Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAMAKO787
2008-09-11 15:48:00
SECRET
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

FALL 2008 SEPQ RESPONSE-BAMAKO

Tags:  ASEC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBP #0787/01 2551548
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 111548Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9629
S E C R E T BAMAKO 000787 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: FALL 2008 SEPQ RESPONSE-BAMAKO

Classified By: ARSO Christopher Brandt, Reason 1.5 (c and d)

S E C R E T BAMAKO 000787

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: FALL 2008 SEPQ RESPONSE-BAMAKO

Classified By: ARSO Christopher Brandt, Reason 1.5 (c and d)


1. (SBU) Embassy Bamako responses to the security Environment
Profile Questionnaire (SEPQ) are as follows:

--------------

2. (S) Political Violence
--------------

DEMONSTRATIONS:


A. Are there any ethnic or religious groups in country that
are capable of carrying out significant anti-American
demonstrations?

There are religious groups that could carry out
demonstrations involving a few hundred individuals. In 2008
these groups held demonstrations to protest an attempt by the
Malian National Assembly to abolish the death penalty. None
of these demonstrations targeted Americans. Indeed, many
leaders of this group noted that the U.S. supports the death
penalty. The group Dawa al-Tabligh (also known as the Jamaat
al-Tabligh movement) has a moderate presence in Bamako.
Dawa al-Tabligh is an international Islamic religious
organization whose focus is religious recruitment and the
propagation of Islam. In Mali the Dawa are based at the
Markaz Da'wa al-Tabligh center in Sogoninko, a residential
area of Bamako. Worshipers meet there every Thursday and
volunteers are sent on traveling preaching missions
throughout Mali that can cover several days or several
months. Internationally, the Dawa al-Tabligh has voiced
anti-American sentiments. Malian Dawa, however, appear to be
largely apolitical. Another group, the Islamic NGO Al
Muntada, has previously expressed anti-American sentiments.
Anti-American preaching has been known to occur at their
headquarters which is located in ACI 2000, near the U.S.
Embassy. Although these groups have the capability to carry
out significant anti-American demonstrations, there is no
indication at the present time that they have the intent of
doing so.

There is no present indication that there is a significantly
anti-American sentiment among the local population. There is
a moderate Lebanese presence in Bamako, and while
anti-American sentiments cannot be dismissed entirely, the
common perception is that they do not harbor negative
sentiment towards Americans. The majority of Lebanese in
Bamako appear to be Christian. The Lebanese community in Mali
is known to be in an enviable financial position; many are
successful business owners and merchants. Given their
favorable position in the community, they are unlikely to
expose anti-American sentiments or carry out any acts against

USG interests, owing to the adverse effects such actions
could have on their business interests.


B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months?

There have been no anti-American demonstrations in the last
twelve months.


C. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of
U.S. Diplomatic facilities?

N/A


D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration?

The last anti-American demonstration in Bamako occurred in
2006 and involved a few hundred individuals.


E. Are anti-American demonstrations usually triggered by U.S.
foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by domestic
issues?

Anti-American demonstrations in previous years have been
triggered by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, U.S.
agricultural policies, and perceived support of military
actions.


F. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?

Demonstrations are generally peaceful. The GOM provides
robust police presence which typically dictates the tone of
demonstrations. There were demonstrations in October 2006
and June, September, and October 2007 at the University of
Bamako's Medical School. Several of these involved violence
and tear-gas fired by police. There was also a demonstration
at the University of Bamako's Law School in April 2008 that
resulted in the serious assault of one professor and property
damage.


G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to
USG property or injuries to USG employees?

No demonstrations in the last twelve months have resulted in
damage to USG property or injuries to employees. There is a
USG presence at the University of Bamako's Medical School
campus as the National Institutes of Health has offices and
laboratories at this facility. No NIH employees were injured
and no USG property was damaged during demonstrations at the
medical school in 2008.


H. If violent, have any demonstrators ever penetrated our
perimeter security line?

No demonstrators have penetrated the Mission's perimeter
security line in the last twelve months.


I. Have there been any anti-government demonstrations in
country within the past 12 months?

Yes, several demonstrations have occurred, many centered on
government related education issues and social legislation
before the National Assembly. Additionally, merchants have
protested a government crack- down on unauthorized street
vendors, and commercial vehicles.


J. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of
U.S. Diplomatic facilities?

Yes, protests have taken place in the vicinity of the former
USAID before a recent move to the New Embassy Compound NOX)
in February 2008. The demonstrators were made up of civil
servants and students protesting the low wages the GOM are
paying public school teachers. These protests, however, were
likely targeting the Prime Minister's Office which was next
door to the old USAID building. In March 2008, a
demonstrator in Bamako protesting raising food prices set
fire to the mayor's vehicle. The demonstrators dispersed
after the police used tear gas. This demonstration took place
in close proximity to the EMR and DCMR.


K. What is the average size of an anti-government
demonstration?

Approximately 200-300 persons typically participate in these
demonstrations.


L. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?

Generally peaceful; the local police are quite adept at
dispersing crowds that have violent intentions.


M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to
USG property?

No recent anti-government demonstrations have resulted in
damage to USG property.

--------------

3. (S) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS
--------------


A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate or
intrastate conflict (this may include battles between
organized and violent drug cartels)?

Yes, violent clashes occur in the northern regions of Mali
and have resulted in loss of life. Remnants of the 1990's
Tuareg rebellion still reside in northern Mali. In May 2006,
an attack by rebel Tuareg elements on Malian military
outposts in Kidal and Menaka resulted in several deaths and
significant loss of military assets. The revolt led to the
subsequent signing of a peace accord between the Tuaregs and
the GOM. Since these accords were signed there have been two
clashes, both in October 2006, between Tuareg rebels and the
Algerian based terror group, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat (GSPC). Several Tuareg and AQIM members were killed
during these clashes. During the second skirmish some
Tuaregs were captured by the GSPC/AQIM and then later
released.

In late August 2007, a dissident group of Tuaregs led by
Tuareg rebel Ibrahim Bahanga took approximately 30 hostages
in northern Mali near Tinzawaten. The hostages included
Malian military and civilian officials. After negotiations
brokered by Libya, the hostages were released in March 2008.
Bahanga took several dozen more Malian soldiers hostage just
weeks later. Tuareg rebel groups attacked Malian military
and gendarme bases in Diabali, Ansongo, Abeibara and Tessalit
during the year. In August the Tuareg rebel Alliance for
Democracy and Change (ADC) and Mali resumed negotiations via
Algerian mediation. The ADC released all of the Malian
military members it was holding in August 2008. Bahanga was
initially a party to these negotiations but soon broke with
the ADC to pursue his own discussions with Libya. On
September 10 Bahanga released 44 Malian soldiers. He is
believed to still hold at least four Malian soldiers.


B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is
limited to a specific region or a countrywide civil war?

Current indications would suggest such incidents are
localized to the northern region of Kidal.


C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. Diplomatic
facilities located in this region?

No U.S. Diplomatic facilities are located in this region.
USAID Mali has contractors in the regions of Gao and
Timbuktu. Peace Corps has volunteers in and around the town
of Gao. An American Corner, supported by the Embassy's
Public Affairs Office, is located in Gao.


D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate
conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American
orientation?

No strong anti-American sentiment has been observed but
recent reporting indicates that the AQIM may be seeking to
target Westerners in Mali, particularly in northern Mali.

--------------

4. (S) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES
--------------


A. Are host country law enforcement agencies professional and
well trained?

Law enforcement training does not approach U.S. standards.
Although specialized units may be adequately trained, the
majority of local law enforcement agencies are poorly trained
and ill-equipped of resources to be sufficiently effective.
Low pay, poor training, minimal resources and a lack of
adequate supervision lends to the overall unprofessional
image of Malian law enforcement. Mali has a civil security
apparatus numbering approximately 16,000 members, a
relatively small contingent compared to the vast geography
and long porous borders.


B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies?

Yes, the training provided by the Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program (ATA) has been effective, albeit with limited effect
within the core of agents that have participated in the ATA
courses. The GOM has yet to effectively apply the ATA
training precepts to the civil protection infrastructure as a
whole. The DOS and DOD have continued to sponsor training
with the hopes of bolstering Mali's security capabilities.
The ATA has continued its commitment to Mali in this regard.
Invariably, Malian National Police would greatly benefit from
U.S. training assistance in all areas, and any training
provided would be a valuable contribution to their efforts in
maintaining law and order. Efforts are underway to
facilitate Mali's inclusion for additional training
opportunities under the International Law Enforcement Academy
(ILEA) and the FBI National Academy (FBINA).


C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious,
widespread corruption inside of their agencies?

Yes, corruption remains a problem throughout all levels of
the Police ranks. With low salaries and generous freedom,
the temptation to augment their low income is difficult to
resist. Police are known, for example, to routinely solicit
daily bribes from local bus drivers. This is done openly and
is common knowledge.


D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable of
deterring terrorist actions?

The GOM intelligence services are limited in their capability
of detecting, deterring and responding to a terrorist attack.


E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with the
U.S. Embassy's request for information and support?

Yes, to the extent of their limited capabilities, GOM
intelligence and security services have been very cooperative
in rendering assistance to the Embassy.


F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats in
recent years, have host country security services been able
to score any major anti-terrorism success?
In recent years, the GOM asked several radical Pakistani
Imams to leave the country. The GOM was highly instrumental
in the release of 14 European hostages held by the Group
Salafist for Preaching and Combat (GSPC/AQIM) in 2003. The
GOM's willingness to combat AQIM has been offset by a severe
lack of resources and difficulties involved in securing
inhospitable and vast swaths of the Sahara. Despite these
problems, the GOM scored some victories against AQIM. A
Malian army patrol that encountered a group of AQIM members
in May 2008 in northern Mali captured valuable information.
In August 2008 Malian security forces captured three
Mauritanian AQIM members along with a significant quantity of
explosives, weapons and other items.


G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness, and
allocation of resources) to embassy requests for protective
security?

Yes, though issues of stipends and provisions for fuel and
maintenance of vehicles are standard overheads for such
requests. Any request for police manpower assistance or
escorts requires the understanding that these payments must
be made.


H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at major
airports in the country?

Poor, airport security services are poorly trained and
equipped. Passenger, luggage and cargo screening are minimal
by international civil aviation security standards. Loose
access controls and a perceived ambivalence are a common
theme.


I. How effective are customs and immigration controls
agencies?

Customs and Immigration control agencies are ineffective.
While the local customs and security services are making
improvements, they remain poorly trained and equipped. Their
ability to track persons entering and exiting the various
border entry points are severely limited. Much of the
data-processing is still paper-driven and there is no
real-time system for tracking incoming or outgoing
passengers. Most all records are paper and the filing system
is rudimentary. There are no central computer databases to
historically track persons entering or exiting Mali by air or
land borders. It is therefore easy to enter and depart
Bamako by air and Mali by land undetected. In October 2007
allegations of bribe solicitations from Embassy personnel
arriving at Senou International Airport (Bamako) were
addressed to the customs chief at Senou Airport.


J. How effective are border patrol forces?

Border patrol forces are ineffective. Most borders are
unpatrolled and uncontrolled. The vast size of Mali's
borders, a border control contingent that is under-manned and
poorly trained, along with widespread corruption, makes
effective border control unrealistic. Moreover, border
control personnel lack the basic resources and
professionalism to effectively perform their work.

--------------

5. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS
--------------


A. Are there any indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups
in country?

None are known or verified.


B. If yes, how many? Please name groups.

N/A


C. Have groups carried out an anti-American attack within the
last 12 months?

N/A


D. Were any of these lethal attacks?

N/A


E. Have groups attacked U.S. Diplomatic targets?

N/A


F. Have groups attacked U.S. businesses, U.S. military, or
U.S. related targets?

N/A


G. Have groups limited their attacks to specific regions or
do they operate countrywide?

N/A


H. If attacks are limited to regions, are there any U.S.
Diplomatic facilities located in these regions?
N/A
--------------

6. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS
--------------


A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not
anti-American) in country?

Possibly, but not organized.


B. If yes, how many?

N/A.


C. Have groups carried out attacks in the capital or in areas
where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located?
N/A.


D. Were attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate?

N/A.


E. Have any Americans been killed or injured in these attacks?

N/A.
--------------

7. (S) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS
--------------


A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a
presence in country?

Yes, the Algerian based AQIM, formerly known as the GSPC.


B. How does post assess this presence? Is it an operational
cell? Financial cell? Support cell? Propaganda cell?

AQIM has operational and financial cells targeting the
Algerian Government and Western interests/entities. Recent
reporting suggests that AQIM, may be seeking to target
American interests in northern Mali. AQIM has recently
attacked western interests in the region, outside of Mali.
In September 2006 the GSPC made a public statement affirming
it ties to Al Qaeda; the group official changed its name to
AQIM in January 2007. Since then, AQIM has made public
remarks that Westerners will be targeted in the region.


C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups?

No, the GOM is not supportive of AQIM.


D. Are there suspect Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in
the country that have a relationship with any of these groups?

Possibly, but not confirmed.


E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country
that are sympathetic to these groups?

Yes, there are ethnic groups engaged in traditional smuggling
that have benefited financially by working in collaboration
with AQIM.


F. How does post assess the level, intent and scope of
hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Serbia,
Sudan, Et. Al.) in country relative to potential
anti-American terrorist acts?

The threat of hostile intelligence exists but is not
considered serious relative to the threat of a potential
terrorist attack. There is a visible Libyan presence within
Bamako. A complex of GOM buildings is being funded by the
Libyan government. The Chinese diplomatic mission in Mali
has grown and is also quite visible. The Government of Cuba
has supplied the GOM with medical doctors to help expand the
reach of medical care in Mali.


G. How does post assess the availability of weapons and
explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile
terrorist elements?

It is widely acknowledged that unknown quantities of weapons
(military rifles, handguns, explosives) are available on the
black market in Bamako and there has been a rise in armed
robberies utilizing handguns. Mali's borders are porous and
poorly controlled, enabling the easy transit of weapons
smuggled from neighboring nations.


8. (S) Based on the current security threat information
available, post recommends no change to current SETL threat
ratings for Bamako.


9. (U) Please direct inquiries to ARSO Christopher Brandt,
(223) 270-2366.
LEONARD