SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 001611

SIPDIS

SECDEF FOR OSD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR MOPS PINS PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES VISIT
TO THAILAND

Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Mr. Secretary, all of us in Bangkok look
forward to your June 1-2 visit as an opportunity to advance
key U.S. foreign policy interests. Your meeting with Prime
Minister/Defense Minister Samak Sundaravej will provide an
opportunity to emphasize the importance of Thailand to our
regional security interests as the United States and Thailand
celebrate 175 years of relations. You will also have an
opportunity to underscore the United States Government's
commitment to working with a democratically elected Thai
government. End summary.

CLOSE U.S.-THAI RELATIONS
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2. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over
fifty years of close cooperation. Thailand is a Treaty Ally
and Thai soldiers, sailors and airmen participated in the
Korean and Vietnamese conflicts and Thai soldiers served in
Afghanistan and Iraq. American businesses have over $23
billion in direct investment in Thailand and the United
States is Thailand's single largest export market and its
second-largest foreign investor, after Japan.


3. (C) The strength of the military relationship is the
result of an extensive security cooperation relationship,
joint training, and a robust International Military Education
and Training (IMET) program. The result of this close
relationship is that Thailand provides the U.S. with unique
opportunities including live fire training and ready access
to Utapao Naval Air Base. Thailand's willingness to allow
the United States to use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub
for our regional tsunami assistance program was key to making
2004 tsunami relief operations a success and for ongoing
relief flights to Burma after the recent cyclone.


3. (C) Beyond emergency operations, U.S. forces regularly
access Utapao, primarily for flights serving operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, Utapao was designated as the
most important Cooperative Security Location (CSL) in the
Asia Pacific Region. While we avoid using the term "CSL"
with the Thai to avoid sensitivities regarding the perception
of foreign basing, Utapao remains vital to our interests in
the region and is accessed by close to nine hundred flights
annually. In your meetings with Thai military officials, you
will have the opportunity to note our desire to return to a
more healthy military-military relationship and to reaffirm
the importance and value we place on the relationship. We
also enjoy excellent cooperation on counterterrorism and law
enforcement, as demonstrated by the recent collaboration that
led to the arrest of international arms dealer Victor Bout.

REWARDING MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM
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4. (C) Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for
exercises unique in Asia. Thailand offers the United States
military good base infrastructure, large areas in which our
aircraft and ground forces can conduct unrestricted
operations and access to bombing ranges -- all in short
supply in Asia. Located near strategic maritime choke points
and having good liberty ports, Thailand also has the
potential to play a greater role in U.S. Naval planning.
Perhaps due to their lack of a colonial heritage, Thai
leaders are far more willing to host multilateral exercises
than are other countries in Asia. Unlike Japan, which only
hosts annual bilateral exercises due to legal prohibitions
over collective security, or Australia, which avoids
multilateral exercises so as not to "dumb down" its own
training opportunities, the Royal Thai Government supports
multilateral exercises as a way to show regional leadership.
This has allowed us to use our exercises in Thailand to
further key U.S. objectives such as supporting Japan's
growing military role in Asia and engaging the TNI and the
Singaporean military. We have just finished our annual Cobra
Gold exercise -- the only multilateral training exercise in
the Asia-Pacific region. The quick ramping of relief
operations at Utapao and our military's ability to interact
rapidly with Thai counterparts during the recent post-cyclone
crisis in Burma underscored the results of decades of joint

combined exercises, training and cooperation. Other annual
bilateral and multilateral exercises conducted with the Thais
include CARAT, COPE TIGER, and BALANCE TORCH - all of which,
when coupled with long-standing professional military
education ties and weapons procurement programs, serve to
illustrate a close and significant relationship between the
U.S. and Thai Armed Forces.

POLITICAL TENSION REMAINS
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5. (C) Despite Thailand's peaceful transition back to an
elected government earlier this year, underlying tensions
remain unresolved. In 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra won an overwhelming majority in the parliament,
but he was accused of abuse of power, corruption, and
disrespect for the monarchy. In 2006, months of political
protests and legal battles led to a political stalemate over
charges against Thaksin and his party. The Royal Thai Army
launched a coup d'etat in September 2006 after months of
political conflict and many Thais accepted the coup as a
means to resolve the protracted political crisis. However,
most Thais soured on the interim administration as it was
unable to solve underlying political problems. The victory
by pro-Thaksin People's Power Party in the December 2007
election was a setback for supporters of the coup but it did
not resolve the underlying political conflicts in Thai
society. Tensions over fundamental questions, such as the
balance of power between urban elite and the rural
population, could lead to further conflict and calls for
military intervention.

SOUTHERN THAILAND
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6. (C) Southern Thailand has witnessed episodic violence
since its incorporation into Thailand in 1902 and violence in
the ethnic Malay Muslim-led insurgency in southern Thailand
has claimed some 3000 lives since January 2004. The interim
government of former Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont made
some attempts at ending the violence through reconciliation,
but lack of political support and preoccupation with the
on-going political tensions in Bangkok caused these efforts
to stall. The root causes of the insurgency -- government
neglect, human rights abuses, and a lack of social justice,
combined with a desire for some form of self-determination,
have not been addressed by any Thai government to this point.



7. (C) Although there is not yet evidence of foreign
involvement in Southern Thailand, Jemaah Islamiyah has
exploited similar Muslim separatist and religious tensions in
Indonesia, and we remain concerned by the possibility that
southern unrest may attract international terrorist groups.
Southern separatists direct their anger at the government in
Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a U.S. presence or
perception of U.S. involvement in the South could redirect
that anger towards us and link it to the international
jihadist movement -- a link that is currently absent -- we
ensure that any offers of assistance or training pass the
"location and label" test. Put simply, we keep U.S. military
personnel away from the far South and we make sure that we do
not label any assistance or training as directly linked to
the southern situation. The Thai government has supported
this approach and is extremely wary of any perception of U.S.
involvement in the issue.


8. (C) The Embassy maintains a three-pronged focus to improve
our military cooperation in order to address the violence in
the South:
1) Using our exercise and training program to improve the
professional and operational skills of the Royal Thai Armed
Forces, especially the Thai Army;
2) Helping the Thai break down stovepipes between the Thai
military, police forces, and civilian agencies;
3) Doing everything we can to ensure the Thai respect
international human rights norms as they counter the violence.

DIFFERING VIEWS ON BURMA
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9. (C) Responding to the crackdown last year in Burma by the
authorities, then-Prime Minister Surayud used his appearance
at the UN General Assembly to criticize publicly the Burmese
regime's actions in a manner that we viewed as constructive.
In general, however, the Thai bureaucracy, and especially the
military, fears instability in Burma will spill over across
Thailand's border. Thailand relies on Burma for substantial
energy imports as well. These factors incline Thailand to
not challenge the status quo.

REFUGEES SEEN AS A SECURITY ISSUE
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10. (C) The Thai government sees refugee issues as a security
matter and has assigned the National Security Council as the
lead policy agency on the issue. Most of the 140,000 Burmese
refugees stay in nine official camps along the border. The
U.S. accepted over 10,000 of these refugees for resettlement
last year and we expect to reach at least that level this
year and for the foreseeable future. About 8,000 Lao Hmong
are kept in a Royal Thai Army-run facility in northern
Petchaboon province. The Thai have set up an internal,
non-transparent screening process for this vulnerable group,
which may include individuals (and their descendants) who
assisted the U.S. during the Indochina war. This process
also involves other ministries including the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. We are uncertain, however, whether the Thai
screening process will meet international standards; the Thai
have refused to allow UNHCR to play any role in these refugee
determinations. We believe that a portion of the group, but
not a majority, may have a legitimate claim to refugee status
and could face harsh treatment by the Lao government if
returned. Your visit offers an important opportunity to
underscore to the RTG the importance of providing
international standards of protection to those who might have
a well-founded fear of return. Thailand has also permitted
us to process, on a case by case basis, a small number of
North Korean refugees who wish to resettle in the U.S.

INFLUENCE FROM REGIONAL ACTORS
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11. (C) Thailand continues to feel the rising influence of
China. While emphasizing the vital role of the U.S. in the
region -- and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S. engagement
-- Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger relations
with China. While Thai military links with the United States
are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai links,
China's growing influence in Thailand is evident. The Thai
military has a number of Chinese weapons systems in its
arsenal and, after the 2006 coup; China offered Thailand $40
million in military assistance and training. In July 2007,
China and Thailand conducted their first-ever combined
training. Called "Strike-2007", the training marked the
first joint military training that China had held with
another country. The Chinese Navy has worked to intensify
ties with the RTN with a ship visit to Phuket, a joint search
and rescue exercise in the Andaman Sea, and the sale of
equipment. Mil-to-mil exchanges and VIP visits between China
and Thailand have also expanded; including attendance by the
Chinese Minister of Defense and a very large delegation of
generals at the King's birthday celebrations last year.
Russia and India lag behind China for influence in Thailand
despite attempts to forge closer ties with Thailand.

IN CLOSING
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12. (U) We look forward to making your visit a success.
Yours is the first Defense Secretary visit in three yearsand
the Thai are excited that you will visit their country.
JOHN