
listening to the views of all parties; we were passing the
same message to all: the current situation needed to be
resolved by Thais in a peaceful manner, within the
constitution, and upholding the rule of law.
JOHN