Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK1370
2008-05-02 11:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

BURMESE PM VISIT: RTG FOCUSES ON ECONOMIC

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM TH BM 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
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P 021125Z MAY 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2917
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 5206
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1661
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5924
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 8673
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5122
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1519
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0203
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0877
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0976
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0696
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5322
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2022
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001370 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CORRECT PARA SEQ NUMBER FROM 8


SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM TH BM
SUBJECT: BURMESE PM VISIT: RTG FOCUSES ON ECONOMIC
COOPERATION, NOT DEMOCRACY

REF: A. BANGKOK 1327

B. BANGKOK 846

C. RANGOON 262

BANGKOK 00001370 001.4 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001370

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CORRECT PARA SEQ NUMBER FROM 8


SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM TH BM
SUBJECT: BURMESE PM VISIT: RTG FOCUSES ON ECONOMIC
COOPERATION, NOT DEMOCRACY

REF: A. BANGKOK 1327

B. BANGKOK 846

C. RANGOON 262

BANGKOK 00001370 001.4 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The RTG used Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein's first
state visit to Thailand primarily to highlight areas of
economic engagement between the neighboring countries. Thai
PM Samak Sundaravej made a show of welcoming Thein Sein to
the Government House and expanding on various opportunities
for collaboration between Thailand and Burma, while seemingly
downplaying concerns in the international community about the
credibility of Burma's upcoming referendum process. In
public statements and private meetings, the RTG proved
reluctant to toughen its position on Burma, preferring to
reiterate its oft-repeated adherence to non-interference,
although FM Noppadon was more forward-leaning. Thein Sein
had an audience with King Bhumibol in which the two
reportedly had a warm exchange of views. End summary.

--------------
RTG SUPPORTIVE OF BURMA'S PATH TO DEMOCRACY
--------------


2. (C) In meetings with Thai officials during his April 29 -
May 1 visit to Thailand, Thein Sein sought to explain the
state of Burma's political situation, MFA Senior Burma Desk
Officer Jirusaya Birananda told PolOff. According to
Jirusaya, MFA Permanent Secretary Virasakdi Futrakul had told
his staff going in to the meeting with Thein Sein that it was
up to the Burmese leaders to determine the best way to move
Burma forward. Thailand's message to the Burmese would
remain clear: the Thais had no intention to deviate from
their core policy of engagement with Burma and adherence to
the principle of non-interference.


3. (C) In discussions with Thailand's Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister, Thein Sein was the one to raise Burma's
political situation, according to MFA sources. He reiterated
the Burmese junta's commitment to its political roadmap and

guaranteed that the constitutional referendum would take
place May 10 as planned. Real political progress would be
made, he maintained, during the two years leading up to the
2010 scheduled elections, during which time Burma's political
parties would have the opportunity to organize. Thein Sein
concluded by repeating Senior General Than Shwe's statement
during Burma's Armed Forces Day that the military would be
willing to transfer power to the civilian government chosen
by the people during the 2010 elections.


4. (C) Jirusaya told us that the RTG was pleased to receive
confirmation of Burma's political plans directly from Thein
Sein. When asked, Jirusaya admitted that neither Thein Sein
nor any RTG officials addressed the issue of the draft
constitution's enshrinement of the Burmese military's hold on
power (Ref C). "We did not get into such specifics" she
responded. She indicated that due to Thailand's own
experience with its military's gradual phasing out of
political involvement, the RTG would be reluctant to
criticize Burma's military for maintaining a role in
governing the country.

BANGKOK 00001370 002.4 OF 004



--------------
BURMESE PM HAS AUDIENCE WITH THE KING
--------------


5. (SBU) King Bhumibol granted Thein Sein an audience on
April 30. A senior ranking official from the Government
House told us that the King's invitation was not a particular
favor to the Burmese leader, but rather a customary formality
given to any foreign leader on a state visit. Our review of
leaders granted an audience with the King during the past
year supported this statement.


6. (C) Arsa Sarasin, King Bhumibol's Principal Private
Secretary, provided Ambassador John on May 1 with the key
points from the audience with King Bhumibol. (Arsa
participated in the one-hour audience.) Arsa said the King
extended warm greetings to Thein Sein, stressing the long
common bond between Thailand and Burma. The King stated
Thein Sein's visit was a "good omen," and the two countries
had to work together, even though the EU and U.S. opposed
such cooperation. Thein Sein agreed to promote Thai-Burmese
cooperation, saying that the King's visit to Burma 30 years
ago remained important, and the tree that he had planted on
that visit remained a valuable symbol, reminding future
generations of the close ties between the Burmese and Thai
people. Understanding the USG's position on the need for
Thai pressure on Burma, Arsa commented to the Ambassador that
the audience had a cordial tone because the Thais "can't
choose our neighbors." Arsa noted that, compared to
Thailand, the U.S. was fortunate to have Canada and Mexico on
its borders.

--------------
RTG OFFICIALS UPBEAT WITH REPORTERS
--------------


7. (C) In encounters with the press during the visit, PM
Samak bluntly stated that the Burmese told him they support
democracy, (and then went on to describe the dinner he
planned to cook for Thein Sein.) Samak further said that the
junta "will put her (ASSK) on the shelf and not bother with
her, which is unacceptable to foreigners. We think it's ok
if she is put on the shelf." In response to the Ambassador's
request for an explanation of this statement, MFA PermSec
Virasakdi said that Samak's remarks were not correctly
translated. Virasakdi claimed that in Thai to "put on the
shelf" referred to placing a Buddha image on an elevated
shelf for worship. The Burmese told Samak that they respect
ASSK as Burmese General Aung San's daughter, and would
respect her more if she were apolitical. The PM's remarks
should be considered in that context, according to the MFA.
(Comment: Even considered in this context, the remarks are
clearly unhelpful. End comment.)


8. (C) FM Noppadon took a more helpful stance, saying that
"Burma's constitutional referendum must be credible, fair,
just and with wide public participation." Noppadon added
that, at the same time, Burma would not act under the command
of other countries but act in self-determination. Army
Commander in Chief General Anupong Paojinda told the press
that "Thailand wants democracy and positive political
development in Burma. Thailand is ready to cooperate, but
will not interfere with Burma's domestic affairs." Burmese
PM Thein Sein did not make any comments to the press while in
Thailand.

BANGKOK 00001370 003.4 OF 004



--------------
ACTIVISTS UNHAPPY
--------------


9. (C) Burmese activists we spoke with were downcast about
the visit. Bangkok-based Teddy Buri -- President of the
Members of Parliament Union, Burma who was a NLD member
elected to Burma's parliament in 1990 but had to flee to
Thailand in 1992 -- surmised that the RTG's handling of Thein
Sein's visit, and Samak's sympathetic comments in particular,
were exactly what the Burmese leaders expected. "The Thais
played right in to their hands," Teddy Buri offered. He
believed that the Burmese generals used the Thais'
willingness to promote a hands-off approach to Burma to ease
pressure from the international community. Samak's
unscripted comments served this purpose well.


10. (C) Longtime Burma advocate Leon de Riedmatten expressed
disappointment that Thailand did not take advantage of Thein
Sein's visit to send a stronger message to the Burmese. He
also questioned the somewhat conflicting statements by Samak
and Noppadon about the RTG's attitude toward political reform
in Burma. He wondered whether there may be an ulterior
motive for Samak's automatic support of everything Thein Sein
told the Thai PM. De Riedmatten told us that unspecified
influential Thais had recently been in touch with him to
discuss possibilities for Thailand doing more on Burma; he
suspected the Thais were upset that Indonesia was taking the
lead on arranging a regional response to the current
political crisis in Burma. The Thais felt they should have
their own initiative on this issue, he concluded.

--------------
AREAS OF COOPERATION EXPLORED
--------------


11. (U) According to press reports and an official MFA
statement, the Burmese and Thai leaders discussed
collaboration in the following areas:

-- development of a deep sea port in Tavoy, Burma, including
supporting transportation and tourism infrastructure;

-- construction of two hydro-electric dams capable of
producing up to 7,000 megawatts of electricity to be shared
with Thailand;

-- construction of a gas pipeline connecting Burma with the
Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate in Rayong, Thailand;

-- signing of an agreement for natural gas production;

-- a strategy framework for development of a crop
substitution program in the Shan State (Thein Sein visited a
similar program in Chiang Rai province - Doi Tung II);

-- contract farming (whereby fallow land in Burma is to be
leased to Thai enterprises at subsidized rates with the
understanding they would employ Burmese);

-- creation of a Mekong rice cartel to allow key producer
countries in the region (i.e. Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam) to exert greater influence on the
world market.


BANGKOK 00001370 004.4 OF 004


--------------
COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Following PM Samak's first official visit to Burma in
March, the MFA told us that the Thai PM viewed himself as a
messenger between the West and Burma (Ref B). Samak recently
reiterated this theme in a call with the Ambassador (Ref A).
However, according to our MFA contact, Samak appeared to be
in listening mode during Thein Sein's recent visit. Our MFA
contact stated that the RTG is sincerely interested in seeing
democracy in Burma, but continues to be content with a wait
and see approach to next week's constitutional referendum and
the subsequent elections slated to take place in 2010. While
the Foreign Minister's public comments were consistent with
this policy position, Samak seemed both off message and too
sympathetic to the Burmese to establish his credibility as a
useful intermediary. We will continue to make our Burma
points with Samak and other senior RTG officials such as the
FM, who clearly understands our points and has made the most
helpful public comments of any senior official.
JOHN