Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAMAKO968
2008-12-29 16:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

EFFORTS TO SAVE ALGIERS ACCORDS ACCELERATE AS

Tags:  PGOV PINS PINR ASEC ML 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6164
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0968/01 3641638
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 291638Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9871
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0524
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000968 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR ASEC ML
SUBJECT: EFFORTS TO SAVE ALGIERS ACCORDS ACCELERATE AS
BAHANGA RUNS AMOK

REF: A. BAMAKO 00960

B. BAMAKO 00623

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000968

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR ASEC ML
SUBJECT: EFFORTS TO SAVE ALGIERS ACCORDS ACCELERATE AS
BAHANGA RUNS AMOK

REF: A. BAMAKO 00960

B. BAMAKO 00623

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary: Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim Bahanga and
members of his Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change
(ATNMC) skirmished with Malian forces outside the towns of
Nara and Goumbou on December 24, then camped on the outskirts
of Mourdiah - approximately 260 KM north of Bamako - until
December 27. Tuareg contacts in Bamako reported receiving
telephone calls from ATNMC members with gleeful messages
about being just around the corner. On December 27 and 28
ATNMC spokesman Hama ag Sid'Ahmed issued statements claiming
the ATNMC was monitoring the Kati-Nioro and Koulikoro-Nara
roads. Although the Paris-based Sid'Ahmed is likely
overstating the ATNMC's reach, a false report of an impending
rebel attack in the western town of Nioro on December 26 sent
Malian soldiers and local residents scrambling for cover.
Tuaregs and others are still assessing whether Bahanga is
acting independently or receiving tacit support from
Mauritania, AQIM, or others. Following Bahanga's deadly
December 20 attack on Nampala (Ref. A) the newly emerging
leader of the Tuareg rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change
(ADC),National Assembly Deputy Alghabass ag Intallah, called
President Amadou Toumani Toure and several senior Malian
military officers to condemn Bahanga's actions and reiterate
the ADC's commitment to the Algiers Accords. With the Tuareg
rebel conflict rapidly escalating, representatives from Mali,
Algeria and the ADC plan to meet in Kidal on December 30, to
discuss - once again - the creation of mixed military units
per the Algiers Accords. Alghabass ag Intallah and several
influential actors in Bamako now seem to regard the mixed
units as key to saving the Accords and undermining Bahanga.
End Summary.

--------------
Bahanga at Large along Mauritanian Frontier
--------------

2.(C) On December 24 Tuareg rebels led by Ibrahim Bahanga
clashed with Malian forces on the outskirts of Nara and
Goumbou. Both towns are south of the Mauritanian frontier in
the Malian region of Koulikoro. This is the first time

Tuareg rebels have ventured into the central region of
Koulikoro. The ATNMC's Paris-based spokesman and Bahanga
father-in-law Hama ag Sid'Ahmed issued a statement on
December 27 claiming to have destroyed two Malian army
vehicles. The Malian army reinforcements encircling Nara
reportedly prevent Bahanga from reaching the town. Mali also
made a show of its two Hind-D helicopters, flying them over
the skies of Bamako on December 25 for what was described as
a routine reconnaissance operation. The Nara and Goumbou
incidents produced no injuries, although the rebels
reportedly made off with two stolen 4x4s and briefly detained
two unfortunate passersby to serve as guides. One local
newspaper reported that several civilians traveling in a taxi
bus near Nara were injured on December 26 when someone opened
fire on the vehicle, but we have yet to confirm this
information.

3.(C) From December 25-27 Bahanga and his group apparently
camped near the town of Mourdiah, about 260 KM north of
Bamako. Kidal Chamber of Commerce president Abdousalam ag
Assalat told the Embassy on December 29 that he received
telephone calls from members of Bahanga's group while they
were camped in Mourdiah. Ag Assalat noted that the callers
were using the local Malian cell phones as opposed to
satellite phones and were therefore well within reach of
Mali's cellular telephone network. Ag Assalat, who is in
Bamako for the treatment of his ailing mother, said some
rebels called him to ask after his mother's health and joke
that they were now just around the corner, on the outskirts
of Bamako. Ag Assalat said he believed Bahanga and his group
left Mourdiah to return to Mauritania on December 28 because
ATNMC members were once again using their satellite phones to
call Tuaregs in Bamako.

4.(SBU) Heightened uncertainty and reports of Bahanga
popping up in unexpected places triggered a December 26
security alert in the western town of Nioro just south of the
Mauritanian border. One Malian newspaper described scenes of
panic with shopkeepers closing their stores and Malian
soldiers and local residents building barricades out of
tires, rocks and pieces of wood. Contacted by the Embassy on
December 29, the Prefect of Nioro, Lt. Col. Falle Tangara,
attributed the alert to rumors emanating from Nara and the
disappearance of two Tuareg soldiers from the Nioro military

BAMAKO 00000968 002 OF 003


barracks. Both soldiers were integrated into the Malian army
following northern Mali's 1991-1995 rebellion. On December
27 Nioro's mayor spoke on three local FM radio stations to
reassure the population and run rumor control. Lt. Col.
Tangara and Nioro's leader of Tidjani Muslims, Amadaou Tall,
told the Embassy that as of December 29 Nioro was calm.


--------------
ADC Denies Involvement
--------------

5.(C) Following the Nampala attack, National Assembly Deputy
and emerging ADC leader Alghabass ag Intallah called
President Amadou Toumani Toure and senior Malian military
leaders to denounce the Nampala attack, distance the ADC from
Bahanga, and restate the ADC's dedication to the Algiers
process. Alghabass called President Toure from the ADC's
base in the mountains outside of Kidal.

6.(C) Some Tuareg rebels with shifting or dual loyalties to
the ADC and ATNMC were involved in the Nampala attack. It
does not appear that any of these individuals are under the
ADC's control. One of the rebels wounded at Nampala and
transported to the Mauritanian town of Fassala for treatment
was reportedly an ADC member. The ADC's as yet still private
condemnation of Bahanga, however, appears genuine. On
December 24 one Bamako newspaper published an article linking
Bahanga with the Mayor of the Mauritanian town of
Bassikounou, which is just north of Nampala. On December 29
a different Bamako newspaper accused Mohamed Mahamoud Ould
Sidi, identified as a former Mayor of Bassikounou and a
narco-trafficker, of supporting Bahanga. The December 24
article gave the names of two Malian Tuaregs fighting with
Bahanga: Mahdi ag Boghassa (aka Mahdi ag Boghada) and Malik
ag Wanassnet. Bogada is an Idnane Tuareg based in
Mauritania. Wanassnet, along with Ibrahim ag Banna, are both
former ADC members who have since joined Bahanga. Wanassnet
and Banna,s participation in the Nampala attack could
account for some of the reports regarding ADC involvement.

--------------
If Not the ADC, Then Who?
--------------

7.(C) There is a considerable amount of speculation among
northern Malians over who is helping Bahanga. While Bahanga
clearly has the capacity to attack the Malian military in
Kidal, it would be difficult for him to operate for prolonged
periods along the Mali-Mauritania border without some local
assistance. The European Union, the U.S., Senegal, and
Mauritanian military junta all issued statements of
condemnation following Bahanga's Dec. 20 attack on Nampala.
Despite the December 24 statement from Nouakchott, some in
Mali believe Mauritania has found a friend in Bahanga. On
December 24 ag Assalat told the Embassy that he suspects
Mauritania is using Bahanga to exact revenge for Mali's
refusal to seek accreditation for the new Malian Ambassador
to Mauritania and the decision not to invite Mauritania to
the November 2008 Ministerial Security Summit in Bamako. Ag
Assalat said Mauritania facilitated Bahanga's return to
northern Mali from Libya one month ago, and that Bahanga
traveled by air from Tripoli to Nouakchott on a Mauritanian
passport to meet with senior Mauritanian officials. Ag
Assalat told the Embassy that Bahanga has no Malian passport
and had once asked ag Assalat to help him obtain one, but ag
Assalat refused. Ag Assalat said a Mauritanian government
vehicle drove Bahanga to the Malian frontier after his
meetings in Nouakchott in November 2008.

8.(C) Others suspect Bahanga is receiving support from
Berabiche Arabs living in the region of Timbuktu. Bahanga
has on occasion met with Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed, a former
Berabiche rebel leader who co-founded the Arab Islamic Front
for the Azawad (FIAA) during the rebellion of the 1990s and
is now resident in Nouakchott (Ref. B). A former school
teacher in his late 60s or early 70s, Ould Sidi Mohamed is
hardly a rebel type. He is still clearly devoted to greater
autonomy for northern Mali, however, and seems to regard
Bahanga as legitimate voice for northern Mali rather than a
self-interested bandit turned narco-trafficker. Although
Sidi Mohamed is somewhat out of the loop as far as
contemporary rebellions in northern Mali are concerned, he
may still have some pull with Malian Arabs. Sidi Mohamed
accompanied the Tuareg rebel delegation that met with
Minister of Territorial Administration, General Kafougouna
Kone, in Algiers in July 2008, much to the chagrin of
Minister Kone.


BAMAKO 00000968 003 OF 003


9.(C) Still others believe Bahanga may be moving closer to
members of AQIM. On December 26 Moulaye Danna, a local
Berabiche leader based in Timbuktu, called the Embassy to
state that Tuareg rebels associated with Bahanga were meeting
with AQIM at a village on the Malian side of the Mauritanian
border north of Timbuktu.

--------------
Comment: Managing Bahanga Through Mixed Units
--------------

10.(C) Bahanga's foray into the regions of Segou and
Koulikoro in central Mali constitute a significant threat to
the viability of the Algiers framework. Many have
interpreted Bahanga's end run around against the Malian
military and civilian population via the region of Timbuktu
and Mauritania as a declaration of war. The attacks also
cast a darker shadow over Tuareg rebel leader Iyad ag Ghali's
role as many in Mali see a link, whether real or imagined,
between ag Ghali's return from Saudi Arabia and Bahanga's
decision to fire away. Either Bahanga is beyond ag Ghali's
control - a development which is difficult to believe given
ag Ghali's role within the Tuareg rebellion - or ag Ghali
quietly approved of Bahanga's actions for reasons that remain
unknown. Either way, ag Ghali is appearing to be more part
of the problem than part of the solution.

11.(C) The good news, if there is any, is that Malian
officials have resisted attempts to lump Tuareg rebels loyal
to the ADC - apparently now led by Alghabass ag Intallah - in
with those responsible for attacking Nampala and harassing
local populations in Nara, Goumbou, and Mourdiah.
Alghabass's emergence as the ADC's resident leader in Mali,
thereby displacing ADC spokesman and fellow National Assembly
Deputy Ahmada ag Bibi, is also a welcome change. Unlike ag
Bibi, whose role as ADC spokesman is due in large part to
prior service as one of ag Ghali's business partners in a
Kidal based tourism agency, Alghabass has the pedigree and
charisma needed to lead Malian Tuaregs of the Adrar des
Ifoghas. Alghabass also apparently seems to understand the
utility of creating mixed military units, both in terms of
the tangible fulfillment the Algiers Accords and also as a
public relations move capable of neutralizing Bahanga.

12.(C) Malian and Tuareg leaders have repeatedly told the
Embassy that there is no viable military or judicial solution
to Bahanga, and that a political settlement - preferably
entailing Bahanga's assignment to a far-flung Malian Embassy
or consulate provided there is a country willing to accept
him - is the only option. A mixed military unit with the
potential to draw in some of those supportive of Bahanga
could set the stage for this kind of settlement. Members of
the Algiers Accords steering committee are planning on
meeting in Kidal, together with Alghabass and ag Bibi, on
December 30 to discuss, once again, the creation of one or
more mixed military units. Several independent observers in
Bamako - including former Minister of Defense and Head of
State Security Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga - have reportedly
urged President Toure to revisit the mixed military units,
arguing that these units are the key to saving the Accords
and undercutting Bahanga. Some of their suggestions
reportedly entail asking the European Union, France, and the
United States for rapid assistance in standing up one or more
mixed units.
LEONARD