TOP REBEL: THE RETURN OF IYAD AG GHALI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000932

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2018
TAGS: PINR PINS ASEC ML
SUBJECT: TOP REBEL: THE RETURN OF IYAD AG GHALI

REF: A. BAMAKO 00918

B. BAMAKO 00902

C. BAMAKO 00901

D. BAMAKO 00482

E. IIR 6 958 0118 08

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary: Recent meetings with Tuareg rebel Alliance
for Democracy and Change (ADC) spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi in
Bamako and civilian and military leaders in Kidal provided
more insight into the impact of Tuareg rebel leader Iyad ag
Ghali's return to Mali. President Amadou Toumani Toure
appears to have taken a calculated risk by recalling ag Ghali
from his one year sabbatical with the Malian consulate in
Djeddah, Saudi Arabia. Ag Ghali's return shuffled the
balance of power in Kidal, re-energized a stalled peace
process, and may have prevented Bahanga from resuming
hostilities - at least for now - against the Malian military.
The price President Toure will ultimately pay in terms of
concessions or crisis management should his ag Ghali gamble
fail remains unclear. Tuareg leaders now see Bahanga's
participation as indispensable to Algiers Accords
implementation. Neither the Tuaregs nor Mali appear any
closer to constituting any mixed military units as stipulated
by the Accords. The next sign post for peace negotiations
appears to be a mid-December meeting in Kidal between the
Malian government and Tuareg rebel leaders including ag Ghali
and Bahanga. Meanwhile the increasingly frail traditional
leader - or Amenokal - of Kidal Tuaregs, Intallah ag Attaher,
was reportedly in fair condition at a private clinic in
Bamako following a December 3 operation to treat a leg
infection. Ag Attaher has been Kidal's Amenokal since 1963.
End Summary.

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The Tuareg Files: Ag Bibi Benched
--------------

2.(C) The Embassy met with National Assembly Deputy and ADC
spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi on December 2 to discuss Tuareg
rebel leader Iyad ag Ghali's return to Mali to manage what
many Malians refer to simply as the "Tuareg File." President
Toure recalled ag Ghali in late November, then dispatched him
to Kidal on November 27 to negotiate the release of four
Malian officers still held captive by dissident Tuareg rebel
leader Ibrahim Bahanga (Ref. A). Providing further evidence
of ag Bibi's shrinking stature within the ADC, ag Bibi told
the Embassy he believed ag Ghali had returned to Bamako on
December 1 with one or two liberated soldiers, but couldn't
be sure because ag Ghali had yet to contact him and the
information ag Bibi had acquired was filtered through fellow
National Assembly Deputy and apparent ag Ghali confidant
Alghabass ag Intallah. We subsequently confirmed that ag
Ghali returned to Bamako on December 1 with only one of
Bahanga's four remaining prisoners.

3.(C) Asked whether the ADC had changed course and sought
once again to involve Bahanga in talks with Mali and Algerian
mediators, Ag Bibi described an internal debate within the
ADC. Like ag Ghali, ag Bibi said Bahanga needed to be part
of the Algiers Accords process but added that if Bahanga were
to return to the Algiers framework, it should be on Mali, the
ADC, and Algeria's terms. "We," said ag Bibi in reference to
the ADC, "are working with the Malians and the Algerians.
Bahanga has no plan for the Tuaregs. All he wants to do is
attack."

4.(C) Ag Bibi told the Embassy that he met with Bahanga on
November 10 in Bourghessa in northern Mali, just days after
Bahanga's return from Libya. During this meeting, Bahanga
proposed renewed attacks against the Malian military. Ag
Bibi said he convinced not Bahanga but some members of
Bahanga's entourage to remain calm and avoid provoking the
Malian army or derailing the Algiers Accords. Ag Bibi
complained that even fellow Tuaregs could not understand
Bahanga, that Bahanga speaks neither French nor Arabic
fluently and has trouble simply expressing himself clearly in
Tamachek.

5.(C) Ag Bibi also lent support to the idea, raised by ag
Ghali previously, of blanket amnesty for individuals
implicated in hostilities that occurred after the signing of
the July 2006 Algiers Accords. Ag Bibi said amnesty would
enable Tuareg rebels to return to Kidal and would also
provide Mali with a face-saving way of extricating itself
from entanglements created by the April 10 executions of
Barka ag Cheikh and Mohammed ag Moussa in Kidal. Ag Bibi
said there was no chance Mali would ever investigate the

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murders. "I know how things work in African countries," said
Ag Bibi. Since Tuareg rebels suspect the Malian military
officers still held by Bahanga of involvement in the
executions, an amnesty agreement for Tuareg fighters could
possibly open a door to liberating Bahanga's remaining
prisoners as well.

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Kidal Still Largely Deserted
--------------

6.(C) The town of Kidal appeared largely deserted during a
December 3-5 visit by the Embassy. In June 2008 the head of
the Malian Red Cross in Kidal estimated that 70 to 80 percent
of city's residents fled following the April 10 executions of
Barka ag Cheikh and Mohamed ag Moussa. Local leaders now
claim that much of the population has returned. To an
outside observer, however, Kidal still appears largely
deserted, with few people on the streets or in the market
during the day and no evident noise, lights, traffic or
pedestrians visible after dark. The unusuallycold weather -
night temperatures were in the mi 40s - could have explained
the town's apparent mptiness. Others speculated that
residents weretraveling to town during the day, but sleeping
innearby desert encampments at night.

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Ag Ghali Claims Center Stage
--------------

7.(C) Sitting in the five-sided office - dubbed "the
Pentagon" - of the newly constructed and conspicuously
labeled "El Hadj Abdousalam ag Assalat Building" in downtown
Kidal on December 3, local Chamber of Commerce president and
ADC member Abdousalam ag Assalat explained how Ghali's return
had short-circuited all other attempts to placate Bahanga.
In mid-November ag Assalat contacted the Embassy to report
that he was close to winning the liberation of the four
Malian military officers still held by Bahanga (Ref. B). On
November 22 ag Assalat and ten other Kidal leaders mostly
belonging to the Taghat Melet fraction of Malian Tuaregs met
with Bahanga to discuss the peace process and the fate of the
four Malian prisoners.

8.(C) According to notes drawn up by a member of the Taghat
Melet delegation, ag Assalat and others urged Bahanga to
liberate the hostages as good-will gesture in return for
direct talks with President Toure. Bahanga initially
refused, citing Mali's failure to respond to his liberation
of several dozen other prisoners in September. The Taghat
Melet delegation's demarche, however, was unusually
compelling because Bahanga is holding the four Malians
soldiers to avenge the as-yet unsolved murders of two Taghat
Melet Tuaregs: ag Cheikh and ag Moussa. Ag Assalat and other
Taghat Melets asked Bahanga not to hold the Malians on their
behalf and encouraged Bahanga to release the four prisoners
in favor of other, more constructive means of honoring the
lives of ag Cheikh and ag Moussa.

9.(C) Ag Assalat said he thought Bahanga had agreed to
accept the Taghat Melet request. "Then," said ag Assalat,
"Iyad called." As Assalat accused ag Ghali of explicitly
instructing Bahanga not to release any of the prisoners to
anyone but himself. Ag Assalat said ag Ghali devised the
December 1 release of just one of the four hostages to cement
his position as the unchallenged leader of Tuareg rebels in
Bamako and Kidal, and predicted that ag Ghali would draw out
the release of the remaining three prisoners in a "drip drip"
fashion in order to "reassert" his role as northern Mali's
undisputed power broker.

10.(C) Ag Assalat also confirmed a report by ag Bibi that ag
Ghali traveled to Kidal on November 27 with Ben Mouloud - an
Arab/Songhai businessman from the town of Gao. Although this
is the first time we have heard of Ben Mouloud, both ag Bibi
and ag Assalat said President Toure frequently relies on Ben
Mouloud to conduct unofficial negotiations with Tuareg rebels
in advance of official talks normally led by Minister of
Territorial Administration, General Kafougouna Kone.

11.(C) In addition to negotiating with Bahanga, ag Ghali and
Ben Mouloud also initiated preparations for an upcoming
meeting between the Malian government and Tuareg rebels
(including ag Ghali and Bahanga) in Kidal. Ag Assalat and
the President of Kidal's Regional Assembly, Intahmadou ag
Albacher, both said a meeting was tentatively set for the
days following the December 8 holiday of Tabaski. Minister
Kone is expected to represent the Malian government. Ag
Albacher said ag Ghali's unexpected return to Mali derailed
the plan, reportedly reached during the last meeting of the

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Algiers Accords oversight committee held November 15-17 in
Kidal (Ref. C),for Tuareg rebel combatants to start
returning to Kidal on December 2.

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April Executions and Bahanga's Firepower
--------------

12.(C) Ag Assalat reported that Minister of Internal
Security Sadio Gassama, who traveled to Kidal for the Nov.
15-17 oversight committee meeting, privately told an
assembled group of Tuareg leaders that he too believed rogue
members of the Malian military were likely involved in the
April 10 murders of ag Cheikh and ag Moussa. According to ag
Assalat, Minister Gassama admitted that there was little the
Malian government could do in terms of identifying the
killers or bringing them to justice. Ag Assalat said he also
regarded an eventual murder inquiry as a non-starter.

13.(C) Coaxing Bahanga back to the negotiation table could
be difficult. During the November 22 meeting with Bahanga,
ag Assalat and fellow members of the Taghat Melet delegation
observed what ag Assalat described as a vehicle mounted heavy
artillery rocket launcher with a range of 25 km. Ag Assalat
said Bahanga acquired the artillery from Darfur and compared
Bahanga's affinity for new weaponry to a small child with a
new toy. "He needs to try them," said ag Assalat, "like he
did with the land mines."

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Mixed Units Still Theoretical
--------------

14.(C) Col. Elhadj Gamou, the senior Malian military
commander in Kidal, appeared half-way through our December 3
meeting with ag Assalat at the "Pentagon" in Kidal. Our
brief discussion with Gamou never moved beyond pleasantries.
Afterwards, however, ag Assalat said Gamou's private Tuareg
Imghad militia, formed in May 2008 (Ref. D),continued to
operate. Ag Assalat said that as an Imghad from Gao, Gamou
needed this para-military group to assure his own security
and provide intelligence Tuaregs belonging to other northern
fractions would withhold.

15.(C) On December 4, one of Col. Gamou's deputies, Lt. Col.
Malik, unexpectedly materialized at dinner at ag Assalat's
residence. LTC Malik is an Imghad Tuareg from Kidal who
reportedly played a key role in calming tensions in Kidal
following the April 10 murders (Ref. E). He and Col. Gamou
belong to a small cadre of ethnic Tuareg senior military
officers who remained loyal to the Malian government
following the May 2006 attacks by Tuareg rebels on Malian
military outposts in Menaka and Kidal.

16.(C) Although Malik was evidently uncomfortable speaking
to the Embassy about current events in Kidal without
authorization from Col. Gamou, he did offer a few
observations on the status of the mixed military units
stipulated by the Algiers Accords. Malik described the mixed
units as no closer to fruition now than the day the Accords
were signed in July 2006. He said there was no consensus
within the Malian or Tuareg camps regarding who would, or
could, command one or more mixed units, where these units
would be based, how they would be equipped, and what missions
they would undertake. Since the mixed units would presumably
be comprised of non-Imghad Ifoghas Tuaregs drawn from the
ranks of the ADC and Bahanga, Malik and Col. Gamou may be
concerned that the creation of an eventual mixed unit could
undermine their own positions within the Malian military - a
intra-Tuareg consideration that presents yet another hurdle
along the road to the creation of mixed military units.

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Aged Leader of Kidal Tuaregs in Bamako
--------------

17.(C) As momentum toward a meeting between Mali, ag Ghali,
and Bahanga appeared to gather speed in Kidal, the aged
traditional leader of the Kidal Tuaregs traveled to Bamako
for medical care. Intallah ag Attaher became Amenokal of
Kidal following Mali's first Tuareg rebellion of 1963. He
injured his leg in a vehicle accident in 2005 and
subsequently sought treatment in Algeria. Last week's
operation was reportedly to treat an infection stemming from
the 2005 accident. Although the Amenokal's power is largely
symbolic, the selection of ag Attaher's eventual successor
could play an important role in peace talks with the Malian
government - depending on who is tapped as the next Amenokal.
Ag Attaher has three sons - Mohamed ag Intallah, Alghabass
ag Intallah, and Atiyoub ag Intallah. Both Mohamed and

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Alghabass are National Assembly Deputies. The younger
Atiyoub is Mayor of Kidal. As the eldest son, Mohamed, is
the obvious successor. However, Mohamed is widely regarded
by fellow Tuaregs as the least intelligent and least dynamic
of the trio. Middle son Alghabass, on the other hand,
appears to have the charisma and leadership qualities Mohamed
so evidently lacks.

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Comment: The Ag Ghali Agenda
--------------

18.(C) Often maligned for his tendency toward the
non-decision, President Toure took a calculated risk by
recalling ag Ghali back to Mali. After several months of
false starts and on-again, off-again negotiations, ag Ghali
is the only Tuareg capable of herding - if indeed that is
possible - Bahanga and the disparate Tuareg micro-rebel
groups back into the ADC tent. Ag Ghali's notoriously
inscrutable character, however, makes it difficult to predict
the direction in which he will steer renewed talks between
Mali and the Tuareg rebellion. Ag Ghali has already hinted
at revisiting the text of the Algiers Accords to "relaunch"
the entire agreement. Judging from recent meetings with ag
Ghali, ADC members, and Tuaregs on the ground in Kidal,
Bahanga is now in line for a significant speaking role in
northern Mali's next act - an eventual meeting between
Minister Kafoungouna Kone and Tuareg rebel leaders in Kidal.
A date for this meeting has not yet been set and officials on
the ground in Kidal simply said it would occur sometime after
the December 8 Tabaski holiday. Ag Ghali returned to Saudi
Arabia for Tabaski, but is expected back in Bamako shortly,
where his first order of business may be dissuading Bahanga
from testing his newly acquired rocket launchers.
MILOVANOVIC