Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAMAKO960
2008-12-23 12:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

ASSESSING BAHANGA'S ATTACK ON NAMPALA

Tags:  ASEC PINS PGOV PINR ML 
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VZCZCXRO3464
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0960/01 3581256
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231256Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9862
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0521
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000960 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018
TAGS: ASEC PINS PGOV PINR ML
SUBJECT: ASSESSING BAHANGA'S ATTACK ON NAMPALA

REF: A. BAMAKO 419

B. BAMAKO 463

C. BAMAKO 932

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000960

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018
TAGS: ASEC PINS PGOV PINR ML
SUBJECT: ASSESSING BAHANGA'S ATTACK ON NAMPALA

REF: A. BAMAKO 419

B. BAMAKO 463

C. BAMAKO 932

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary. A band of Tuareg rebels led by Ibrahim
Bahanga attacked the Malian military post in Nampala, in the
northernmost portion of the central region of Segou, during
the early morning hours of December 20. Fighting reportedly
lasted for several hours. Estimates of Malian casualties,
both military and civilian, remain hazy. Military contacts
reported 20 soldiers killed and 11 others wounded. Malian
government contacts have reported numbers nearly twice as
high. There are also conflicting reports about whether
Bahanga captured any Malian soldiers during the offensive.
President Amadou Toumani Toure appeared on national
television after the attack. Although evidently exasperated
by Bahanga, Toure once again sought to defuse any simmering
ethnic tensions by re-asserting Mali's commitment to peace in
the north and portraying Bahanga as nothing more than a
self-interested narco-trafficker. Possible explanations for
Bahanga's attack on Nampala vary, with some speculating that
Bahanga is trying to strengthen his negotiating position in
advance of renewed meetings over the Algiers Accords in
Kidal, and others believing that Bahanga is simply trying to
provoke Mali and other northern actors into a full-scale
rebellion. End Summary.

--------------
Details of Attack in Nampala
--------------

2.(U) Tuareg rebels associated with Ibrahim Bahanga attacked
the Malian military base in Nampala during the early morning
hours of December 20. Nampala is the northernmost town in
the central region of Segou, near Mali's border with
Mauritania. On December 22 the Malian government newspaper
l'Essor said the incident marked the first time Bahanga has
attacked Malian forces outside his home region of Kidal.
This is not, howver, the first time Tuareg rebels have
attacked military outpost in the Segou region. On May 6,
2008, Tuareg rebels aligned with the Alliance for Democracy
and Change (ADC) attacked the military base in Diabali, a
little more than 100KM south of Nampala along the road to

Niono (site of the MCC irrigation project) and Segou (Ref. A).

3.(U) According to the l'Essor, the group that attacked
Nampala had 16 4x4s carrying more than 50 individuals.
Casualty numbers vary widely. The l'Essor reported 15 Malian
soldiers killed and 13 others wounded. The l'Essor reported
an unknown number of "bandits" killed or wounded, and claimed
that Malian forces captured 2 attackers. The rebels took
three Malian soldiers hostage.

4.(C) Casualty numbers provided by Malian officials are
somewhat higher. Malian military contacts told the DATT's
office that 20 Malian soldiers were killed and another 11
were wounded. Separate government sources, including
Minister of Territorial Administration, General Kafougouna
Kone, told the Embassy that casualties were closer to 50 or
60 individuals. Several Malian contacts said losses suffered
by the Malian military were much greater than those incurred
during the May 21 attack by the ADC in Abeibara, in the
region of Kidal, which left perhaps as many as 30 Malian
soldiers dead and several dozen captured (Ref. B).

5.(C) Initial reports indicated that some civilians living in
the camp may have been among those killed or wounded. Malian
officials have subsequently insisted that casualties were
limited to Malian military personnel. On December 23 the
Algerian DCM told the Embassy that he believed civilian
casualties had occurred and that this marked the first time a
Tuareg rebel attack has killed or wounded civilians.
Information regarding potential hostages is also
contradictory. Two government sources told the Embassy on
December 21 that three soldiers were captured during the
attack, including the Prefect or Sub-Prefect of Nampala. On
December 23 military sources told the Embassy that reports of
Malian soldiers captured by Bahanga in Nampala were
incorrect. The Algerian DCM also said he did not believe any
hostages were taken. Tuareg sources, on the other hand, have
indicated the presence of new hostages. Tuareg contacts also
report that two rebels were killed and an unknown number
wounded. Bahanga may have transported his wounded to
Fasalla, which is near Nampala but just inside the
Mauritanian border.

--------------

BAMAKO 00000960 002 OF 003


President Toure's Response
--------------

6.(U) A few hours after the Nampala attack, President Toure
delivered remarks that were replayed on Malian television and
RFI. In some respects President Toure's remarks were
similar to those he delivered after the May 23, 2006, attacks
by the ADC on military outposts in Menaka and Kidal. Both
speeches defused simmering ethnic and regional tensions by
urging Malians not to associate the vast majority of
law-abiding, patriotic northern Malians with a small,
marginalized group of Tuareg bandits. The Nampala attack,
said Toure as quoted by l'Essor, was orchestrated by "an
isolated band within the Tuareg and Kidal communities. This
means it had nothing to do with ethnicity. There are Tuareg
soldiers in the army. The group that committed this act
doesn't even have any demands. The attack in Nampala was
committed by a marginal group. We must not let a
marginalized band destroy our reputation."

7.(U) Although President Toure's speech was not bellicose,
it indicated that he has reached his limit in so far as
Bahanga is concerned. "Enough is enough," said Toure as
quoted by the l'Independant newspaper, "We will not cross our
arms in order to count our dead. Those who committed this
cowardly attack are the same ones who have distanced
themselves from the Algiers Accords. I have tried everything
to bring them back to the peace process. I am a partisan of
peace. I work for peace, but I will never accept just any
peace. Those who attacked Nampala and who claim to be
fighting for the development of their region are enemies of
the peace, without which there will be no development. I am
telling you that 3 billion CFA are ready to be injected into
the region of Kidal but, because of their aggression and the
insecurity they are sowing in that part of our country, we
are unable to boost Kidal's development."

--------------
Why Nampala
--------------

8.(C) The Malian military was, once again, caught completely
unawares and unprotected. This is strange since several days
prior to the attack a number of sources signaled the presence
of Bahanga's group with a dozen or more 4x4s near Timbuktu,
which is a long ways from Bahanga's stomping ground of
Tinzawaten along Mali's eastern frontier with Algeria. The
road map for contemporary rebel attacks seems to be very
similar to the one Tuareg rebels used in the 1990s. There is
little creativity here: Tuareg rebels are attacking places
they hit in the 1990s that also have military posts with
significant quantities of weapons and equipment. Rebels
attacked both Diabali and Nampala in the 1990s. Although
both of these towns are in the central region of Segou, their
proximity to the Mauritanian frontier provides rebels with
relatively easy access. Other army posts hit in the 1990s
that remaa.S~rgets due to their proximity to Mauritania
are Nara in the region of Koulikoro and Nioro in the region
of Kayes. Additional potential targets that were attacked
during the 1990s include Goundam, Lere, and Lerneb. These
three towns are in the region of Timbuktu, however, and
attacking them could create complications with Malian Arab
communities, something Tuareg rebels would presumably prefer
to avoid.

--------------
Impact on Algiers Accords
--------------

9.(C) Two ways of interpreting the Nampala attack have
emerged. The previous wave of Tuareg rebel attacks - which
included attacks against military installations in Diabali,
Aguelhok, Abeibara, Ansongo and Tesslit - occurred in advance
of July 2008 talks between the Malian government and Tuareg
rebels in Algiers. These attacks seemed to signal an attempt
by various rebel groups to reinforce their positions in
advance of these negotiations. Bahanga's attack on Nampala
could be his way of solidifying his power prior to upcoming
talks in Kidal involving ag Ghali, Minister of Territorial
Administration Kafougouna Kone, and others.

10.(C) A more disturbing analysis is that Bahanga is simply
out to destroy the Algiers Accords process, draw other rebel
factions - both Tuareg and Arab - into the conflict, and
provoke the Malian military into responding with force.
There is some reporting that Bahanga is interested in
expanding the conflict through renewed attacks against the
Malian military (Ref. C).

11.(C) The Algerian Embassy's DCM told the Embassy on

BAMAKO 00000960 003 OF 003


December 23 that he did not believe the Nampala attack would
seriously alter the Algiers process. However, he noted that
the was the first time civilians were killed during an attack
by Tuareg rebels and said Nampala likely presaged a turning
point in Mali's policy toward Bahanga.

--------------
Comment: Mission Bahanga
--------------

12.(C) President Toure's remarks following the Nampala
attack likely defused, for the time being, any tendency among
the Malian public to hold all Malian Tuaregs accountable for
Bahanga's actions. Patience with Bahanga both within the
Malian government and the general public, however, has run
out. Politically Toure cannot single-handedly hold back the
growing tide of resentment toward restive Tuaregs. At some
point the public outrage over Bahanga's violence and Mali's
apparent willingness to take each attack on the chin may
overwhelm the President. Already many opposition leaning
newspapers in Bamako are calling for Mali to declare war on
Bahanga. It is difficult to see how President Toure can
afford not to respond given the brazenness of Bahanga's
attack in Nampala and the number of casualties inflicted.
The challenge for Toure and the Malian military is crafting a
response that pinpoints Bahanga without dragging other Tuareg
rebel factions, which remain committed to the Algiers
Accords, back into the fray. Since this is likely what
Bahanga has in mind, the Malians need to carefully weigh
their options and plan accordingly in order to avoid a repeat
of previous failed efforts to engage Bahanga militarily.
MILOVANOVIC