Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAMAKO918
2008-12-01 10:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

TUAREG REBEL LEADER IYAD AG GHALI WANTS OVERHAUL

Tags:  PINS PINR PTER PREL ASEC ML 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2885
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0918/01 3361016
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011016Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9809
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0510
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000918 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS: PINS PINR PTER PREL ASEC ML
SUBJECT: TUAREG REBEL LEADER IYAD AG GHALI WANTS OVERHAUL
OF ALGIERS ACCORDS

REF: A. BAMAKO 00901

B. BAMAKO 00660

C. 07 BAMAKO 00559

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000918

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS: PINS PINR PTER PREL ASEC ML
SUBJECT: TUAREG REBEL LEADER IYAD AG GHALI WANTS OVERHAUL
OF ALGIERS ACCORDS

REF: A. BAMAKO 00901

B. BAMAKO 00660

C. 07 BAMAKO 00559

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary: During a November 24 meeting with the
Embassy in Bamako, Tuareg rebel Alliance for Democracy and
Change (ADC) leader Iyad ag Ghali provided a different spin
on reports, emanating from the November 15-17 meeting of the
Algiers Accords oversight committee in Kidal, of progress
toward creating a mixed military unit and reducing Malian
troop levels in the north. Ag Ghali dismissed recent
discussions of mixed military units and troop re-deployments
as premature and said Mali and Tuareg rebels first needed to
reach consensus regarding the meaning of the Algiers Accords
document. He said divergent readings of the text required a
new round of negotiations to "relaunch" the Accords with a
common interpretation of the document accompanied by a number
of side agreements. These would include an implementation
timeline, a promise by the Malians to replace the Governor of
Kidal, and assurances of immunity from prosecution for all
combatants. Ag Ghali said he envisioned a "post-war" truth
and reconciliation process that would take into account
hostilities that occurred after the signing of the July 2006
Accords. He added that neither this process, nor any
discussion of mixed units or troop draw-downs, would succeed
without the participation of Ibrahim Bahanga. After meeting
with President Amadou Toumani Toure, ag Ghali flew to Kidal
on November 27, reportedly to devise a new timeline for
Algiers Accords implementation. End Summary.

--------------
Ag Ghali Seeks to Revisit Algiers Accords
--------------

2.(C) On November 24 the Embassy spoke with Tuareg rebel
leader Iyad ag Ghali and National Assembly Deputy Alghabass
ag Intallah in the empty living room of one of the many
vacant villas Tuareg rebels and their retinues seem to use as
urban safe houses when passing through Bamako. Ag Ghali was
recalled to Mali a few days earlier, for the second time in
the space of one month, by President Toure to discuss

apparent ongoing efforts to win the release of four Malian
military officers held captive by Ibrahim Bahanga.

3.(C) Ag Ghali described the November 15-17 meeting of the
Algiers Accords oversight committee meeting in Kidal as
pointless. "I was not in favor of that meeting at all," said
ag Ghali. "It means nothing." This assessment stood in stark
contrast to the relatively optimistic reports conveyed by
meeting participants, including ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi,
who indicated that Mali, Algeria, and the ADC had reached
tentative agreements on the reduction of Malian troop levels
in the north and the creation of one mixed military unit by
the end of December 2008 (Ref. A). Both ag Ghali and ag
Intallah said Tuareg rebels were no where close to
identifying potential mixed unit commanders. Ag Ghali
insisted that Mali create at least four or preferably five
mixed units at once, all with proper headquarters, resources
and missions, and said continued meetings of the oversight
committee or discussions about mixed units were pointless
without what he described as "preliminary" steps to
"solidify" the Algiers Accords and resolve divergent
interpretations of the agreement's text.

4.(C) To reach a common reading of the Accords, ag Ghali
advocated a new round of talks similar to those that produced
the Accords in July 2006. Ag Ghali described these
negotiations as a "post-war" process of reconciliation and
truth-telling to incorporate post-2006 events into the
Accords. Instead of producing a new document, this process
would yield something akin to an Algiers Accords companion
text, or editor's guide, to resolve various points of dispute
left unsettled by the original document, attach a timeline
for agreement implementation, and provide binding assurances
of immunity for those suspected of committing post-2006
atrocities. Ag Ghali said this would absolve Malian soldiers
of responsibility for the April 10 executions of ADC member
Barka ag Cheikh and Mohammed ag Moussa in Kidal. It would
also alleviate Tuareg concerns about a new counter-terrorism
law passed by the Malian National Assembly earlier this year
(Ref. B). Ag Ghali asserted that under the new law,
autotheft is classified as a terrorist act. He predicted
that Tuareg rebel fighters would not return to Kidal without
formal assurances from the Malian government of immunity from
future prosecution.


BAMAKO 00000918 002 OF 003


5.(C) Ag Ghali said the revised agreement should also entail
a specific commitment to replace the Governor of Kidal with
an individual more amenable to Tuareg rebels. Many Kidal
Tuaregs regard current Governor Al Hamdou ag Illyen as only
half Tuareg and from a caste located among the lower rungs of
Kidal's traditional hierarchy. Ag Ghali and ag Intallah said
Tuareg rebels believed ag Illyen's removal was an implicit
part of the Algiers Accords, even though no reference to such
an agreement appears in the text. They also said Tuaregs
hoped to clarify clauses regarding development, water
resources, employment, youth reinsertion programs, and the
authority to bypass the central government in negotiating
directly with foreign donors for Kidal based development
projects. "We are not asking for the sky," said ag Ghali.

6.(C) Ag Ghali warned that no progress could occur without
the participation of Ibrahim Bahanga. He said Bahanga was
unlikely to release the four Malian military officers still
in captivity since Bahanga had already released several dozen
others and had no incentive to liberate the final group of
four. When asked if Bahanga was now committed to Libyan, as
opposed to Algerian, mediation, ag Ghali said that while
there was no viable alternative to Algerian mediation,
Algeria needed to be more engaged in the Algiers Accords
process and Bahanga was simply trying to identify other
potential partners.

7.(C) Ag Ghali also said Algeria needed to increase its
engagement in regards to economic reinsertion payments for
Tuareg ex-combatants and Kidal youth. He belittled the USD 2
million set aside by Algeria and Mali for these payments as
enough only for 15 development projects, stating his view
that Kidal required at least three times this amount. He
also faulted Mali's program to reintegrate Tuareg
ex-combatants into the Malian military as inadequate, noting
that Malian recruitment quotas fixed a limit of 200
individuals from the region of Kidal for 2007 and another 200
recruits for 2008 (Ref. C).

--------------
AQIM Strategy
--------------

8.(C) Turning to AQIM and the October 31 liberation of the
Austrian tourists, ag Ghali said he had no first hand
knowledge that a ransom had been paid but said he was
convinced AQIM would have never released the Austrians
without compensation. Ag Ghali said Yahia Djouadi, who he
referred to as Abu Alam, would have lost too much respect
within AQIM had he agreed to release the Austrians without
receiving something in return. He said AQIM and Djouadi were
aware of what he described as a UN Security Council
resolution that was introduced by Algeria and directed Mali
to attack AQIM. Although some of the details were slightly
off, ag Ghali seemed to be describing the UN Security Council
1267 Sanctions Committee's July 2008 approval to include
Djouadi and other AQIM leaders on the list of individuals
subject to targeted sanctions.

9.(C) Ag Ghali said he believed AQIM was changing tactics in
Mauritania but did not know if this was due to Mauritania's
recent coup, an influx of Mauritanian AQIM members, or some
other factor. He did not think AQIM had changed tactics in
Mali or southern Algeria, and noted that AQIM refrained from
carrying out attacks in either area, preferring to use these
zones instead for logistical purposes in advance of attacks
planned for northern Algeria. If Mali were to attack AQIM,
ag Ghali continued, AQIM would respond by targeting Timbuktu,
oil prospecting operations, and tourists in Mali.

--------------
Internal Tuareg Divisions
--------------

10.(C) At the end of the meeting National Assembly Deputy
Alghabass ag Intallah said Tuareg rebels in Kidal were
divided into four camps: members of the ADC; Bahanga and his
followers; Tuareg rebels who are former Malian military
officers; and Tuareg youth. Ag Intallah and ag Ghali said
they fell into the first category as members of the ADC and
believe that no solution to the crisis in Kidal has yet been
found. Ag Intallah said Bahanga's faction was interested
first and foremost in the withdrawal of Malian military
personnel from Kidal and Bahanga's home area of Tinzawaten in
particular. Ag Ghali complained that by trying to plant a
Malian flag in Tinzawaten following the signing of the
Accords in 2006, the Malian government sought to portray
itself as the victor and Bahanga as the vanquished. This is
a situation, said ag Ghali, that Bahanga could never accept.

BAMAKO 00000918 003 OF 003



11.(C) Ag Ghali also cautioned that the lines between
Bahanga and the ADC were not as clear as one might think, and
said there were a fair amount of people moving back and forth
between the two groups. He dismissed any statements issued
by Bahanga's Paris-based father-in-law Hama ag Sid'Ahmed as
little more than comic relief for "real" Tuareg rebels on the
ground in Kidal. Ag Ghali joked that he could not even
remember the latest acronym - the ATNMC for Northern Mali
Tuareg Alliance for Change - invented by Sid'Ahmed for
Bahanga's group. He also said Sid'Ahmed's claims about
linkages between the ATNMC and Tuareg rebels in Niger were
fictitious.

12.(C) Ag Intallah said the third category of Tuareg rebels
- former Malian military officers - was most interested in
the creation of mixed military units. The remaining group,
Tuareg youth, cared only about economic opportunities and
promises to fund various small enterprise projects in Kidal.

--------------
Comment: Ag Ghali In, Ag Bibi Out
--------------

13.(C) Following his November 24 meeting with the Embassy,
ag Ghali met at least once more with President Toure, then
flew to Kidal on November 27. ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi,
meanwhile, remains in Bamako. Ag Bibi's name did not come up
once during our meeting with ag Ghali and ag Intallah - an
omission providing further evidence that ag Bibi is not
really running the ADC. On November 27 ag Intallah, who also
did not travel with ag Ghali to Kidal, told the Embassy that
while he was not present during ag Ghali's most recent
meeting with President Toure, he believed the president had
invested ag Ghali with the authority to begin hashing out a
new timeline for the implementation of the Accords. Ag
Ghali's statements regarding the need to revisit the entire
Accords document seem, at least for the moment, to represent
the personal views of only ag Ghali.
MILOVANOVIC