BERABICHE AND AQIM IN NORTHERN MALI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000371

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PINS PINR ML
SUBJECT: BERABICHE AND AQIM IN NORTHERN MALI

REF: A. BAMAKO 00239

B. 06 BAMAKO 01243

C. 06 BAMAKO 01244

D. 07 BAMAKO 00960

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: This cable provides an overview of the Arab
Berabiche and Kounta communities of northern Mali.
International observers often focus on the Tuareg and their
disparate rebel movements when tracking AQIM's use of
northern Mali as a safe haven. Malian Berabiche, however,
are likely of greater interest due to inherent social,
language and cultural ties with AQIM members from southern
Algeria. Indeed, the Libyan government has reportedly used
several Berabiche, including the Malian army Major Lamana
Ould Bbou, to contact the AQIM cell in northern Mali
currently holding two Austrian hostages.

2.(C) Summary continued: Like the previous cable on Malian
Tuaregs (Ref A),we identify some of the key local decision
makers within each group of Malian Arabs. A deeper
appreciation of northern Mali's complex social dynamics
should improve our ability to understand and interpret events
in the north. Identifying important local decision makers
will also provide potential future points of contact. This
cable is not intended to advocate for a so-called "tribal"
analysis of events in northern Mali as the decisions of
specific actors - such as Major Lamana - likely hinge less on
increasingly fluid ethnic associations than on individual
calculations of risk, profit and future gain. End Summary.


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Malian Arabs and Moors
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3.(U) Arabs account for roughly 10 percent of northern
Mali's population of approximately 1.2 million people.
Tuaregs likely account for more than 50 percent of northern
Malians and Songhrai around 35 percent. There are three main
groupings of Moors/Arabs in Mali: the Berabiche, the Kounta
and the Telemsi Arabs. Although there are slight differences
in meaning, the labels "Arab" and "Moor" are often used
interchangeably. The Berabiche, Kounta and Telemsi speak
Hasaniya, a variant of Arabic spoken from Western Sahara
through Mauritania and into northern Mali. They are
generally Malikite Sunnis who adhere to the quadriyya Sufi
brotherhood. While the term "Malian Arab" covers all three
groups, it glosses over significant internal differences
between them. .

4.(U) In May 2006 Malian Kounta and Berabiche split over
internal leadership questions when the Kounta organized what
was billed as an all-Arab meeting in the town of Gossi, south
of Timbuktu, following Mouammar Qadhafi's tumultuous visit to
Timbuktu one month earlier. Worried that the Gossi meeting
would be dominated by the Kounta, Mali's Berabiche leaders
refused to attend and instead organized a rival conference in
Timbuktu. The two competing conferences produced two
organizations: the Kounta-dominated Coordination of Malian
Arab Communities (CCAM) led by Mohamed El Moctar, now the
Malian Minister of Culture; and the Union of Malian Arab
Communities (UCAM) led by Lamine Tahar, a prominent Berabiche
businessman from Timbuktu.

5.(U) Tensions amongst Malian Arabs also flared following
the July 2007 legislative elections. Only two Arab
candidates, Mohamed Ould Matali and Danna Moulaye, ran for
National Assembly seats. Matali, a Telemsi Arab from Bourem
running as an incumbent, lost his seat to a non-Arab.
Moulaye, a Berabiche from Timbuktu, failed to qualify for the
final round of voting. Neither Matali nor Moulaye had the
unified support of Arab populations in their respective
constituencies.

6.(C) As a result, Mali's 147 seat National Assembly
currently has no Arab members. The same holds for the High
Council of Collectivities (HCC),which serves as Mali's
largely ceremonial 75 seat second house of parliament. By
way of comparison, there are 12 Tuaregs in the National
Assembly and many more (including former and current rebels
Iyad ag Ghali and Ibrahim Bahanga) in the HCC. This lack of
representation, along with quiet observations by some Arab
leaders that Mali seems to reward those who take up arms
against the central government like ag Ghali and Bahanga, may

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have influenced President Amadou Toumani Toure's decision to
appoint Mohamed El Moctar as Minister of Culture in October

2007.

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The Kounta and Telemsi Arabs
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7.(U) The Kounta, who are centered in the region of Gao, are
traditionally regarded as nobles and religious leaders
although any residual authority they may have had over the
Berabiche or Telemsi Arabs has been diminished to the point
of being non-existent. The Kounta often present themselves
as moderators between Malian Tuareg and Malian Berabiche.
This may be due partly to the Kounta's noble status and
partly to their physical geographic location between the
Tuaregs of Kidal and the Berabiche of Timbuktu. The Kounta
are not divided into fractions like the Tuareg or the
Berabiche.

8.(U) Notable Kounta leaders include:
-- Sidi Mohamed Ould Haytel, local Chief in the town of
Imelach
-- Naghma Ould Sidi-Aghmar, businessman in Gao
-- Mohamed Ould Idriss, local politician in Gao
-- Baba Ould Sidi Elmoctar, Chief of the Kounta in the
region of Kidal

9.(U) Telemsi Arabs are also located in the Gao region and
were once regarded as subservient to the Kounta, but are now
independent of Kounta dominance. Telemsi Arabs are also not
divided into fractions but form one group. Key Telemsi
leaders include:

-- Mohamed El Moctar, current Minister of Culture and
president of the CCAM
-- Mohamed Ould Matali, former National Assembly Deputy
from Bourem
-- Mohamed Ould Laghwinat, businessman in Gao
-- Mohamed Ould Meydou, Malian Army Colonel

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The Berabiche
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10.(U) Malian Berabiche live throughout northern Mali, from
the Mauritanian frontier to Kidal. The majority of Berabiche
are likely in the Timbuktu region. There are as many as 35
different Berabiche fractions. In Mali the Berabiche are
traditionally traders. They have controlled, for instance,
the salt trade from the mines of Taoudenni for generations
even though most of the actual salt miners are ethnic
Songhrai. Key Berabiche leaders include:

-- Ould Najem Sidi Mohamed, Imam and local Chief in Timbuktu
-- Lamine Tahar, businessman, UCAM president and prominent
businessman in Timbuktu
-- Dinna Ould Sidi Mohamed, businessman in Timbuktu
-- Danna Moulaye, retired military nurse, based in Timbuktu
-- Lamana Ould Bdou, ex-rebel member of the Armed Islamic
Front for the Azawad (FIAA),Major in Malian Army

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Typecasting Tuaregs as Terrorists
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11.(C) Tuareg rebels like Iyad ag Ghali and Ibrahim Bahanga
are often portrayed by the international press and others as
potential AQIM allies or recruits. This is due in part to
Tuareg leaders' dabbling with Dawa al Tabligh - a
fundamentalist movement from Pakistan and India that swept
through Kidal in the 1990s but apparently lost its appeal
once Malian Tuaregs fully understood Dawa's austere belief
system and its incompatibility to Tuareg traditions. It is
also due to the implication of Tuaregs in northern Mali's
lucrative gun and drug trade, and ag Ghali and Bahanga's
proclivity for attacking the Malian military.

12.(C) While certain Tuaregs are clearly providing
logistical services to AQIM, there is little evidence that
this support is motivated by anything beyond economic gain.
There is no indication, for instance, that Tuareg smugglers
or bandits have any religious or ideological links with AQIM.
What they share is an interest in trafficking weapons, drugs
and anything else passing through the Sahara. Malian Tuaregs
generally regard AQIM as a foreign extremist group
trespassing on Tuareg land. The Algerians who form the

BAMAKO 00000371 003 OF 003


backbone of AQIM do not speak the Tuareg language of Tamachek
and share no cultural ties with Malian Tuaregs. The Tuareg
rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change's (ADC) decision to
attack AQIM twice in 2006 (Ref B),and AQIM's subsequent
decision to withdraw - at least temporarily - from Tuareg
zones to areas controlled by the Berabiche (Ref C) illustrate
both the absence of religious/ideological ties between AQIM
and the Tuareg and the need to focus on potential links
between AQIM and certain Berabiche.

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The Berabiche and AQIM
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13.(C) The Berabiche receive relatively little attention, at
least in comparison to Malian Tuaregs. This may be because
the Berabiche comprise only a very small portion of the
overall northern Malian population. Unlike the Tuareg, the
Berabiche have also not drawn attention to themselves by
attacking the Malian military - even though zones inhabited
by Malian Arabs remain as underdeveloped and neglected as
Tuareg enclaves like Kidal. Since the end of the "Tuareg"
rebellion of the 1990s - which involved Berabiche and Arab
factions - Malian Arabs have preferred to work with the
central government, thereby preserving their commercial
interests. Like the Tuareg, however, certain Berabiche are
actively involved in northern Mali's drug and gun smuggling
business.

14.(C) The Hasaniya spoken by Malian Berabiche is different
from Algerian Arabic, but as Arabic languages, are more
compatible linguistically than they are to Tamachek, which is
related to Berber. In addition to linguistic links, Malian
Berabiche are culturally closer to southern Algerian Arabs,
like Moctar bel Moctar who is an ethnic Chaamba, than they
are to non-Arab Tuaregs. This does not mean that Malian
Berabiche are more receptive to AQIM's message, although the
potential is likely higher with the Berabiche than with the
Tuareg. It means, rather, that Berabiche operators like
Major Lamana have a comparative advantage over their Tuareg
counterparts when it comes to commericial exchanges and
arrangements with AQIM.

15.(C) Given this comparative advantage, it is not
surprising to hear contacts report that Libya is relying on
Berabiche, not Tuareg, to negotiate with the AQIM cell
holding two Austrian nationals in northern Mali. Three names
that have surfaced as Berabiche go-betweens are Dinna Ould
Sidi Mohamed, Abdurahmane Youba and Major Lamana. Both Sidi
Mohamed and Youba are "businessmen" based in Timbuktu.
Lamana is an officer in the Malian DGSE (Director General for
State Security) who was recently implicated in a northern
Mali cocaine deal worth approximately USD 450,000. Lamana is
believed to have fed information to criminal and terrorist
organizations in the past and is also believed to enjoy the
protection of DGSE Director, Col. Mamy Coulibaly (Ref D). If
Libya or another nation eventually meets AQIM's ransom
demands for the two Austrians, Mali's Berabiche
intermediaries will likely receive a cut. If Lamana is
involved, some of this money will presumably make its way
back to Col. Coulibaly.

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Comment: Economics for Smugglers and Extremists 101
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16.(C) The argument for focusing on certain Berabiche rather
than Tuareg rebels as AQIM facilitators is, above all, an
economic one. As ethnic Arabs who speak a language similar
to Algerian Arabic, Malian Berabiche hold certain comparative
advantages over their Tuareg counterparts. Malian Berabiche
can also operate from Mali's western frontier with Mauritania
all the way to Mali's eastern border with Algeria north of
Kidal. Northern Mali is divided into zones similar to those
used by taxis in Washington, DC. The more zones crossed, the
higher the fare. If one is able to enlist the support of the
right Berabiche, one could conceivably circumvent the Tuareg
zone entirely. AQIM likely pays taxes to cross some zones
and receives payments from others crossing AQIM territory.
It is also important, however, to point out that culture
similarities shared between AQIM and Malian Arabs do not
necessarily indicate shared ideologies or allegiances. Like
other Malians, most Malian Arabs identify themselves as
"Malian", view AQIM as Algerian interlopers, and would
eagerly step in and fill the void were AQIM to lose its
ability to exact tolls from smugglers crossing its zone.
MCCULLEY