Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK2255
2008-07-24 05:58:00
SECRET
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THAI OFFICIALS BRIEF DIPLOMATS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH 
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VZCZCXRO4754
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #2255/01 2060558
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 240558Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3806
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6187
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 8916
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4797
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0938
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2341
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 5490
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002255 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THAI OFFICIALS BRIEF DIPLOMATS
ON IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SITUATION, BUT STATISTICS SUGGEST A
MORE COMPLEX STORY

REF: BANGKOK 01210 (SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: RTG TALKS WITH
INSURGENTS STALLED BUT IN "A GOOD SPOT")

BANGKOK 00002255 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission, James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4
(b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002255

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THAI OFFICIALS BRIEF DIPLOMATS
ON IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SITUATION, BUT STATISTICS SUGGEST A
MORE COMPLEX STORY

REF: BANGKOK 01210 (SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: RTG TALKS WITH
INSURGENTS STALLED BUT IN "A GOOD SPOT")

BANGKOK 00002255 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission, James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a June 30 briefing to the diplomatic corps
about developments in southern Thailand, Thai officials from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Thai Army, and the
Ministry of Interior outlined a broad strategy for dealing
with the insurgency in the South. Deputy Commander of the
Joint Civil-Police-Military Task Force said the situation in
the deep south had improved dramatically over the past few
months, but the insurgency appears to continue unabated.
Security officials contend they are getting things under
control and some statistics appear to bear this out.
Anecdotal evidence on the ground, however, implies perceived
improvements in the security situation may be ephemeral.
Brutal attacks continue, while Thai government officials
contend they have a plan in place to end the insurgency that
is founded on principles of non-violence and justice. We
believe senior Thai officials involved in quelling the
violence are trying to reach beyond traditional security
measures to find a solution, but we also are concerned that
these officials are more focused on managing the violence
than addressing grievances. Meanwhile, insurgents appear to
be less constrained than in the past regarding their targets.


The Official Strategy



2. (SBU) In late June, Thai officials from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Royal Thai Army, and the Ministry of
Interior briefed the Bangkok-based diplomatic corps on
Thailand's efforts to resolve the conflict in the deep south.
Pranai Suwanrath, Director of the Southern Border Provinces
Administration Center (SBPAC),told the diplomatic corps that
the Thai government's strategy for resolving the southern
violence rested on four principles: "non-violent means,
justice and fair treatment, engagement with stakeholders, and

fostering a better understanding of the actual situation in
the south." According to Pranai, this meant first
suppressing the insurgency, then giving the Malay-Muslim
population of the South a "correct understanding of the
situation." Pranai said the military was in charge of the
situation in the South because the violence must stop before
the civilians can move in to develop and rebuild livelihoods
and the economy of the region.


3. (SBU) Fourth Army Area spokesperson Colonel Acra Tiproch
echoed Pranai's comments. He said the Civil-Police-Military
task force, the operational arm of the Internal Security
Operations Command in southern Thailand, had to first provide
security to local people, then provide them with a correct
interpretation of history, religion, and nationalism in order
to break the hold of the insurgents. Continuing, Acra said
the insurgency is different from past security challenges
because the RTG had not been able to identify a leadership
structure. He said because there is no known leadership,
there can be no negotiations to end the violence. He also
said, however, that the insurgents have a clear strategy to
draw the international community into the conflict by
claiming they are the victims of injustice.


4. (SBU) At the same briefing Deputy Commander of the Joint
Civil-Police-Military Task Force, Major General Jumlong
Kunsong, said the army was conducting operations based on the
principles Pranai outlined, and was experiencing good
results. He said local populations were beginning to trust
the army and giving it more help; this has led to more
arrests and to a dramatic improvement in the security
situation over the past several months. When asked
specifically about allegations of human rights abuses, he
defended the army's use of force against the insurgents, but
said the use of "unjust means" was completely forbidden. He
acknowledged that there were likely people at lower levels

BANGKOK 00002255 002.2 OF 003


who may have engaged in misconduct, but said anyone guilty of
this type of misconduct would be punished.


The Numbers



5. (SBU) Statistics appear to bear out General Jumlong's
contention that the security in the South was getting better.
During the first six months of 2008, there were 563 violent
incidents, compared with 1,135 for the same period in 2007.
Using the number of violent incidents as an indicator of the
security situation, however, is problematic. No two sources
report the same numbers, what is included as an incident is
unclear, and determination as to what incidents are
attributable to the insurgency is subjective and dependent on
Thai government reporting. Nonetheless, there appears to be
a downward trend in the number of violent incidents for the
fist six months of 2008. At the same time, however the
proportion of killed and injured per incident appears to be
higher than in the previous period. For example, Isara news
agency reports that for the first six months of 2007 there
were 1,135 violent incidents resulting in 417 deaths, or a
death per incident ratio of 36.74 percent, and for all of
2007, 867 deaths resulted from 2,025 incidents or 42.81
deaths per incident. In the first six months of 2008, there
were 563 incidents and 301 deaths, or a ratio of 53.46
percent. The same holds true for those injured. In all of
2007, there were 1,720 injuries from 2,025 incidents and in
the first six months of 2008, 517 injured in 563 incidents.
This puts the injured-per-incident ratio at 84.94 and 91.83
respectively. Although we hesitate to attribute too much
weight to these numbers, it appears that either the militants
or security forces are becoming more efficient.


The Violence



6. (SBU) Anecdotal information helps give a more complete
story about what is happening on the ground. A variety of
press reporting since the beginning of June points to a
continued climate of fear. For example:

- In Narathiwat, four militants boarded a train, opened
fire, and killed three railway workers and a police officer.

- In Yala, unidentified men riding in the back of a
pick-up truck sprayed a tea-shop with automatic weapons fire,
killing three people and wounding five.

- In Yala, an elementary school principal was
assassinated, prompting the temporary closure of 55 primary
schools in Raman district.

- In Pattani, insurgents opened fire on a truck carrying
students to school, killing two rangers escorting the
students. Three students were injured in the ambush.

- A school bus driver, after dropping students off at
school, was forced off the road by suspected militants. As
he was crawling out of the bus, he was shot in the head.

- In Pattani, a couple taking their son to school was
shot and killed, and their bodies set on fire. Their son
escaped uninjured.

- A 56 year-old Buddhist in Yala was shot, beheaded,
nailed to the road, and set on fire. His 28-year-old son was
injured.


Insurgents Targeting More Selectively



7. (C) According to Don Pathan, reporter for The Nation
newspaper, the number of attacks in the deep south are going

BANGKOK 00002255 003.2 OF 003


down because the insurgents have chosen to be more selective
in their targets, and to preserve their "human resources."
Pathan said his contacts have told him that hardened RKK
units are now only being used for attacks the insurgent
leadership considers either high profile or "important."
(Note: RKK stands for Runda Kumpilan Kecil, and is the
acronym Thai authorities have given to insurgent commando
units. End note.) According to Pathan, younger cadres who
are seeking a place in the insurgency, and are considered
expendable, carry out the more routine operations. Pathan
said anger and a longing for a place in society is driving
the youth into the conflict. The insurgency is giving them
an identity -- "one day a kid is a struggling laborer or
rubber tapper, the next, after joining the militants, he
believes he is part of a heroic struggle against the Thai
government."


8. (S) Pathan, who is in contact with the Henri Dunant Centre
for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) about its efforts to broker a
peace deal between the Thai government and the insurgents
(reftel),said he believes HDC is "barking up the wrong
tree." He said the people HDC is bringing to the
negotiations have little ability to control the insurgency.
According to Pathan, HDC's interlocutors are from the former
generation of insurgents; they are appalled at the tactics
the newer generation of BRN-C leaders are using. (Note:
BRN-C is the Barisan Revulusi Nasional-Coordinate, and is the
insurgent group many analysts believe to be behind the
violence in the south.) He said the older militants are
begging the RTG for something so they can show their
relevance to the new generation of militants; they are
looking for some way to exert some influence over them.
According to Pathan, the RTG is not obliging them.

Comment



9. (C) We do not perceive the violence in southern Thailand
is any closer to being resolved than at any other time in the
previous four years. This is a brutal conflict which the
Thai army correctly understands as a challenge to Thai
sovereignty. We believe the majority of people living in the
South are tired of the killing and fear, but are locked in a
cycle of violence that has tuned the conflict into a way of
life. Although Thai officials appear to be exploring new
ways to address the insurgency, their insistence on
reeducating militants about history, religion, and
nationalism could back fire and further stoke resentment
against the government.
JOHN