BRUNEI/IRAN: UNSCR 1803 DEMARCHE, READOUT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000097

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2028
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL ECON IR BX
SUBJECT: BRUNEI/IRAN: UNSCR 1803 DEMARCHE, READOUT OF
FORMIN II'S TRIP TO IRAN

REF: A. STATE 21770

B. STATE19694

BANDAR SER 00000097 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon, Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Government of Brunei (GOB) readout of
Foreign Minister II Lim's trip to Tehran paints it as a
non-substantive event designed primarily to satisfy the
diplomatic requirement of responding to a long-standing
Iranian request for a high-level visit. The majority of the
abbreviated agenda was taken up by bilateral economic topics;
international issues, including the dispute over Iran's
nuclear program, were touched upon only briefly. Despite
their hosts' pitch for GOB involvement in Iranian energy
projects, no commitments were made and we expect the
controversy-averse Bruneians to shy away from such
investments. At the same time, the GOB is unlikely to take a
strong stance on the Iranian nuclear program based on our
demarche on UNSCR 1803, although it will adhere to the letter
of the resolution. END SUMMARY.

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FORMIN VISIT TO IRAN: LITTLE SUBSTANCE, MUCH TOURISM
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2. (C) Government of Brunei (GOB) Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Trade II Pehin Lim Jock Seng paid an official
visit to Iran February 21-25 as part of a Gulf swing that
also included Oman. In a brief conversation with Ambassador
shortly after returning to Brunei, Lim explained that his
visit had little significance other than meeting the demands
of diplomatic protocol for GOB relations with a fellow OIC
government. Commenting that "this trip was ten years in the
making," Lim explained that it had been that long since
Tehran first began issuing invitations to GOB officials.
Lim's visit was scheduled, according to him, because the lack
of a positive GOB response for so long was "becoming an
embarrassment." (Comment: In 2006, at USG urging the GOB
declined an Iranian invitation for the Sultan to make an
official visit, and a mooted substitute visit by the Sultan's
brother, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade I Prince
Mohamed Bolkiah, never materialized. End Comment.)


3. (C) At Ambassador's request, MFAT Permsec Datin Maimunah,
who accompanied Lim to Tehran, provided a fuller readout of
the trip during a March 13 meeting in her office. She said
the Bruneian delegation met with Minister of Foreign Affairs
Motaki, MFA Vice Minister for Economic Affairs Sheykh-Attar,
and Minister of Commerce Mir-Kazemi; Sheykh-Attar also hosted
a dinner in Lim's honor. Like Lim, Maimunah minimized the
significance of the visit, explaining that only about a half
day was devoted to substantive meetings and even those were
hindered by the requirement for Farsi-English translation of
all conversations. The remainder of the Bruneians' time in
Iran was taken up by sightseeing trips arranged by their
hosts, including an excursion to Esfahan that included a
visit to that city's Armenian cathedral.

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BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES DOMINATE AGENDA
--------------


4. (C) According to Maimunah, much of Lim's discussions with
Iranian officials was taken up by an exchange of general
ideas for expanding bilateral economic ties, which she
described as currently "minimal" and "in their infancy." The
Iranian side raised the possibility of cooperation on oil and
gas projects, health care and pharmaceuticals, and tourism
promotion; the GOB delegation talked about Iranian food
exporters using the "Brunei Halal" certification to support
their marketing efforts. The Iranians supported their pitch
for Bruneian participation in oil and gas projects within
Iran by arguing that other foreign investors were expanding
their involvement and it was in the GOB interest to act soon
before the best opportunities were snapped up by others.


5. (C) Asked about follow-up to these discussions, Maimunah
replied that the MFAT had requested the GOB Ministry of
Health to consider an exploratory visit to Iran to
investigate, among other things, the potential for importing
Iranian pharmaceuticals. Whether or not the Health Ministry
followed through would depend on whether the economics made
sense. Maimunah said that no specifics about oil and gas
projects were discussed and she was not aware of any serious
consideration being given to GOB participation in Iranian
energy projects.


6. (C) Maimunah said that discussion of foreign affairs had
been minimal, confined primarily to brief exchanges with

BANDAR SER 00000097 002.2 OF 002


Sheykh-Attat and Motaki about how each country saw
developments in its own region. In response to Ambassador's
question about Iranian views of Iraq and Afghanistan, she
said that Lim's hosts did not go beyond their previous public
statements on these topics. Recalling that before the trip
he had urged her to stress to the Iranians the importance of
complying with relevant UNSC resolutions, the Ambassador
asked if there had been any discussion of Iran's nuclear
program. Maimunah said the subject was touched upon only
briefly, with the Iranians repeating the familiar refrain
that their nuclear program was solely civilian in nature and
the GOB restating its hope that the impasse would be overcome
through constructive negotiations.

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DEMARCHE ON UNSCR 1803; GOB SEES PRC AS HELPFUL
-------------- --


7. (C) At the meeting with Maimunah, Ambassador also
presented reftel demarches on UNSCR 1803 and IAEA Deputy
Director General Heinonen's briefing to IAEA member states,
and left behind non-papers, the text of the resolution, and
the P5 1 Foreign Ministers statement. In response to
Maimunah's comment that the GOB still hoped for a negotiated
solution to this problem, Ambassador stressed that the USG
was also intent on a diplomatic solution, but that would
require a united international front to impress upon Tehran
the need for full cooperation to restore confidence in its
intentions. In that regard, he stressed the need for full
GOB adherence to the provisions of UNSCR 1803 and urged a
report to the Sanctions Committee by April 30 on steps taken
to implement its provisions.


8. (C) Maimunah said the GOB would study closely the
resolution and the requirements it imposed upon UN member
states. She told Ambassador that China was being quietly
helpful to "your efforts" behind the scenes. Asked to
elaborate, she said the Chinese were telling the Iranians
"help us to help you by showing some flexibility." Maimunah
demurred when the Ambassador asked what led her to make that
assertion, explaining that the Chinese prefer to keep a low
profile on this issue and not broadcast their activity too
widely.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) It's hardly surprising that Lim and Maimunah
downplayed the significance of their discussions in Tehran
when speaking to the American Ambassador. Even allowing for
that, however, it does not appear that much came out of their
visit. We note that Iran's official media paid hardly any
attention, confining its coverage to short and nondescript
press releases. The confrontation-averse GOB will probably
continue to avoid any steps that could involve it in Iran's
conflict with the UNSC over its nuclear program, to include
both partnering with the Iranians on controversial energy
projects as well as pressing them vigorously for full
compliance with relevant UNSCR's. END COMMENT.
SKODON