Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAMAKO599
2008-06-27 11:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON A DISCOURAGED

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9363
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0450
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 0319
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 0281
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000599 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON A DISCOURAGED
MINISTER OF TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

REF: ALGIERS 725

Classified By: Ambassador Terence P. McCulley, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000599

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON A DISCOURAGED
MINISTER OF TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

REF: ALGIERS 725

Classified By: Ambassador Terence P. McCulley, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador's June 20 farewell call on
the Minister of Territorial Administration found General
Kafougouna Kone upbeat about the Mali-U.S. relationship, but
discouraged on prospects for peace in northern Mali. Kone,
who is extraordinarily close to President Amadou Toumani
Toure, defended the Government of Mali's (GOM) application of
the Algiers Accords to date. He showed little enthusiasm for
a more robust standing up of Special Mixed Units to secure
the north of Mali, citing the unhappy experience of the Kidal
unit commander's desertion. Speaking on issues ranging from
the death of two Tuareg alliance members in Kidal to the
proliferation of Tuareg factions, the Minister said his
previous confidence about prospects for peace in northern
Mali had turned decidedly less optimistic. He noted that
Mali did not intend to send representatives to the ongoing
talks in Algiers until the Algerians had succeeded in
unifying the various factions to present a cohesive
interlocuteur. The Ambassador responded that recent GOM
efforts to highlight its activism on the Algiers Accords was
useful in countering propaganda from rebel factions, but that
the eventual participation of loyal Tuareg elements in
securing the north was essential to a successful, peaceful
outcome. End summary.


2. (C) Minister Kone was effusive in his praise for
advances in U.S.-Malian relations during the Ambassador's
tenure, citing in particular bilateral military training and
"discreet involvement" by the U.S. in northern issues. While
the situation in the north sometimes lent itself to glimpses
of hope, he had been distressed that the positive development
of international donors' participation in the Kidal Forum had
been undone by Bahanga's "senseless acts" that undermined the
stability required for development. Kone was sanguine about
Algerian pique over Libyan involvement in the liberation of
military hostages, saying the detention of the nation's sons
obviously provoked a wish to involve any friendly country in
their safe return. On issues of northern security and border

control, he made a barbed comment familiar from ATT's talking
points to the effect that if Algeria could not control its
border, Mali's prospects for doing so were even slimmer, but
in the end welcomed Algeria's return to a negotiating role.


3. (C) On the deaths of two ADC members in Kidal, General
Kone began by regretting a mass departure of Alliance members
from Kidal after the event, in particular because they had
blamed the Army. Kone recalled that the GOM had made
statements condemning the act and launched a commission of
inquiry, and observed that it was "not the Army's habit to
assassinate people." Kone stated that the position of the
spent cartridges near the bodies seemed to be more arranged
than random, leading him to suspect that the bodies had been
planted near the Army base. He regretted that the relatives
of the deceased had been permitted to take the bodies for
burial, since the gesture of the Army organizing a funeral
would have been a positive one. The Ambassador agreed that a
transparent and open government inquiry into the matter was
essential.


4. (C) Kone claimed that of the 18 identified tasks
required of either the GOM or the ADC by the Algiers accords,
the Government had fulfilled all but three of theirs. Both
sides had agreed that a provisional regional assembly had
been overtaken by events; the National Pact's call for tax
relief in the north was in the form of a draft law currently
under review with the Minister of Finance; and there had been
progress on socio-economic reinsertion, with a budget in
place and current and projected training for 400 total new
recruits to the Army. On the latter point, there was also a
group with representatives from Gao and Kidal reviewing
proposed projects with support from UNDP. The Ambassador
agreed that Bahanga's side had engaged in considerable
propaganda about the state of Algiers Accords implementation,
but there were legitimate concerns about the operational
status of the Special Units. In the ensuing exchange,
Minister Kone stressed the "bad taste" that the desertion of
inaugural Kidal Special Unit Commander Fagaga had left for
the GOM. The Ambassador agreed that it was problematic but
not impossible to find trustworthy Tuareg military members,
citing the ADC military who had worked with the Malian army
during the siege at Tinzouaten, and added that Tuaregs feel

BAMAKO 00000599 002 OF 002


strongly about the need to participate in northern security.
He reiterated USG willingness to explore extending training
to the Special Units once they had been reenergized under
trustworthy leadership. Kone recalled that the ADC call for
lightened military presence in the north actually exceeded
the premises of the Algiers Accords, which in fact discussed
withdrawing only surge forces that had gone to Kidal in the
wake of the 23 May 2006 uprising. He saw this action
conditioned on the rebels returning arms stolen from the
military. The Ambassador encouraged the GOM to continue
their public relations strategy to highlight the true status
of Algiers accords commitments and their fulfillment.


5. (C ) Regarding the ongoing discussions in Algeria and
the apparent reunification of Tuareg factions, the Ambassador
asked Kone if he thought the talks were promising for a
restored northern peace. He replied that the past confidence
had been undermined by Bahanga's senseless acts, repeated as
recently as the May 21 attack at Abebeira, and the recent
proliferation of factions implying lack of consensus. Kone
said that the GOM would first give the Algerians the chance
to get the parties to unify before sending a negotiator, but
that in the end those Tuaregs who believe in the promise of
the Algiers Accords should agree to move forward, since Mali
firmly views the Accords as the legal underpinnings for
resolving Mali's northern problem. He mused aloud about the
difficult decision of how to handle a Bahanga who had engaged
in laying mines and working with traffickers. Whether to
fight him or to talk to him depended a great deal on the
decisions Bahanga makes, as well.


6. (C ) Comment: Kone's clear wariness of the Special
Units is perhaps understandable given the bitter recent
experience of betrayal. Participation in ensuring the
security of their region, however, is a hugely significant
issue for the Tuareg. We will continue our campaign with
senior GOM leadership to stress the importance of making the
leap of faith to draw in Tuareg regulars who have proven
their loyalty to date.
MCCULLEY