ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR'S VIEW OF SECURITY SUMMIT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000867

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR ASEC ML
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR'S VIEW OF SECURITY SUMMIT AND
ALGIERS ACCORDS

REF: BAMAKO 00558

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Classified By: Ambassador Gillian Milovanovic for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)

1.(C) Summary: During Ambassador Milovanovic's introductory
call, Algerian Ambassador Abdelkarim Gueraieb shared his view
of President Amadou Toumani Toure's oft-postponed Head of
State security summit and the Algiers Accords implementation
process. Gueraieb has a central role in ongoing peace
negotiations with Tuareg rebels. Before discussing his views
of present day Mali, however, Gueraieb recounted his role as
a mediator during the 1979-1981 hostage crisis in Tehran.
Gueraieb said his efforts to resolve the crisis, and
subsequent trip to Camp David to meet with President Carter
and the families of imprisoned American diplomats, shaped his
deep personal affection for the United States. Turning to
the topic of President Toure, Gueraieb complained that Toure
says "yes" to whoever is sitting in front of him. He said
that President Toure's Head of State conference had been
postponed once again due to scheduling conflicts with Libyan
leader Mouammar Qadhafi and Algerian opposition to
Mauritanian involvement. Gueraieb said the Summit was now
tentatively scheduled for November. He added Algiers insists
on there being a Foreign Ministers, meeting first to prepare
the summit. Gueraieb was relatively optimistic about progress
toward implementing the Algiers Accords. End Summary.

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Flashback to Tehran 1979
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2.(C) During an introductory meeting with Ambassador
Milovanovic on October 30, Algerian Ambassador Gueraieb
described his role as a mediator during the Tehran hostage
crisis of 1979-81. Gueraieb said he became friendly with
Ayatollah Khomeini while the two were living in France in

1978. Upon his return to Iran in 1979, Khomeini sent a
message to Algeria asking for Gueraieb's assistance. Algeria
responded by sending Gueraieb to Tehran as Ambassador, where
he became involved in the hostage crisis and served as a
go-between for American and Iranian officials. Gueraieb said
he arranged for a French Monsignor living in Algeria to say
mass for the American hostages during their first Christmas
in captivity in 1979. For Christmas 1980 Gueraieb said he
arranged, at President Carter's request, to visit each of the
hostages to check on their condition. These visits occurred
at three different locations, including the basement of the
Iranian Foreign Ministry, and permitted Gueraieb to take
photographs with each hostage and receive letters addressed
to family members in the U.S. After meeting with all of the
hostages, Gueraieb said he traveled to Camp David to meet
President Carter and the hostages' families. Gueraieb noted
that Algerians have a particular affection for the U.S.
dating back to Algerian independence and the Kennedy
administration, but that his affection is much deeper and was
shaped by his personal involvement with the American
government and American hostages while Ambassador to Iran.

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View of President Toure
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3.(C) Returning to 2008, Gueraieb complained that President
Toure's need for consensus leads him to agree with whomever
is sitting in front of him. This, Gueraieb continued, often
leads to conflicting commitments and non-decisions. Gueraieb
said President Toure's unwillingness to say "no" and desire
to please everyone explains why Toure is often unable to
follow through on promises to Algeria and other nations.

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Head of State Summit Scheduling Woes
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4.(C) President Toure's oft-postponed Head of State summit
on Sahel-Saharan security is now tentatively scheduled for
mid-November. A brief meeting of Foreign Ministers from the
region will convene in Bamako one or two days before the
summit. The actual summit date, however, remains uncertain
due to scheduling conflicts and confusion over Mauritania's
level of involvement or lack thereof. Gueraieb told the
Ambassador that the summit was previously scheduled first for
October 27 and then for November 5. However, Gueraieb said
he met President Toure within the past week to ten days and
learned that November 5 presented a scheduling conflict for
Qadhafi. Algeria apparently favors Libyan participation as
Gueraieb noted that President Bouteflika telephoned Qadhafi

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after learning of the Nov. 5 scheduling snafu to help
identify an alternate date.

5.(C) Mali apparently formulated two options regarding
Mauritanian participation, and Algeria rejected both. The
first option involved inviting a lower-level Minister from
General Aziz's military junta. Algerian President Bouteflika
personally vetoed the second option which was to invite the
Mauritanian Ambassador to Mali as a stand-in for the jailed
Mauritanian Head of State. The Mauritanian Ambassador, who
according to the Algerian Ambassador has been recalled to
Mauritania is in any case, to our understanding, a relative
of jailed President Abdallahi. According to Gueraieb,
Bouteflika refused to sit with an Ambassador at a meeting
billed as a Head of State summit. Bouteflika was so irked by
this idea that he directed his Foreign Minister, who was
traveling in the region anyway, to travel directly to Bamako
to deliver the following two-point demarche: point one, only
Heads of State will be invited; and point two, no
Mauritanians.

6.(C) Returning to his earlier theme of President Toure's
need to please, Gueraieb said Toure responded positively to
the Algerian Foreign Minister's message, saying the idea was
a good one and that he agreed completely. Gueraieb said he
personally was not yet convinced President Toure had fully
dropped the idea of inviting a non-Head of State or a
Mauritanian representative. He observed that only President
Toure knows what Mali has in mind as far as the summit is
concerned and that even well-placed presidential insiders are
uninformed. Gueraieb said there had been a considerable
amount of misunderstanding about the size and purpose of the
summit, and that Algeria envisioned a summit primarily for
regional actors - although there was certainly no intention
of excluding the U.S. or other key partners. He said a
committee was already working on the text of a "Bamako
Declaration" and an action plan intended as summit take-ways.

7.(C) As if on cue, Gueraieb then fielded a call from the
Malian Foreign Minister, Moctar Ouane, and conducted the
conversation in Ambassador Milovanovic's presence. Ouane
told Gueraieb that he had been instructed to contact
Presidents in the region to fix a date for the summit but had
been unable to reach anyone in Chad because lines of
communication were down. Using the familiar "tu" form of
address, Gueraieb directed Ouane to continue trying to reach
Chad and reiterated Ouane's marching orders, reminding Ouane
to call up each Head of State, fix a firm date for the
summit, and also arrange a meeting of Foreign Ministers one
day before the actual summit.

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Algeria Not Pessimistic About Accords Implementation
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8.(C) The Algerian Ambassador spoke briefly about the
progress of Algiers Accords implementation, expressing
guarded optimism about the Accords' future. He said Algeria
was currently focused on provisions for the reinsertion of
former rebel combatants and the creation of mixed military
units. He noted that Algeria had set aside approximately USD
2 million (reftel) for vocational training and other programs
to rehabilitate Tuareg rebels but that the money remained
untouched. Gueraieb said that while he believes it is
possible to keep the various Tuareg rebel factions and their
leaders in check, there is no permanent fix to the problem in
northern Mali.
MILOVANOVIC