OF TUAREGS AND TERRORISTS: A REBEL'S VIEW OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000462

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2018
TAGS: PTER PINS PINR ML
SUBJECT: OF TUAREGS AND TERRORISTS: A REBEL'S VIEW OF
UNREST IN THE NORTH AND AQIM

REF: A. BAMAKO 00419

B. BAMAKO 00414

C. 07 BAMAKO 01006

D. BAMAKO 00366

E. BAMAKO 00299

F. BAMAKO 00415

G. BAMAKO 00371

H. 07 BAMAKO 01255

Classified By: Political Officer Glenn Fedzer, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: A May 6 conversation with rebel
leader/National Assembly Deputy Deity ag Simadou underscored
the increasingly complex situation in the North of Mali and
the need for active U.S. engagement with both the Malian
government and the varied Tuareg factions who are key to
establishing security in the Sahel region. During a
wide-ranging discussion of the growing Tuareg rebellion, the
April 10 execution of two Tuaregs in Kidal and the Austrian
hostages held by AQIM, ag Sidamou, who doubles as the
"finance" secretary for the Alliance for Democracy and
Changes (ADC),explained the motivation behind the ADC attack
on Diabali (Ref A),complained about alleged GOM diversion of
counterterrorism funds to combat Tuareg rebels, and claimed
that the ADC remains the only military force in northern Mali
with the ability and the will to engage AQIM. Ag Sidamou's
status as an ADC leader makes him an important interlocutor
for USG understanding of at least one of the Tuareg points of
view. His alleged connections to smuggling and purported
economic facilitation of AQIM activities, however, weaken his
credibility as an appropriate or effective USG partner in
helping restore stability in the north . End Summary.

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Ag Sidamou: Many Different Hats, Few Legitimate
-------------- --

2.(C) The Embassy met with Deity ag Sidamou, the National
Assembly Deputy from Tessalit, on May 6 to discuss the Tuareg
rebel attack in Diabali (Ref A) in central Mali earlier that
morning. Ag Sidamou had been making the rounds of the Malian
political and military establishments to distance himself
from allegations that he was involved in the May 3 attack on
a Malian military convoy destined for Tessalit (Ref B). Ag
Sidamou's conflicting roles as a renowned trafficker, an ADC
officer, and Tessalit's highest elected leader put him in a
difficult position as many southern Malians and members of
the Malian military are convinced that bandits could not
orchestrate an attack outside of Tessalit without ag
Sidamou's knowledge. Ag Sidamou, who was in Bamako on May 3,
placed the responsibility for the attack on smuggler/bandit
Merzouk ag Acherif. Several Malian newspapers nevertheless
accused ag Sidamou of orchestrating the May 3 attack and
published grainy front page photographs of him wrapped in the
traditional Tuareg turban, prompting ag Sidamou to tell the
Embassy that he now feared for his own safety.

3.(C) Ag Sidamou was wounded during the ADC's attack on the
GSPC in October 2006 (Ref C). He was elected to the National
Assembly in July 2007 but rarely, if ever, attends National
Assembly meetings in Bamako. Since he speaks neither French
nor Bambara fluently, he is unable to follow debates on the
Assembly floor without Tamachek translations, which are
normally not provided. Given his apparent disinterest in the
workings of the National Assembly, his attendance record
would likely not improve were he able to understand his
fellow Deputies. His truancy record is matched by the
Kidal's other three National Assembly Deputies - the two
Intallah brothers and ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi.

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Rebel Groups and the Kidal Executions
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4.(C) While ag Sidamou blamed the bandit Merzouk ag Acherif
for the March 26 attack in Aguelhok and the May 3 attack near
Tessalit, he acknowledged ADC responsibility for the May 6
attack on Diabali. Ag Sidamou stated that the ADC motivation
was to rearm itself so that it could improve its negotiating
position with both the Malian government and Ibrahim Bahanga.
He stated that the catalyst for the ADC's decision to rearm,
and break nearly two years of peace with the Malian
government, was the April 10 execution of two Tuareg ADC
members in Kidal and a falling out of sorts with Bahanga.

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The ADC - presumably under the command of ADC officer Lt.
Col. Moussa Bah - encouraged Bahanga to retaliate with
renewed attacks against the Malian military. Bahanga
apparently retorted that the ADC was not in a position to
give battle orders and that he would only engage Malian
forces on his own terms. Bahanga also reminded the ADC that
he had a cease-fire agreement with the Malian government and
that the ADC was therefore on its own. This led the ADC,
which officially disarmed in 2006 following the signature of
the Algiers Accords, to reconsider its negotiating position
and the need for renewed firepower. This, at least in ag
Sidamou's mind, was the genesis of the May 6 ADC attack in
Diabali.

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Failure of Algiers Accords All ATT's Fault
--------------

5.(C) Ag Sidamou said the situation in northern Mali was
unraveling because President Amadou Toumani Toure was
unwilling to work toward any solutions. He expressed
disappointment with the international community's willingness
to take President Toure's descriptions of his efforts to
resolve the crisis at face-value and said the ADC had tried
in vain, from July 2006 to April 10, 2008, to work with the
President to apply the Algiers Accords. Like other Tuareg
leaders, ag Sidamou urged the U.S. to assume a greater role
in the mediation process, arguing that the U.S. could succeed
where Algeria and Libya failed.

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AQIM and the Austrian Hostages
--------------

6.(C) Ag Sidamou said Kidal Tuaregs were tired of AQIM's
continued presence in traditional Tuareg zones and the tactic
of holding westerners for ransom. "If you give us the
means," he said, "we will go get the hostages right now. We
are ready. We will put an end to the entire hostage trade in
northern Mali. If you want AQIM's geo-coordinates so you can
kill them, let us know." Noting that the Libyan government
likely paid Bahanga for the release of three hostages who
were handed over to the Libyan Consul to Mali on May 1 in
Kidal (Ref. F),he asked the U.S. to do everything it could
to prevent a ransom payment for the Austrians, warning that
such a payment would only result in further hostage crises.
Ag Sidamou noted that what had first begun as the kidnapping
of Germans and Austrians could easily spread t the taking of
Americans and French hostages.

.(C) Ag Sidamou accused Mali of collaborating wit AQIM on
two levels. At the macro level, ag Sidmou accused Mali of
actively channeling AQIM int traditional Tuareg zones like
Tessalit to fuel umors of Tuareg ties to terrorism. At the
micro level, he charged that several Malian officials were
working with AQIM to secure a percentage of any eventual
ransom payment for the release of the two Austrian hostages.
Several of these officials are ethnic Arabs employed by the
Malian government as mediators. These include army Major
Lamana, Col. Mohamed Abderahmane Ould Meydou, businessman
Mohamed Ould Laghwinat, and the Mayor of Almoustarat, Baba
Ould Chouekh. (Comment. Major Lamana works for the Malian
security services, is deeply implicated in criminal and
likely terrorist activities, and is seemingly protected by
the Director of State Security, Col. Mamy Coulibaly (Ref. G).
Ould Meydou and Ould Chouekh are Telemsi Arabs from the Gao
region. End Comment.)

8.(C) Like the Embassy's other Kidal Tuareg contacts, ag
Sidamou said Tuaregs simply want AQIM to vacate Tuareg lands.
He admitted that some Tuareg smugglers sold fuel, food and
other supplies to AQIM, but stressed that these linkages were
commercial in nature and had nothing to do with shared
ideologies or religious persuasions. He also cited ethnic
reasons for Tuareg hostility toward AQIM's continued use of
northern Mali as a safe haven. "They are Arabs," he said of
the Algerian salafists who form the core of the AQIM cell in
northern Mali, "and it is essential for them to leave our
lands. We are not happy that this is occurring in our zone."

--------------
What Have You Done For Us Lately?
--------------

9.(C) At the start of the meeting, ag Sidamou said he was

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happy to talk the Embassy because the U.S. "hasn't done
Tuaregs much good, but hasn't done us any harm either." He
argued that Mali receives "tens of thousands" of dollars in
counter-terrorism assistance from the U.S. and other donors
but is now using this money to fight Tuaregs instead of
terrorists. With a palpable sense of irony, Ag Sidamou
pointed out that the ADC remains the only military force in
northern Mali willing and able to take on AQIM, having
attacked AQIM directly once in 2006 and run into them a
second time a few days later. If the U.S. doesn't want to
collaborate with the Tuaregs, said ag Sidamou, the U.S.
should stop assisting the Malian military or, at the very
least, pressure Mali to arrest individuals like Major Lamana
and Col. Ould Meydou. (Comment. Ag Simadou, himself, has
been reported to have economically facilitated AQIM
activities as well in the past, making him a dubious ally in
our counterterrorism work. End Comment.)

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Comment: The Tuareg Diversion
--------------

10.(C) Although ag Sidamou speaks largely for himself, his
views of AQIM, the failure of the Algiers Accords, and the
GOM's perceived focus on Tuaregs rather than terrorists are
shared by other Kidal Tuaregs. The fact that he, like other
Kidal Tuaregs, has a significant stake in retaining a certain
amount of autonomy in the north so as to ensure continued
income from smuggling further highlights the delicate balance
that the USG must strike between supporting Malian
sovereignty over their territory and providing economic
alternatives to a population which historically controlled
the important trans-Saharan trade routes. Should tensions
and clashes between the Malian military and Tuareg rebels
increase, Tuaregs in opposition to the Malian government are
likely to perceive counter-terrorism assistance provided by
the U.S and other international donors to the Malian military
as counter to Tuareg interests. In order to combat this
perception, we will continue to engage directly with key
Tuareg leaders, highlighting the many humanitarian assistance
and USAID projects that have directly benefited Tuareg
populations. We will also engage with the GOM to ensure that
they are clear as to the nature of US-Malian military
cooperation in the form of JCETs in the north.

11.(C) In regards to the suggestion made by ag Sidamou and
other ADC members that the U.S. support ADC efforts to
dislodge AQIM, it is clear that we can in no way support a
proxy force - as Algeria did prior the ADC's battles with the
GSPC in 2006 - that has attacked a democratically elected
government and close ally, killing Malian soldiers and
civilians. Such action would undermine the Malian government
and further destabilize northern Mali. That said, we believe
that negotiations between the ADC and the GOM are key to any
resolution and will continue to push President Toure and
other key Malian decision makers to create mixed military
units as stipulated by the Algiers Accords. We will also
maintain our clear position in support of credible
investigations of the October 2007 murder of a Tuareg
gendarme by members of the Malian 314th Infantry Company
based in Kati (Ref. H),and the April 10-11 executions by
unknown individuals in Kidal as an important means to assuage
Tuareg concerns and distrust of the Malian government. In
this regard, we have already raised the need for
investigations with Malian military and civilian leaders and
informed them that allegations of credible human rights
abuses by members of the Malian military will affect our
ability to provide future training.
MCCULLEY