SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL BOONSRANG'S COUNTERPART

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 002591

SIPDIS

JCS FOR CHASE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS PINS PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL BOONSRANG'S COUNTERPART
VISIT WITH CJCS ADMIRAL MULLEN

Classified By: Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Embassy Bangkok is extremely appreciative
that General Boonsrang Niumpradit will be able to conduct a
counterpart visit with CJCS Admiral Mullen. The visit will
reinforce the importance of Thailand to our regional security
interests as the United States and Thailand celebrate 175
years of relations. It will be an opportunity to underscore
the United States Government's commitment to working with a
democratically-elected Thai government and to working with
the Thai military on issues of mutual importance. End
Summary.

BOONSRANG - WEST POINT GRADUATE MAKES GOOD
--------------


2. (C) General Boonsrang attended West Point and maintains
close ties with senior U.S. military officers and classmates
from other countries. He attended Norwich University prior
to West Point and also received an MS from MIT and a PhD from
the Asian Institute of Technology. General Boonsrang has
consistently been receptive to USG initiatives and has been
provided a calm, reasoned voice during recent political
conflicts. He ably led the UN Mission in East Timor for a
year, was a strong advocate for Thai participation in both
Afghanistan and Iraq, and was a key player in the RTG pledge
of an infantry battalion for the Darfur peacekeeping force.
General Boonsrang was critical to engineering Thai acceptance
of the Defense Resource Management Study, pushing for the
project to spur Thai defense reform and transformation. He
was also the proponent for the creation of a strategic
studies center that he views as a complement to the
Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies.

THE OVERALL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
--------------


3. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over
fifty years of close cooperation. Thai soldiers, sailors and
airmen participated in the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts,
and Thai troops served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Prior to
coup sanctions, Thailand was the fourth largest participant
in the U.S. International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program. Thailand's willingness to allow the United
States to use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our
regional tsunami assistance program was key to making
Operation Unified Assistance a success and greatly assisted
relief flights to southern Burma which began after the recent
devastating cyclone. Utapao remains vital to our interests
in the region and is accessed by close to nine hundred
flights annually, primarily in support of operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan.

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
--------------


4. (C) Bilateral relations with Thailand are very good, and
we are optimistic that this will be the case going forward.
Post-coup restrictions on our military engagement were lifted
February 6 and the RTG has continued to signal its desire for
a close mil-mil relationship. The goodwill generated by
America's quick and massive response to the December 26, 2004
tsunami was palpable. Thailand is a Treaty Ally, has been
firmly supportive of the War on Terror, and has participated
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF),which led President Bush to declare Thailand a
Major Non-NATO Ally in his October 2003 visit to Thailand.
American businesses have over $23 billion in direct
investment in Thailand and the United States is Thailand's
single largest export market and its second-largest foreign
investor, after Japan.


5. (C) Responding to last year's recent crackdown in Burma,
then-Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont used his appearance at
the UN General Assembly to criticize publicly the Burmese
regime's actions in a manner that we viewed as constructive.
In general, however, the Thai bureaucracy, and especially the
military, fears instability in Burma will spill over across
Thailand's border where Thailand currently accounts for over
140,000 refugees from Burma held in detention camps along the
Thai-Burmese border. Thailand relies on Burma for thirty
percent of its energy imports as well. These factors incline
Thailand to want to preserve the status quo. We believe it

will be necessary to keep pushing the RTG on Burma so it does
not allow commercial ties or concepts of ASEAN solidarity to
overshadow human rights concerns.


6. (C) The Thai government sees refugee issues as a security
matter and has assigned the National Security Council as the
lead policy agency on the issue. Most of the 140,000 Burmese
refugees stay in nine official camps along the border. The
RTG has allowed a large-scale US resettlment program, and
about 13,000 Burmese will enter the US from Thailand this
fiscal year. However, about 6,100 Lao Hmong are kept in a
Royal Thai Army-run facility in northern Petchaboon province.
The Thai have set up an internal, non-transparent screening
process for this vulnerable group, which may include
individuals (and their descendants) who assisted the U.S.
during the Indochina war. We are uncertain, however, whether
the Thai screening process will meet international standards;
the Thai have refused to allow UNHCR to play any role in
these refugee determinations. We believe that a portion of
the group, but not a majority, may have a legitimate claim to
refugee status and could face harsh treatment by the Lao
government if returned. We want to take every opportunity to
underscore to the RTG the importance of providing
international standards of protection to those who might have
a well-founded fear of return. Thailand is also the
preferred interim destination for a small number of North
Korean asylum seekers who wish to resettle in the U.S.

MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM
--------------


7. (C) Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for
exercises unique in Asia. Thailand offers the United States
military good base infrastructure, large areas in which our
aircraft and ground forces can conduct unrestricted, though
not unilateral, operations, and access to bombing ranges --
all in short supply in Asia. Located near strategic maritime
choke points and having good liberty ports, Thailand also has
the potential to play a greater role in U.S. naval planning.
Perhaps due to their lack of a colonial heritage, Thai
leaders are far more willing to host multilateral exercises
than are other countries in Asia. Unlike Japan, which only
hosts annual bilateral exercises due to legal prohibitions
over collective security, or Australia, which avoids
multilateral exercises so as not to "dumb down" its own
training opportunities, the Royal Thai Government supports
multilateral exercises as a way to show regional leadership.
This has allowed us to use our exercises in Thailand to
further key U.S. objectives, such as supporting Japan's
growing military role in Asia and engaging the TNI. In 2008
we completed the first multi-lateral FTX phase of the major
JCS-directed COBRA GOLD exercise, in addition to CPX and
UNPKF pieces.

REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY
--------------


8. (C) As part of an effort funded by Section 1206 of the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, we worked closely
with PACOM and Embassies Manila, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and
Colombo to develop regional maritime security architecture to
improve communications, domain awareness, and intercept
capabilities in the waters surrounding Southeast Asia. The
Thai portion of the initiative, approved by Congress but
suspended as part of coup sanctions, was a layered approach
to assist the Thai military secure territorial waters while
also providing coverage of the northern shipping lanes
feeding into the Strait of Malacca. Encouragingly, on
January 23 the Thai Cabinet earmarked funding to support
maritime patrols in conjunction with Malaysia, Singapore, and
Indonesia in the Straits of Malacca beginning October 1 this
year. We intend to work closely with the Thai government on
maritime security.

PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS
--------------


9. (C) Thailand has been an active contributor in
peacekeeping missions, best known for General Boonsrang and
General Winai Phattiyakul, the Ministry of Defense Permanent
Secretary, leading the UNTAET force in East Timor. The Thai
government last year committed to deploying a battalion of
peacekeeping troops to Darfur, but the Government of Sudan
has so far refused to agree to allow the United Nations to

include Thailand as troop contributing country for UNAMID.
The Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters also has ambitious
plans to develop a regional peacekeeping operations center.

DEFENSE REFORM
--------------


10. (C) General Boonsrang has been a key proponent of defense
reform and was the driver for Thailand's acceptance of the
Defense Resource Management Study (DRMS). The Thai military
leadership approved DRMS Phase Two, which is intended to
design and adopt better resource management processes.
Additionally, on 20 December 2007 (just three days shy of the
national election) the interim National Legislative Assembly
passed the Ministry of Defense Reform Act. This act includes
many articles to make the Thai military more joint in nature
and provide increased influence for the Royal Thai Armed
Forces Headquarters over the component services. However,
the implementation of this act may only cause superficial
changes to the overall military system instead of providing
for needed far-reaching reforms in budgeting, procurements,
government oversights, and overall military capabilities.

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY
--------------


11. (C) The Royal Thai Army (RTA) is a legacy force faced
with serious modernization issues. The RTA is still
primarily designed to defeat the large conventional threat
that Vietnam represented in the mid-1980's. On paper, the
RTA would seem to possess the capability to defeat a large
conventional attack -- however, it is plagued by an almost
universally low operational readiness rate.


12. (C) Much of this decline in effectiveness is due to the
budget constraints that were imposed from 1997-2001 after the
Asian Financial Crisis. Since that time, budgets have
increased slightly, but not to pre-1997 levels. Increasing
the military budget shortfall was a key focus of the interim
government, allowing all the services to improve their
capabilities. The increase in the military's budget, during
a period of economic uncertainty, was controversial, but
resulted in RTA purchase of South African REVA 'V-hulled' 4x4
troop transport vehicles, Israeli rifles, and the planned
purchase of Ukrainian armored personnel carriers.


13. (C) While the RTA has a long history working with the
U.S. Army, recently we have also been working with MARFORPAC
and III MEF to improve links between the U.S Marine Corps and
the RTA. In many ways, our Marines are perfect training
partners for the RTA, and field exercises in Thailand afford
our Marines many opportunities they do not have elsewhere in
Asia.

THE NAVAL RELATIONSHIP
--------------


14. (C) Our overall links with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) are
good, but the relationship languished during the post-coup
period in which USN ship visits ceased. Prior to the coup,
we were working closely with the RTN on potential projects
like the 1206 Andaman Sea Maritime Security Initiative and
worked with PACFLT and Seventh Fleet to increase the tempo of
U.S. Navy ship visits. U.S. aircraft carrier and other ship
visits have been well received by the RTN, received front
page and prime time media coverage, and were successful
opportunities to demonstrate the benefits of the U.S.-Thai
security relationship. Recently, the Chinese have improved
their ties to the RTN as mentioned above. Likewise, the RTN
has been developing a closer relationship with the Indian
Navy and has conducted some exercises with the Indians.


15. (C) Through our security assistance program we have been
working to develop a closer relationship with the RTN by
engaging them at every opportunity. We have offered them EDA
items such as the S-3 aircraft, and are working with them to
consider U.S. military articles and services over that of
other countries like China. The RTN has responded positively
to our efforts despite budget limitations. Some of the
projects we are working with RTN include efforts to purchase
the SeaVue radar, support for P-3 aircraft, and increased FMS
funding in support of the Harpoon Weapon System. We also
expect the RTN to attempt to purchase two more MH-60
helicopters.



16. (C) In addition to supporting our annual Cooperation
Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise with Thailand,
JUSMAGTHAI has worked closely with RTN Special Warfare units
to increase their capacity. USN SEALS have helped to provide
their Thai counterparts with some impressive capabilities.
For instance, Thai SEALS regularly conduct exercises aimed at
protecting oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Thailand.
This NSW relationship was compellingly demonstrated during
the tsunami response when USN and RTN SEALS rapidly deployed
to Phuket to assist in the recovery efforts. The Prime
Minister was photographed in a recovery boat manned by the
SEALS. Despite their improved professionalism, the Thai
SEALS are not well-supported by senior RTN officials.

THE AIR FORCE RELATIONSHIP
--------------


17. (C) The RTAF has close ties to the USAF. Training in
F-16 and C-130 programs has established a solid history of
cooperation and shared expertise and experience. The annual
COPE TIGER flight training exercise among the United States,
Thailand and Singapore is the largest joint/combined air
combat exercise in Thailand. The RTAF recently purchased
Saab JAS-39C/D Gripen fighters and Saab 340 Erieye AWACS
aircraft to replace their F-5 fleet. The Gripen is fully
NATO compatible and will contain significant U.S. technology.
We are urging the RTAF to proceed with a Mid-Life Upgrade
for existing F-16A/B planes.

DEMOCRACY RESTORED BUT TENSIONS REMAIN
--------------


18. (SBU) Despite Thailand's peaceful transition to an
elected government earlier this year, underlying tensions
remain unresolved, and ongoing anti-government protests and
domestic political conflict continue to keep the Thai
government preoccupied. In 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra won an overwhelming majority in the parliament,
but was later accused of corruption, abuse of power, and
disrespect for the much-revered monarchy. In September 2006,
following months of political protests and legal battles that
led to a political stalemate over charges against Thaksin and
his party, the Thai army launched a coup d'etat which many
Thais accepted as a means to resolve the protracted political
crisis.


19. (C) The victory by the pro-Thaksin People's Power Party
(PPP) in the December 2007 election, however, marked a
setback for supporters of the coup. The PPP was able to form
a coalition government headed by its party leader, Samak
Sundaravej, a former Governor of Bangkok and Minister of
Interior. Tensions remain, as Thailand has yet to establish
a stable balance of political power among factions of the
urban elite and the rural population. Then-Prime Minister
Thaksin was abroad when the coup took place, and he remained
overseas until the PPP administration took power. Upon
return, Thaksin and his family faced a range of court cases
for abuse of power and corruption and Thaksin's wife was
convicted of tax evasion at the end of July. Thaksin and his
family fled in early August for the UK, and the former prime
minister alleged that the Thai judiciary was treating him
unfairly, that Thailand remained under the influence of the
"dictatorship" that took power after the 2006 coup d'etat,
and cited threats to his physical safety.


20. (C) The anti-government People's Alliance for Democracy
(PAD) staged a mass demonstration in Bangkok and strategic
points around the country August 26 in a what was claimed to
be a final show-down with the government of Samak.
Protesters occupied the grounds of Government House, forcing
the Prime Minister to conduct business from the Royal Thai
Armed Forces Headquarters. The RTG has as of August 28
refrained from using force to clear the protesters despite
court orders to arrest the PAD leaders and for the protesters
to clear the Government House compound.

MILITARY QUIETLY IN THE BARRACKS
--------------


21. (C) Despite pre-election speculation about whether the
Royal Thai Army would tolerate a PPP administration, the Thai
military has refrained from an active role in the continuing
political drama. Samak appointed himself Defense Minister --

a civilian Defense Minister is rare but not unprecedented in
Thailand. The military has shown a willingness to work
cooperatively with Samak, and the Prime Minister has
apparently allowed the military much leeway in drafting the
important annual military reshuffle that will take effect
October 1. In a significant departure from 2006, there seems
now to be a widespread recognition that military-installed
governments have no special capability to resolve Thailand's
political problems. Army Commander Anupong Paochinda has
repeatedly confirmed, both privately and publicly, that he
has no intention of involving the Army in resolving the
political conflict.

SOUTHERN THAILAND
--------------


22. (C) Recent Thai governments have struggled to quell the
ethnic Malay Muslim-led insurgency in southern Thailand, a
region that has witnessed episodic violence since its
incorporation into Thailand in 1902. Regional violence has
claimed some 3000 lives since January 2004, when the
separatist movement accelerated attacks. The interim
government of Prime Minister Surayud made some attempts at
ending the violence through reconciliation, but a lack of
political support and preoccupation with the on-going
political crisis in Bangkok caused these efforts to stall.


23. (C) Since this round of violence erupted in 2004,
separatist attacks have become more complex and
sophisticated, in terms of tactics and use of Improvised
Explosive Devices. The root causes of the insurgency --
government neglect, human rights abuses, and a lack of social
justice, combined with a desire for some form of
self-determination, have not been addressed by any Thai
government to this point. The southern insurgency has not
yet been a priority for Samak's government, likely due the
ongoing political conflict. As such, the Thai military
remains the lead actor in trying to address the violence in
the South.


24. (C) Although there has not yet been evidence of Jemaah
Islamiyah involvement in Southern Thailand, JI has exploited
similar Muslim separatist and religious tensions in
Indonesia, and we remain concerned by the possibility that
southern unrest may attract international terrorist groups.


25. (C) Southern separatists direct their anger at the
government in Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a U.S.
presence or perception of U.S. involvement in the South could
redirect that anger towards us and link it to the
international jihadist movement -- a link that is currently
absent -- we ensure that any offers of assistance or training
pass the "location and label" test. Put simply, we keep U.S.
military personnel away from the far South, and we make sure
that we do not label any assistance or training as directly
linked to the southern situation. Likewise, we work to avoid
feeding rampant, outlandish speculation that we are somehow
fomenting the violence in the South in order to justify
building permanent bases -- a very sensitive issue in
Thailand. We do not want to jeopardize our access to key
military facilities in Thailand like Utapao Naval Air Station.


26. (C) The Embassy maintains a three-pronged focus to
improve our military cooperation in order to address the
violence in the South:
1) Using our exercise and training program to improve the
professional and operational skills of the Royal Thai Armed
Forces, especially the Thai Army;
2) Helping the Thai break down stovepipes between the Thai
military, police forces, and civilian agencies;
3) Doing everything we can to ensure the Thai respect
international human rights norms as they counter the violence.

THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION
--------------


27. (C) Southeast Asia continues to feel the rising influence
of China and India. While emphasizing the vital role of the
U.S. in the region -- and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S.
engagement -- Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger
relations with the two regional powers. The Thai military
has a number of Chinese weapons systems in its arsenal.
While Thai military links with the United States are deeper
and far more apparent than Sino-Thai links, China's growing

influence in Thailand and Southeast Asia is evident in
business, the arts, the media, and the military. China and
Thailand recently completed the Strike-2008 anti-terror joint
training exercise in northern Thailand, the second year of
joint special forces exercises. The PLA Navy has close links
with the RTN and have conducted a major ship visit to Phuket.
After jointly holding a limited naval exercise in the
Andaman Sea in 2005, Thailand and China are exploring
conducting joint search and rescue exercises. The RTN has
acquired several ships from China over the past decade.
China is refurbishing tanks and air defense equipment
provided to Thailand in the late 1980's. Mil-to-mil
exchanges between China and Thailand have expanded in recent
years as has the number of bilateral military VIP visits.
There have also been unspecific reports of future joint
missile development. India's "look east" policy has impelled
the country to forge closer ties with Thailand as well.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE UPCOMING VISIT
--------------


28. (C) General Boonsrang and the U.S. Embassy team look
forward to opportunity for this counterpart visit and to
sharing views on how best to promote our mutually supported
strategic interests in Thailand and the region. In all
meetings with General Boonsrang's delegation, we suggest US
officials emphasize that Thailand is a valued partner and
that the U.S. stands ready to assist the Thai military in
moving forward on defense reform via the DRMS process, force
modernization plans, and peacekeeping initiatives. We should
stress that the United States and Thailand both benefit our
defense cooperation.
JOHN