FORMER PM THAKSIN FLEES TO ENGLAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002427

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM KJUS TH
SUBJECT: FORMER PM THAKSIN FLEES TO ENGLAND

REF: A. BANGKOK 2327 (POTJAMAN CONVICTED)

B. BANGKOK 2242 (THAKSIN PREDICTS LIFE ABROAD)

C. BANGKOK 2092 (LEGAL TEAM PESSIMISTIC)

D. BANGKOK 2091 (RULINGS CLOUD FUTURE)

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (C) Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra announced on
August 11 that he had traveled to the U.K. in order to avoid
victimization by unfair legal proceedings in Thailand.
Thaksin's move will stave off further trials on various
charges, although an ongoing prosecution will continue. It
remains unclear whether Thaksin will try to exert significant
political influence from abroad, as he had done previously in
the wake of the 2006 coup. Thaksin's departure will likely
make it necessary for Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej to
establish decisively his leadership, if he is to hold his
party and his administration together in the face of legal
and political challenges.


2. (C) Comment: Thaksin's fleeing abroad sends a resounding
signal of defeat, despite his proxies' victory in the 2007
legislative election. Unable to secure his own freedom in
the face of a flurry of court rulings against his interests,
Thaksin may well question whether it is worth expending
significant effort to influence developments in Thai politics
that are less critical to him. He may instead bide his time
and await an eventual shift to a more favorable environment.
Given Thaksin's flight from prosecution, any eventual
rehabilitation would likely take years rather than months.
Chances for possible extradition from the U.K. appear slim,
given past experience with high profile cases, such as
disgraced financier Pin Chakkaphak. End Summary and Comment.

THAKSIN FLEES, ALLEGING POLITICIZED JUDICIARY
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3. (U) On August 11, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
faxed a handwritten statement to the Thai media from London,
explaining that he and his wife, Potjaman, had traveled to
England rather than returning from China to Thailand to
attend their ongoing trial for abuse of power (ref C).
Thaksin alleged that the Thai judiciary was treating him
unfairly, complained that Thailand remained under the
influence of the "dictatorship" that took power after the
2006 coup d'etat, and cited threats to his physical safety.
He also professed loyalty to the royal family.


4. (C) In response, the Supreme Court issued arrest warrants
for Thaksin and his wife and declared their previously posted
bail forfeit. Pundits publicly speculated about the
likelihood that Thaksin would request asylum in England, and
the Office of the Attorney General began to prepare a request
for Thaksin's extradition, according to local press reports.
(A U.K. diplomat in Bangkok told us that Thaksin entered on a
visitor's visa and has not yet requested asylum.) The
People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) -- the organization
which has led most of the anti-Thaksin protests in recent
years -- announced it would continue its efforts to block
Samak Sundaravej's administration from carrying out
constitutional reforms.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THAKSIN AND THE GOVERNMENT
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5. (C) The recent tax evasion conviction of Potjaman (ref A)
reinforced a widespread perception among the Thai political
class that the courts, with encouragement from the palace,
were determined to marginalize Thaksin, and that he would
likely be convicted in his ongoing abuse of power trial.
(Comment: We have not sought to assess the merits of these
cases, and we are do not mean to second Thaksin's assertion
that the courts are biased; however, many Thais might assume
that Thaksin and his lawyers have sought to influence the
judges and that it would take special determination to rule
against the Shinawatras, even if the evidence supports

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conviction. End Comment.) Thaksin had previously refused to
return to Thailand during the post-coup Surayud
administration, claiming at that time that it was impossible
for him to receive a fair trial prior to the restoration of a
democratically-elected government. His refusal to submit to
the courts' judgment under current conditions may strike some
Thais as suspect, although there may be few who do not
already hold strong views, pro or con, about the polarizing
former Prime Minister.


6. (C) Thaksin's decision to remain abroad may make it easier
for the government to seize his approximately two billion USD
in frozen assets, according to local press reports. But
because Thai law does not allow defendants to be tried in
absentia, he should be able to avoid prosecution in other
pending cases (e.g., for establishing an illegal lottery, for
arranging improper loans to Burma, and for irregularities in
the government procurement of rubber saplings). Because
Thaksin was present at the beginning of his abuse of
power/land purchase trial, however, that case should continue
to its conclusion.


7. (C) It remains unclear whether Thaksin will try to exert
significant political influence from abroad, as he did during
the interim administration. We do not rule out the
possibility he will try to follow the rough outline of a plan
he sketched out recently for the Ambassador (ref B) --
Thaksin may believe that, if he remains abroad and distances
himself from politics, he increases the likelihood of an
eventual amnesty or pardon following his likely conviction.
A People's Power Party (PPP) legislator, Pracha Prasopdee,
has already publicly floated the idea of an amnesty for
Thaksin; we do not believe Pracha's initiative is timely,
however. Another part of Thaksin's plan -- a national unity
government including the opposition Democrats -- did not come
to fruition in the recent Cabinet reshuffle.


8. (C) Thaksin's absence might allow Prime Minister Samak to
further his claim to be Thailand's leading figure in formal
political processes. Samak currently faces serious
challenges, however, including a potential court case that
could result in his party's dissolution (ref D) and a recent
schism that erupted when members of one faction of PPP
denounced what they termed the "Gang of Four" -- Samak,
Deputy Prime Minister Surapong Suebwonglee, Theerapol
Noprampa (Secretary General to the Prime Minister) and close
Thaksin associate Newin Chidchob -- for allegedly dominating
PPP and profiting from their political positions. If Samak
proves unable to provide sufficient leadership or resources
to maintain his party's cohesion and fend off legal
challenges, Thaksin's move overseas might accelerate the
collapse of Samak's administration rather than giving Samak
an extended lease on political life.
JOHN