Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK1991
2008-06-27 08:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

PDAS FEIERSTEIN DISCUSSES CT ISSUES WITH THAI

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL PTER TH 
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6119
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
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RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001991 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: PDAS FEIERSTEIN DISCUSSES CT ISSUES WITH THAI
COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICIALS

BANGKOK 00001991 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Anne S. Casper, 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001991

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: PDAS FEIERSTEIN DISCUSSES CT ISSUES WITH THAI
COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICIALS

BANGKOK 00001991 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Anne S. Casper, 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a round of meetings in early June to
discuss Thai counterterrorism issues, Thai security officials
told S/CT PDAS Gerald Feierstein that they did not believe
Thailand is a likely target of international terrorism, but
acknowledged that Thailand did have a regional role in
dealing with terrorism. Although they believe Thailand's
counterterrorism capabilities are good, they cited weaknesses
in several areas and requested further assistance in
understanding how to deal with urban terrorism, how to
protect critical infrastructure, and how to use mass media to
counter radical extremism. While we are uncertain how to
assess these officials' confidence in a low probability of an
attack in Thailand, these discussions lead us to believe that
the current political turmoil in Bangkok has not distracted
security officials from paying attention to the threat posed
by international terrorism. End Summary.


2. (SBU) In a round of meetings in early June with Thai
counterterrorism officials, S/CT PDAS Gerald Feierstein,
Office Director Theodore Allegra, RSI Coordinator Jason
Donovan and Poloff spoke with Counterterrorism Operations
Center (CTOC) Commanding General Tanasak Patimapragorn,
National Security Council (NSC) senior expert on terrorism
Surachai Nira, MFA Director of Policy planning Sek
Wannamethee, and Penprapa Vongkovit, chief of the MFA,s
International Security Unit.


3. (SBU) General Tanasak, commander of Thailand's
Counterterrorism Operations Center (CTOC),said Thailand's
counterterrorism capabilities were very good thanks to U.S.
assistance. He asserted that the CTOC is the primary
operational organization responsible for dealing with
international terrorism in Thailand, and that, in the event
of a terrorism related crisis, operational control would fall
to CTOC. CTOC coordinates all civilian, military, and police
units that would be tasked with responding to a terrorist
attack, and its responsibilities include supervising,

coordinating, and training these units.


4. (SBU) Expanding further on Thailand's national level
organization for responding to terrorism, Tanasak said the
NSC established Thailand's primary organization for setting
counterterrorism policy and strategy, the Committee of
Counter International Terrorism (COCIT). The Prime Minister
chairs this committee. Its 25 members include the chiefs of
all the armed forces, the Supreme Commander, the Secretary
General of the NSC, the Police Commissioner, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and other cabinet ministers. The Supreme
Commander chairs a committee subordinate to the COCIT called
the sub-COCIT, which is composed of operational level
elements of the armed forces, police, and the relevant
agencies. According to Tanasak, if there were a crisis,
local authorities would take the lead in an initial response.
The local authorities would report the situation to the CTOC
and sub-COCIT, which would recommend a course of action to
the COCIT. The COCIT would issue orders to the CTOC,
depending on the CTOC's recommendations.


5. (SBU) Surachai Nira, senior expert on terrorism at the
NSC, told the delegation that, in his opinion, Thailand was
not currently at risk of attack from international
terrorists. He said this could change quickly, however, and
that Thailand needed help in three specific areas: how to
deal with urban terrorism, how to protect critical
infrastructure, and how to use mass media to counter radical
extremism. He said Thailand needed to conduct a review of
its counterterrorism policies and needed to focus on three
major areas: prevention, intelligence, and coordination with
international partners - both bilateral and multilateral.
Surachai is a firm believer in cooperation. He said, "We
cannot solve this alone. Terrorists have networks; we need
our own networks to solve the problem." Surachai repeated
much of General Tanasak,s lecture on national level
counterterrorism organization, and added one more committee
to the list of organizations he believes are important in

BANGKOK 00001991 002.2 OF 003


formulating counterterrorism policy. He said the National
Coordinating Center for Combating Terrorism and Transnational
Crime (NCC-CTTC) plays an essential role because of its focus
on transnational crime, which Surachai believes supports
terrorist activities. This organization operates under the
supervision of the Secretary General of the NSC and is
chaired by the Deputy NSC Secretary General.


6. (SBU) Moving on to a discussion of southern Thailand,
Surachai said the insurgency in the deep south did not pose a
"terrorist threat". He said they worry about international
groups entering the conflict, but as yet, they have not seen
any connections in the South to international terrorist
groups. He believes that if there are any links, they are
likely personal and not organizational. Surachai added that
the South was a long-standing problem that will take time to
resolve. He described the conflict as having several levels:
the first is the political level - the constitution says
Thailand is one country that cannot be divided. The
insurgents, however, want to divide it. The second level is
economic. People in the deep south, according to Surachai,
are among the poorest in Thailand in terms of income per
year. The third level is the social structure of the South.
To guard their religious identity, parents send their
children to private schools with a primarily religious
curriculum - which deprives them of the education they need
to function in Thai society. The last layer and the most
difficult to deal with is the cultural layer, i.e.,
tradition, language, customs. Surachai acknowledged that
ethnic Malay Muslims in southern Thailand have had, in the
past, legitimate social grievances. He believes, however, it
is time to get over those grievances. "We can't do anything
about what happened in the past. The other side must look to
the future."


7. (SBU) MFA Director of Policy planning Sek Wannamethee and
Penprapa Vongkovit, Chief of the International Security Unit
in the MFA, said terrorism is a relatively new issue for the
MFA and they are still learning how best to add value to the
existing counterterrorism infrastructure. According to Sek,
the Policy Planning office is attached to the office of the
Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the International
Security Unit, headed by Penprapa, is within the Office of
Policy and Planning.


8. (SBU) Both Sek and Penprapa agreed with Surachai,s
assessment that Thailand is probably not itself at risk from
international terrorist groups. They acknowledged, however,
that terrorism continues to be an issue for the region and
that Thailand has a role to play in dealing with it. When
asked what Thailand could do regionally, Sek mentioned
Thailand's decision to participate in the "eyes in the sky"
program. (The "eyes in the sky" program is a program run
jointly by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia to provide
surveillance and security to the Malacca Straights.) Sek
said the operating procedures for Thailand's participation
are still being reconciled with those that were drafted by
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, but the cabinet has
approved Thailand's participation. Malaysia will host the
coordinating mechanism for the program. Sek also talked
about the ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism. Although it
was signed in 2007, it is up to each individual nation to
ratify the agreement. Sek said Thailand would use its term as
ASEAN Chairman to push for all the ASEAN nations to accede to
the convention. Turning to domestic issues, Sek said one of
the primary issues Thailand is struggling with is how to deal
with "homegrown radicals." Although Sek suggested there were
not many of these individuals in Thailand, he said they
presented a challenge. He believes the internet plays a
significant role in their radicalization, and Thailand needs
to find a way to counter its influence.


9. (C) Comment: None of the officials we spoke with
considered Thailand a likely target for international
terrorists at the present time. Although their reasoning
remains unclear, their uniform and confident response was
interesting given the large and diverse international
presence in Thailand. These officials seemed to be

BANGKOK 00001991 003.2 OF 003


unaffected by the ongoing political turmoil in Bangkok, and
it appeared that they remained focused on the possible
terrorist threat, not internal politics. Although confident
about their capacity to deal with incidents involving
international terrorism, they requested further assistance in
understanding how to deal with urban terrorism, how to
protect critical infrastructure, and how to use mass media to
counter radical extremism. We will look for opportunities to
expand our cooperation on this issue, as appropriate.


10. (U) PDAS Feierstein did not clear on this cable.

JOHN