Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK258
2008-01-25 08:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

DAS MARCIEL PRESSES MFA PERMSEC ON BURMA

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM PREF KDEM KPAO TH BM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000258 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PREF KDEM KPAO TH BM
SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL PRESSES MFA PERMSEC ON BURMA

REF: 2007 BANGKOK 5234

BANGKOK 00000258 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000258

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NSC FOR LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PREF KDEM KPAO TH BM
SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL PRESSES MFA PERMSEC ON BURMA

REF: 2007 BANGKOK 5234

BANGKOK 00000258 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Burma remained a complicated issue for the
RTG, and the Thais shared China's concerns about the
potential impact on its borders if the situation in Burma
were to destabilize, MFA Permanent Secretary Virasakdi
Futrakul told Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel over
lunch on January 23. Marciel emphasized the importance of
continued pressure on the Burmese junta, and encouraged
Thailand to support U.S. efforts in initiatives such as the
proposed import ban on Burmese gems and hardwoods. Virasakdi
lamented Thailand's deteriorating influence within the
Burmese government; he gave no indication that Thailand's
policy towards Burma would toughen up in the near future.
END SUMMARY.

--------------
THAILAND FACES DILEMMA WITH BURMA
--------------


2. (C) Virasakdi described Thailand's relationship with Burma
as drastically weakened since former Burmese Prime Minister
Khin Nyunt (perceived as close to the RTG) fell out of favor
with the Burmese junta. "They are punishing us now" stated
Virasakdi "and today our influence in Rangoon is nil." While
the RTG appreciated why the U.S., EU, and the UN looked to
Thailand to take a more proactive stance towards Burma, the
MFA PermSec believed that his government had very little
leverage over the Burmese regime. The RTG continued to take
what small action they could; Virasakdi pointed out, for
example, that the RTG had pointedly postponed inviting
newly-appointed Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein to visit
Thailand.


3. (C) Virasakdi also defended Thailand's sensitive economic
relationship with Burma, which drove much of the RTG's policy
with its western neighbor. Marciel explained that Burma
remained a priority issue in Washington. For example, both
Houses in the U.S. Congress have drafted legislation to ban

the importation of Burmese-origin gems and hardwoods, and we
would ask our colleagues in the region to consider similar
initiatives. Marciel recognized the effect a gem and
hardwood ban would have on a country like Thailand, but
emphasized the importance of coordinated efforts to keep
pressure on the junta.


4. (C) Thailand was also concerned about USG proposed
sanctions on financial institutions and gas investments, and
their possible negative implications for the Thai economy,
added Virasakdi. He explained that if Thailand lost access
to Burma's gas reserves, which power 20% of his country's
electricity, the resultant price increases would lead to
rampant inflation. Furthermore, the loss would have a huge
effect on the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT),which is
one of the Thai Stock Exchange's largest companies.
Virasakdi concluded that Thailand's loss would be China's
gain as the Chinese would immediately acquire any investments
abandoned by Thailand.

--------------
THAILAND SHARES CHINESE CONCERNS
--------------


5. (C) Thai and Chinese officials were most concerned about
stability within Burma, Virasakdi stated. He believed that
in recent weeks China tempered its willingness to intervene
due to a perception that the U.S. was advocating for rapid
regime change in Burma, versus behavioral change as promoted

BANGKOK 00000258 002.2 OF 002


by the UN. Virasakdi referred to the Chinese claims to have
evidence that the US had been behind the demonstrations; he
said that the Chinese fear of US support for a "color
revolution" in Burma might be one reason why China was less
supportive of international efforts on Burma now. (reftel)
Virasakdi explained that in its conversations with Thailand,
China repeatedly expressed concern about the ramifications of
uncontrolled change and the resulting instability that would
occur in Burma, likening it the chaotic fallout following the
breakup of Yugoslavia. This scenario was not in the interest
of China or Thailand.


6. (C) Marciel responded that the USG was not calling for
radical, overnight change, but added that maintenance of the
status quo in Burma would only lead to further deterioration
and, ultimately, even more instability. Therefore, the USG
supported the Burmese opposition's call for inclusive
dialogue with the Burmese military to determine the future of
Burma. Virasakdi questioned whether the USG had clearly
explained this position to China.


7. (C) Virasakdi believed that the Burmese junta would move
forward with plans to legitimize the current governing role
of the military in the new constitution. The junta would
subsequently politicize its mass social movement (Union
Solidarity Development Association or USDA) and only then
invite the participation of the opposition. He added that
the Burmese junta would continue to follow this path
confident that it had the support of China. Marciel pointed
out that the problem with that process was that the Burmese
junta had no popular support. If China continued to shield
the Burmese government, he explained, a controlled transition
would become harder and harder to manage.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Thailand continues to plead its powerlessness and lack
of influence on the Burmese junta, raising the specter of
threatened economic links and instability on their border.
Virasakdi also anticipated that the new Thai government would
revive much of former Prime Minister Thaksin's economic
diplomacy policies, which sought ways to increase financially
profitable engagement with the Burmese government regardless
of the junta's political shortcomings. Virasakdi accepted
Marciel's explanation of U.S. policy as aimed at convincing
the Burmese junta to begin meaningful steps towards a
democratic transition and national reconciliation in Burma.
However, he was clearly concerned that this message had not
gotten through to China. End Comment.


9. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary Marciel cleared this cable.
JOHN