Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAMAKO636
2008-07-07 16:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL WITH PRESIDENT TOURE

Tags:  PREL PTER EAID ML 
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VZCZCXRO1183
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0636/01 1891632
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071632Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9411
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0459
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0009
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MCC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0121
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000636 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID ML
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL WITH PRESIDENT TOURE

REF: BAMAKO 00627

BAMAKO 00000636 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Terence P. McCulley, Reasons 1.4. (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000636

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID ML
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL WITH PRESIDENT TOURE

REF: BAMAKO 00627

BAMAKO 00000636 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Terence P. McCulley, Reasons 1.4. (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT)
effusively praised the state of U.S.-Malian relations during
the Ambassador's July 3 farewell call, citing specifically
the Millennium Challenge Compact and bilateral military
cooperation. The president said he was reluctant to see an
exchange of money in the resolution of the Austrian hostage
situation for fear of the future consequences. ATT expressed
familiar reservations about the Special Mixed Units given the
history of Tuareg military desertion, and skepticism about
their likely effectiveness against terrorists. ATT said he
hoped to convene his proposed regional security summit in
July, but that "problems remained."


2. (SBU) Outstanding Cooperation: The Ambassador's
farewell call with ATT featured a glowing review of U.S.
assistance to Mali in areas ranging from development
assistance to military cooperation. On MCC, he said the
compact's focal point at the presidency had just updated him
on the status of the compact, and he had been delighted to
hear that Mali's progress placed it among the furthest
advanced compacts to date. The Ambassador added that
activities would be starting soon, but expressed concern that
MCC's Malian counterpart organization had still not appointed
a Director General. ATT agreed that this was an important
next step. On military cooperation, he praised the quality
of American training, observing that his own very first
parachute jump had been during a bilateral military exercise
with the U.S.


3. (C) Special Mixed Units: The Ambassador noted that a
Joint Exercise would soon kick off in Timbuktu, and he hoped
that as security circumstances permit, training could extend
to farther northern locations such as Tessalit. He added
that we expected to have an answer soon on the delivery of
the variety of military equipment Mali had requested. ATT
agreed with the importance of an effective military presence
in the north to constrain the presence of "certain entities,"
and in Tessalit in particular, as this location is key to
securing the border and thus the zone. The President

observed that only the previous day, there had been a clash
between rival drug factions that had led to fatalities.
Referring to positive developments in Algiers between the
Government of Mali and Tuareg rebels, the Ambassador
reiterated U.S. readiness to support the Special Units. He
suggested that one possible role that would also enhance
their training and equipment might be in the context of a
deployment to Somalia. ATT replied that this would indeed
require additional training, since the existing skills set of
special unit participants would not really extend to peace
keeping operations. More generally, the President stressed
the confidence problem linked to the issue of the units'
command given the serial desertions with their Malian army
supplies by Tuareg rebels, including the first unit's
commander, Hassan Fagaga. He expressed some uneasiness with
"Algeria's vision and Fagaga's dream" for the special units,
since ATT does not believe they could be counted on to be
effective against terrorists. He allowed, however, that Mali
was not closed to the overall concept of the units. He
expressed the hope that a "young, trustworthy" individual
could be identified to lead the units, and that restored
peace would allow the Malian army to turn to "other tasks."
(See also reftel.)


4. (C) Austrian Hostages: ATT described the Austrian
hostage situation as "an embarrassment" for Mali, since
clearly the terrorists' decision to move their hostages from
Tunisia to northern Mali reflected Mali's inability to
control its territory. He said the situation was a difficult
one for Mali, which is stuck between a humanitarian issue and
realism. While Mali's friends have asked them to help secure
the release of the hostages, he has to take into account that
their kidnappers are terrorists. Locating the hostages is
not a difficult matter, but any financial transaction would
create a new threat not only of further hostage takings, but
of adding money to the terrorists' coffers. While the
Austrians have pleaded the situation of the hostages as a
humanitarian matter, ATT wryly noted that casualties in
terrorist attacks in Algeria are a humanitarian issue, too.
He said he would not involve ransom in their release without
a green light from Algeria to do so, which he found it
unlikely Algeria would give for just such reasons. He mused

BAMAKO 00000636 002.2 OF 002


that a "clean and neat" military rescue operation would not
be possible without Algeria's help.


5. (C) Regional Security Summit: The President said that
in principle his proposed regional security summit is to
occur in July, but "problems remained" for its organization.
He described one of these as his error in conveying an
invitation to Morocco to attend, only to learn later that the
Algerians were vehemently opposed to Moroccan participation.


6. (C ) Comment: The Ambassador's farewell call met a
concise reflection of ATT's view of the security concerns
that face northern Mali. His suspicion of Tuareg elements is
rooted in a notable history of Tuareg rebel desertion and
active rebellion against the government; his definition of
security threats in northern Mali extends not only to
international terrorists, but to drug and contraband
traffickers. His doubts on Algeria's view of the role of the
special units are a reminder that ATT's welcoming of
cooperation and assistance on security matters is naturally
rooted in how he views such help may practically address the
range of threats he perceives in his complicated northern
Mali.
LEONARD