NO CLEAR PATH TO STABILITY IN THAI POLITICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 002226

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KJUS TH
SUBJECT: NO CLEAR PATH TO STABILITY IN THAI POLITICS

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, under pressure, plans
to carry out a cabinet reshuffle. He has gone on the
offensive against his opponents, and he is once again
publicly floating the idea of constitutional amendment. The
shaky state of Samak's administration is a direct and
deliberate consequence of the political framework established
by the 2006 coup leaders. Various factors appear likely to
seriously impede all scenarios that one might realistically
hope could put Thailand on a path toward more stable and
effective governance in the near term. End Summary.

CABINET RESHUFFLE SOON
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2. (C) Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej said publicly on July
15 that he would carry out a significant cabinet reshuffle
toward the end of July, according to local press reports.
Samak appears to be acting not simply to plug holes left in
his cabinet by resignations, but also to regain public trust
after widespread criticism of his administration. In the
past few months, opponents of the government led by Samak's
People's Power Party (PPP) have carried out street
demonstrations, floated coup rumors (possibly reflecting
actual contingency plans by military figures),held a
no-confidence debate in the parliament, and requested that
the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) proceed
with impeachment and criminal charges against the cabinet.
Moreover, a Supreme Court decision that disqualified a top
PPP official from holding office makes PPP liable to
dissolution by the Constitutional Court.


3. (C) In recent days, PPP has begun to fight back. The
party has begun once again to call for constitutional reform,
even though this proposal previously energized demonstrations
and coup rumors. Some PPP officials have publicly floated
the idea of impeachment proceedings against certain
independent agencies -- most notably the Election Commission,
the NCCC, and the Constitutional Court. And a PPP official
filed a complaint with the Election Commission requesting the
removal from office of 27 legislators from the opposition
Democrat Party (DP) and 32 Senators, claiming that they
violated constitutional provisions on asset ownership. Samak
complained, "The government is now paralyzed and the state of
the country has been totally destroyed by a defective
system," and said that it was time for him to "kill"
(metaphorically) the political opponents who had successfully
targeted his own allies, according to local press reports.

SYSTEM WORKING AS INTENDED
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4. (C) Many of PPP's troubles stem directly from provisions
in the 2007 constitution. This charter, drafted by an
assembly established by the leaders of the 2006 coup, aimed
to reduce the likelihood of a single political party
achieving the dominant status achieved by Thaksin
Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai, which led the government from
2001 until 2006. Certain provisions of the constitution --
including the reversion to multi-member electoral districts
and the shift from national to regional party lists -- were
specifically designed to facilitate competition against a
leading party, although PPP nevertheless came close to
winning a majority of the seats in the House in December 2007
elections. Other new provisions in the constitution have
hobbled PPP, however:

- Article 237 provides for potential party dissolution if a
party executive is found guilty of electoral fraud; one such
executive from PPP has been found guilty, leaving the party
vulnerable.

- The establishment of a 150-seat Senate that includes 74
members selected by a committee, rather than elected by the
citizenry, made PPP comparatively weaker in the Senate than

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in the House. A majority of the selected Senators supported
a motion to hold a debate critical of the Samak
administration's performance in June.

- New, strict conflict-of-interest prohibitions in Articles
265-269 appear to have made it difficult for PPP to attract
prominent people to serve as cabinet officials.


5. (C) In addition to the structural factors described above,
PPP faces difficulties associated with personnel factors:

- The Commissioners of the National Counter Corruption
Commission were all selected by the 2006 coup leaders in the
immediate aftermath of the coup, and the constitution
provides that they hold their office for nine-year terms.

- Some military officers who played important roles in the
2006 coup -- including current Army Commander Anupong
Paojinda and current Defense Ministry Permanent Secretary
Winai Phattiyakul -- retain top positions in the military.

- The 2007 constitution provides for judges to participate in
the selection of the 74 selected Senators, and to play an
increased role in the selection of members of key independent
bodies. Judges themselves are selected by Court committees
and formally appointed by the King; they swear an oath of
loyalty to the King (as do cabinet members and military
officers, although legislators and civil servants do not).
In the current environment, judges are generally viewed as
predisposed toward (if not members of) the royalist oligarchy
-- a perception that recent court rulings with an adverse
effect on PPP will likely reinforce.

NO CLEAR WAY OUT
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6. (C) Given the current circumstances, it is difficult to
see a clear path toward more effective Thai governance. The
following scenarios for greater stability all have factors
that make them improbable:

- STABILITY UNDER THE PPP: Samak's ability to stabilize his
government is questionable. He does not appear to have
widespread support in the political class. His network of
loyalists is extraordinarily weak; most politicians we meet
are uncertain whether Samak has an "inner circle," or, if he
does, who is in it. The support he has in PPP seems largely
due to Thaksin's backing for him, which appears tentative.
Samak is currently appealing a defamation conviction, and he
remains under investigation for alleged corruption dating
back to his term as Bangkok Governor; other legal cases have
also been lodged against him. With most former Thai Rak Thai
party executives still ineligible to hold political office,
Samak has a very limited pool from which to draw talented
figures to serve in his administration. Also, there is no
PPP figure who appears especially suitable to supplant Samak
as Prime Minister and govern more effectively.

- RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THAKSIN AND THE PALACE: It is
virtually impossible to imagine genuine reconciliation
between the two principal camps, currently engaged in a
zero-sum competition for power and influence. Thaksin showed
during his administration a desire to eliminate all
opposition, sometimes employing ruthless tactics to do so.
Notoriously vindictive, Thaksin is unlikely to forgive or
forget the 2006 coup and his ensuing legal difficulties.
Many in Thailand's political class believe that Thaksin
fundamentally hopes that Thailand will modernize in ways that
entail a reduced role for the monarch; he has kept company
with some left-wing figures who have expressed disdain for
Thailand's royal patronage system. The palace appears to
view Thaksin as an existential threat.

- THE DP AS A COMPROMISE SOLUTION: Aware of the difficulty in
resolving the fundamental conflict driving Thai politics, a
few of our contacts suggested that a workable compromise
might be for PPP, at Thaksin's behest, to agree to cede power
to a new coalition government that has the Democrat Party at
its core. Our contacts speculated that Thaksin might be

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willing to take this step in exchange for lenient treatment
from the Thai courts. We do not entirely rule out this
scenario, but we have not yet discerned efforts to negotiate
the extraordinarily complex and broad agreement that would be
essential for this to work. PPP and the DP are currently at
each others' throats, and it is difficult to imagine that PPP
legislators, who received significantly more popular support
than their DP counterparts, would passively permit the
Democrats to lead the government and reap the associated
benefits. While Thaksin's opponents might pitch this concept
as a compromise that allows Thaksin to benefit from reduced
public agitation over his influence, he would likely prove
reluctant to relinquish hard-won political power and
leverage, perceiving this option as comparable to an
invitation to surrender.

- THAKSIN'S ELIMINATION: Thaksin's conviction in ongoing
court cases would likely diminish his stature and might
effectively remove him from the political scene. Royalists
will likely remain concerned, however, that the populist
sentiment that Thaksin stoked might once again be harnessed
to the palace's detriment; this anxiety may be particularly
acute given the uncertainty surrounding royal succession, and
the inability of any heir to exercise the same moral
authority as the current King, at least in the near term.
Given the widespread perception of a divide between the
Bangkok elite and the rural masses, the palace would likely
continue to prefer a political system entailing weak
governments, even if Thaksin is removed from the scene.

- ANOTHER COUP: A more extreme version of the "elimination"
scenario, above, would entail a coup d'etat. Speculation
about a coup has diminished since June, but few people seem
to believe this possibility is completely off the table.
Leaders of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD),which
represents hard-line anti-Thaksin views, have publicly
advocated "new politics," a regressive concept including
military intervention into the political realm in times of
crisis. While the recent turmoil has managed to make the
previously generally unpopular Surayud administration look
reasonably effective by comparison, we believe most
politically-aware Thais recognize that a coup would devastate
the business climate and Thailand's international reputation,
and that civil society would not tolerate an open-ended
period of extraordinary military influence over politics.

- THAKSIN WINS: Despite a sympathetic administration, Thaksin
currently appears on the defensive, particularly (and
literally) in his ongoing legal cases. It is not impossible
to imagine, however, that Thaksin might over a period of
months clear his name and return to formal politics through a
combination of factors that could include the death of King
Bhumibol, a modus vivendi with military leaders, and perhaps
an economic crisis that leaves Thais desperate for a
political leader with star power. It is difficult, however,
to believe that the experience of being overthrown has taught
Thaksin to be more accommodating rather than more aggressive,
or that he would adopt a style of governance different from
that which led to his downfall. With a large segment of the
Bangkok elite already deeply set against him, Thaksin's
return to formal power would likely lead to substantial
anxiety, protests, and continued uncertainty.

COMMENT
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7. (C) In 1997, having soured on a political system that
encouraged shaky coalition governments, the Thais redrafted
their constitution to enable a stronger and more effective
executive branch. Taking advantage of the new political
structure, Thaksin consolidated power to a greater extent
than any previous civilian Prime Minister, alienating the
royalist oligarchy. The instability that we see today is a
direct and deliberate consequence of the new framework
established by the 2006 coup leaders, whose main goal, in
order to ensure nobody ever amassed Thaksin-like power again,
was to weaken politicians so as to preserve the preeminence
of the palace. It appears that the reestablishment of a
relatively stable and effective government would require both

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systemic reforms and accommodation between key political
actors. It is unclear when those might come about, but the
time frame may well be measured in years rather than months.
JOHN