Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAMAKO385
2008-04-22 16:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

COMMISSION OF TUAREG LEADERS TO MEET WITH ADC AND

Tags:  ASEC PINS PINR ML 
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VZCZCXRO4856
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0385/01 1131603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221603Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9041
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0416
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000385 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: ASEC PINS PINR ML
SUBJECT: COMMISSION OF TUAREG LEADERS TO MEET WITH ADC AND
BAHANGA

REF: A. BAMAKO 00375

B. BAMAKO 00339

C. 07 BAMAKO 00994

D. 07 BAMAKO 01366

E. 07 BAMAKO 01255

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000385

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: ASEC PINS PINR ML
SUBJECT: COMMISSION OF TUAREG LEADERS TO MEET WITH ADC AND
BAHANGA

REF: A. BAMAKO 00375

B. BAMAKO 00339

C. 07 BAMAKO 00994

D. 07 BAMAKO 01366

E. 07 BAMAKO 01255

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: A commission of eight Tuareg leaders left
Bamako for Kidal on April 18 to spend one month meeting with
local officials, the rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change
(ADC) and Ibrahim Bahanga. The group is expected to meet
with the ADC and Bahanga on April 21. Bahanga and the ADC
forces are reportedly camped in the same location in the
mountains to Tigharghar, but have not joined forces. The
commission has the support of President Amadou Toumani Toure
but does not speak on behalf of the Malian government and
therefore cannot present any deliverables to the ADC or
Bahanga - a fatal flaw according to ADC spokesman Ahmada ag
Bibi (Ref A). What the commission may provide, however, is
new window for negotiations via the involvement of
influential Kidal Tuaregs who have, until this point, been
overshadowed by ag Bibi and ADC leader Iyad ag Ghali.
Commission members include four high level Kidal Tuareg
leaders - National Assembly Deputy Mohamed ag Intallah,
former government Minister Mohamed ag Erlaf, presidential
advisor Acherif ag Mohamed and Malian diplomat Abdurahmane
Ghalla. Ghalla, who led a rebel faction during the 1991-1996
Tuareg rebellion and is now assigned to the Malian consulate
in Tamanrasset, Algeria, spoke to the Embassy on April 15
about the commission's objectives, recent events in Kidal and
prospects for peace. End Summary.

--------------
President Toure a One-Man Show
--------------

2.(C) On April 14 a self-appointed commission of eight
Tuareg leaders originally from Kidal met separately with
President Toure and Minister of Territorial Administration,
General Kafouguna Kone. According to Acherif and Ghalla,
during the meeting President Toure offered his condolences
for the two Tuaregs executed in Kidal April 10-11, expressed
exasperation with Algerian mediation efforts and said he
regretted involving Libya in negotiations with Ibrahim
Bahanga given the failure of the Tripoli talks and Algeria's

negative reaction. President Toure said he turned toward
Tripoli not to send a message to Algeria, undermine the
Algiers Accords or change mediators in mid-stream but to
secure the release of Bahanga's 33 hostages.

3.(C) Ghalla reported that President Toure was attempting to
manage the northern crisis on his own, without the help or
input of even his most trusted advisors. General Kafougouna
Kone subsequently told Ghalla and other commission members
that even he was unaware of the President's decision to
involve Libya in the hostage negotiations with Bahanga. In
contrast to a recent report by the French Ambassador to Mali
(Ref A),Ghalla described the President as "tired" and
"frustrated" by the lack of progress with Bahanga, the
off-again on-again role of Algeria and the ineffectiveness of
the Malian military.

-------------- --
Tuareg Leaders Ignore Ag Bibi, Depart For Kidal
-------------- --

4.(C) ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi advised Ghalla and other
commission members to postpone travel to Kidal until Foreign
Minister Moctar Ouane returns from Algiers. He argued that
the commission's inability to offer anything other than more
talk to Tuareg rebels would render travel to Kidal pointless.
Ag Bibi may also be uneasy with non-ADC Tuareg leaders
inserting themselves into the negotiation process. Up to
this point, ADC leader Iyad ag Ghali has facilitated
negotiations between the Malian government and Tuareg rebels.
While ag Ghali is an experienced political operator and
rebel leader, many Tuaregs who are not from Kidal or do not
regard themselves as rebels question ag Ghali's allegiances
(Refs B and C). Ag Ghali, however, has been in Tripoli for
several weeks, has repeatedly said he wants to leave Mali,
and is supposed to report to a new job at the Malian
consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (Ref D). During ag Ghali's
absence, Ag Bibi's authority over ADC members is open for
debate given his thin credentials as a rebel and military

BAMAKO 00000385 002 OF 003


leader. ADC officers with more solid military backgrounds,
such as Lt. Col. Moussa Bah, who led the ADC forces out of
Kidal on April 12, may be more natural replacements for ag
Ghali.

5.(C) Abdurahmane Ghalla readily admitted that his
commission was short on deliverables. "What are we bringing
for Bahanga?" he asked rhetorically, "Nothing. Just advice to
promote negotiations." Ghalla said the commission could
still serve a useful purpose by opening a space for
negotiations, even if it could promise nothing on behalf of
the Malian government. He said the commission hoped to link
up with another self-appointed group in Kidal, the so-called
"Committee of Wise Men" which helped negotiate a cease-fire
between Bahanga and the Malian military earlier this month.

-------------- ---
Ghalla's View of Executions, Bahanga and the ADC
-------------- ---

6.(C) During the 1991-1996 rebellion Ghalla led the
Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of the Azawad (ARLA)
rebel movement. Until recently, he encumbered the position in
Riyadh similar to the post to which ag Ghali was assigned to
in Jeddah in late 2007. Ghalla was subsequently transferred,
at his request, to the Malian consulate in Tamanrasset,
Algeria. During his meeting with the Embassy, Ghalla
complained that the application of the Algiers Accords was
too slow and that while President Toure remained committed to
a peaceful solution, some members of the Malian military -
such as those he believed responsible for the recent
executions - were actively sabotaging negotiation efforts.
He attributed acts of sabotage within the military to
discontent over promotions, low pay and plummeting morale.
He said commission members were convinced the Malian military
was responsible for the killings. At first, said Ghalla, he
thought the killings were the result of an inter-Tuareg
dispute, then considered whether they were carried out by
AQIM sympathizers. Ghalla said that allegations of salafist
involvement in the murders was simply "not true" and that the
executions were committed by lower level members of the
Malian military acting outside of official orders.

7.(C) Although Ghalla supports the call for a investigation
into the murders, he felt the likelihood of a credible
inquiry was low, recalling that the inquiry into the killing
of a Tuareg gendarme by Malian soldiers in October 2007 went
nowhere (Ref E). He said the family of the dead gendarme had
received no response to repeated requests for information on
the progress of the murder investigation.

8.(C) Ghalla said he had no idea whether Bahanga was
interested in money, securing smuggling routes through
Tinzawaten or the genuine application of the Algiers Accords.
Given his position in Tamanrasset, Ghalla maintains close
ties to Algerian diplomats. Ghalla said the Algerian
Ambassador to Mali told him that Algeria would have arrested
Bahanga in Tamanrasset in late 2007 "in a minute" had Mali
issued an arrest warrant. President Toure will never issue
such a warrant, said Ghalla, because he knows that the
problem with Bahanga can only be solved through political
means.

9.(C) The ADC, or some elements within the ADC, could very
well align themselves with Bahanga, said Ghalla. He
cautioned, however, that while the ADC and Bahanga could
conceivably coordinate attacks, they remain politically
distinct. Ghalla said his commission would advocate for the
following points: a point by point timeline for Algiers
Accords implementation, a solid cease-fire agreement and
safe-passage for Malian military re-supply convoys via
pre-approved corridors. Ghalla said it was not yet too late
to prevent what could become Mali's third Tuareg rebellion.
"No one," said Ghalla, "has declared war yet."

10.(C) Comment: We do not share ag Bibi's assessment that
without the ability to promise concrete deliverables, the
eight-man commission to Kidal is doomed to fail. Abdurahmane
Ghalla and Mohamed ag Erlaf are two extremely well-respected
Kidal Tuaregs who have, until now, been ignored by both the
Malian government and the ADC. Even though promises from
previous negotiation efforts remain unfulfilled, the decision
of Ghalla, ag Erlaf, and the others to insert themselves into
the process as good-faith negotiators will increase the
number of Kidal leaders at the table and allow perspectives
of Tuaregs other than Iyad ag Ghali to see daylight. In this

BAMAKO 00000385 003 OF 003


sense, the commission may at least create some breathing
space to reduce tensions and allow Malian and Algerian
negotiators time to regroup. On April 21 Acherif ag Mohamed
told the Embassy that he and six other commission members
were leaving Kidal to meet the ADC and Bahanga in Tigharghar.
Ghalla, who planned to travel to Kidal via Tamanrasset,
telephoned the Embassy from Algeria on April 21 to report
that he was still in Tamanrasset, awaiting permission from
the Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to rejoin the
commission in Kidal.
MCCULLEY