HOW HOT IS IT, ANYWAY?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001612

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: HOW HOT IS IT, ANYWAY?

REF: A. BANGKOK 1567 (POLITICAL TENSIONS)

B. BANGKOK 1293 (LESSONS LEARNED)

C. 06 BANGKOK 5929 (THAILAND: DIVIDED)

D. 06 BANGKOK 3916 (WHAT'S THAKSIN UP TO?)

E. 06 BANGKOK 2991 (STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF
THAILAND)

Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: The current state of political deadlock is
similar in many ways to the protracted statemate of 2006. Of
greatest concern are the repeated references in the media and
by contacts of a serious threat to the monarchy. This fear
is based on the increase in criticisms of the monarchal
institution in the media, internet and even from within the
current government. All sides of the political conflict are
trying to exploit the monarchy for their own ends, with the
military issuing warnings that they should stop. On a deeper
level, there is concern that some politicians, including
Thaksin, would try to abolish the monarchy if they could,
especially if they held power when the aged King finally
dies.


2. (C) There has also been a sharp increase in discussion of
the prospects of violent clashes between the contending
political camps. The announcement that the former
anti-Thaksin coalition will hold a demonstration on Sunday,
and that the pro-Thaksin side is preparing for
counter-demonstrations, has fueled anxieties and speculation
that the military might again intervene if the political
conflict turned violent. The press has identified the First
Army commander and a well-known Palace insider as two key
figures in the conspiracy; the intense scrutiny of these two
resulting from this media speculation, however, would seem to
make it harder for them to carry out such a plot, even in
Thailand. There is also speculation that the government
itself could be feeding coup rumors in order to justify a
pre-emptive move by its own supporters within the military.
Informed and reasonable interlocutors are extremely
discouraged, and warn of an impeding conflict more serious
than in 2006. It should be possible to resolve these
conflicts through peaceful and rational means, but few
politicians appear to be interested in trying. Unless this
changes, we can expect the political turbulence to continue
for the foreseeable future. END SUMMARY


3. (C) Thai politics have been in a state of tension for a
long time, leaving nerves frayed and anxieties high. The
extraordinary events of the past two years have made the Thai
public expect the worst. Despite the transition to an
elected government with a comfortable parliamentary majority,
politically-aware Thais seem to have little confidence that
there will be a stable political environment over the next
year. It seems that every politician's speech, academic
conference and editorial features dark prognostications about
imminent political clashes. While the public is concerned
about the economy, especially rising fuel and food prices,
the sources of deepest anxiety and fear are not practical
issues, but perceived threats to the country's unity and the
monarchy. These same fears dominated the political conflict
in 2006. The September coup was supposed to resolve those
issues: its failure to do so has left Thailand pretty much
back where it started in 2006. Then, a seemingly-intractable
political stalemate led to the military coup that was
accepted by many as the only way to break the deadlock and
move forward. Now the same kind of statemate seems to be
looming, and it is not clear that the Thai have yet figured
out a better way to resolve it this time (ref B).

THREATS TO THE MONARCHY
--------------


4. (C) The most dangerous element in the current conflict is
the repeated claim that the monarchy faces a serious threat.
These claims are based on several developments. One is the
proliferation of anti-monarchy statements appearing on the
internet, both on anti-royalist websites and on more
mainstream ones. Senior military officials recently warned
the government to do more to shut down or block such
websites. The recent case of a young activist who refused to
stand up to show respect when the royal anthem was being
played in a movie theater has sparked a wave of violent
emotion - both for and against -- including threats against
the young man's safety (septel). The case of Minister in the
Prime Minister's Office Jakrapob (septel) has caused special
concern. Jakrapob's repeated public attacks on the
"patronage system" and "feudalism," as well as on the King's

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advisor, Privy Council President Prem, do not seem (to us, at
least) to violate the letter of the lese majeste law.
However, "everybody knows" that Jakrapob is opposed to the
monarchy, and his careful avoidance of direct, open criticism
of the King has not helped him to avoid lese majeste charges
and the suspicion that he would like to make Thailand a
republic.


5. (S) Although the King is genuinely beloved and respected,
he and the institution of the monarchy have been subject to
criticism regularly over the years. Even academics from
"good" families and universities have gotten into trouble for
their "leftist," anti-royal views. Yet, there is a feeling
that the situation is different, and more serious, this time.
In the first place, the internet and other independent media
make the spread of such views so easy. The discussion of the
King's role in Thai politics has left the classroom and
academic journal, and is accessible to anyone. This is
dangerous both because it facilitates the gathering of
support for these views, and it mobilizes opponents who are
outraged to read such scandalous reports. Second, the King
himself is old, frail and ill, and the monarchal institution
is weakening with him. The love for the Thai king is very
personal -- fostered by a concerted effort by the Palace for
sixty years -- and does not extend, at all, to his son and
presumed heir. Whoever controls political power when the
King dies could be in a very strong position to sway the
destiny of the country - to preserve the monarchy or to turn
Thailand into a republic. For the military and the
royalists, it is a cause of deep concern to have known
anti-monarchists like Jakrapob in important government
positions. Threats to the monarchy tend to provoke an
irrational overreaction from the military.


THAKSIN REDUX
--------------


6. (C) Which brings us back to former Prime Minister Thaksin.
He has been keeping what, for him, is a reasonably low
profile. However, his involvement in the ongoing political
struggle is no secret, and his alleged attempts to set
himself up as the King's rival are not forgotten. During the
recent vote on the new House Speaker (ref A),Thaksin showed
that he is still directly involved in politics by personally
calling MPs to rally support for a candidate who is the
father of one of his most loyal henchmen. His role in
choosing the current ministers is also clear. Despite
Thaksin's repeated claims that he was done with elected
office, other stories circulating cause many to doubt his
claim. As one example, a retired advisor to the Ministry of
Finance - a "Bangkok elite" -- told us a story recently:
Thaksin was trying to persuade a local lawyer to charge
Thaksin less for his legal services. Thaksin reportedly told
the lawyer to accept a lower fee now, but promised that when
Thaksin returned to power he could give the lawyer a good
government position as a reward. Stories like this cannot be
verified, but they are easily repeated and widely believed.
The current plan to amend the 2007 Constitution, led by the
pro-Thaksin People's Power Party, is particularly seen as
part of the larger strategy to pave the way for Thaksin's
return (ref A).


BLOOD IN THE STREETS
--------------


7. (C) Another dangerous theme reprised from 2006 is the
visceral fear of violent confrontation between the two
political camps. This prospect evokes for many Thai the
traumatic events of 1992, which resulted in dozens, if not
hundreds, of deaths when the security forces shot protesters.
Just like in 2006, there are repeated warnings in the media
that there will be bloodshed when the rival political forces
finally clash openly (ref C). In 2006, the coupmakers tried
to justify the coup in part by saying that they had acted to
prevent imminent violence, an excuse that was met with
skepticism from many quarters. Respected military analyst
Dr. Panitan Wattanyagorn told the press earlier this month
that this time the military will wait "until there is a
bloodbath. ...I have heard some senior generals say: "This
time we should let them clash for a while and allow bloodshed
to happen. Then we will come out."


8. (C) This particular fear has been fanned this week by the
announcement that the anti-Thaksin People's Alliance for
Democracy (PAD) will hold a large rally this Sunday against

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the planned constitutional amendments. A human rights NGO
source told us that a pro-Thaksin group will hold their own
event on Saturday, to test and see how big a crowd they can
turn out in preparation for confronting the PAD - maybe this
weekend, maybe another time. Interactions between the PAD
and pro-Thaksin demonstrators have already been more heated
than during the remarkably orderly protests of 2006, with the
two sides throwing projectiles at each other during a March
rally. Even if the leadership on both sides tries to exercise
restraint, large crowds will be hard to control, perhaps
harder than in 2006; the mood is just uglier now than it was
then.


WHO COULD POSSIBLY BE DUMB ENOUGH TO TRY THIS?
-------------- -


9. (C) Press speculation has already identified some likely
culprits in a coup scenario. First Army commander Prayut
Chan-ocha is regularly named as the soldier most likely to
putsch the government. This is probably in part just because
the First Army has the resources in or close to the capital
that would be needed to pull the coup off. Prayut supported
the 2006 coup, and he, like Army Commander and former
coupmaker Anupong, is formerly of the Queen's Guard and
believed to be close to the Queen. (Prayut is close to the
Anupong as well, but virtually all sources, public and
private, believe that Anupong is trying to keep the military
out of politics, at least for now.)


10. (C) Speculation also links Palace insider Piya Malakul to
the coup plot (ref D). Piya appears to be quite close to the
Queen, and was a very vehement opponent of Thaksin, although
one who remains somewhat behind the scenes. Piya's
involvement in the September 06 coup is not clear. In July
2006, however, Piya told us that the military might intervene
if the political confrontation at that time was not otherwise
revolved. (Comment: In our limited experience with him, Piya
appears to be a very odd character who could well be screwy
enough to be drawn into a misadventure of this kind. End
comment.)

WHO COUPS?
--------------


11. (C) Even in Thailand, it seems like a bad idea to have
your coup plotting regularly discussed in the daily papers.
The prevalence of public commentary, and the resulting close
scrutiny of the First Army, would seem to have a deterrent
effect on successful coupmaking. Like in 2006, however,
there is also some speculation that the government itself
might be looking for an excuse to use military forces loyal
to its side to stifle opposition and safeguard its position.
In such a case, the constant drumbeat of coup warnings could
ultimately benefit the current government, perhaps giving a
justification for a military intervention (declaration of a
state of emergency or martial law, for example) in support of
the government. If the process of amending the constitution
is yet further tangled up and bogged down (ref A),some kind
of "auto-coup" might be one of the few ways to put a stake
through the heart of the 2007 Constitution, allowing the
government to return to the 1997 charter, or something like
it. In this scenario, the persistent reports of threats
against the monarchy could be used by the government as a
further excuse to justify a state of emergency. (Note: In
1976, a bloody assault on a university by right-wing
paramilitaries was provoked in part by false reports that the
students had hanged the Crown Prince in effigy. This kind of
manipulation of alleged threats to the monarchy is not new
here. Neither is the "auto-coup" - a tactic that was employed
in 1971 in response to a somewhat similar time of political
deadlock and tensions. End note.)


COMMENT - NO EXIT, AGAIN
--------------


12. (C) This is a society in desperate need of reconciliation
and a political leadership willing to put the people's
interests first. Both these commodities are in short supply.
Politicians on all sides continue to play politics with the
monarchy, engaging in dangerous and destabilizing
brinksmanship. Smart, moderate contacts are inclined to a
striking pessimism, casting the current crisis as even more
serious than 2006. One told us that the 2006 coup was just a
preliminary round and the coming clash will be a "once in 50
years event." In Dr. Panitan's interview (para 7),he warned

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that, "If there is a military coup again, there will be a
more serious crisis. This time, things are far more serious
than last time."


13. (C) We will continue to warn senior contacts of the
disastrous effect another coup or military intervention would
have, but these decisions will probably not, in the end, be
driven by rational calculations. Personal ambitions -
particularly the interests of senior military officers and
politicians contending for the top jobs -- will play a role.
But the political dynamic is driven more by a deep-seated
fear that, depending on how this conflict plays out, it could
change the very nature of Thailand. Unless the country's
leadership finds a way to achieve some kind of political
truce, at least, we can expect the current turbulence to
persist for the foreseeable future.


JOHN