AS NORTHERN CRISIS DEEPENS, MALI DRIFTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000364

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018
TAGS: ASEC PINS PINR ML
SUBJECT: AS NORTHERN CRISIS DEEPENS, MALI DRIFTS

REF: A. BAMAKO 00305

B. BAMAKO 00325

C. BAMAKO 00339

D. BAMAKO 00357

BAMAKO 00000364 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: On April 10 President Amadou Toumani Toure's
advisor on Tuareg issues, Acherif ag Mohamed, said the
President was adrift following the failure of last week's
talks in Tripoli with the Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for
Change (ATNMC) of Ibrahim Bahanga. Acherif said President
Toure lacked the will to make either war or peace and that no
one at the presidency was even discussing events in the
north. He predicted that Algeria, angered by Libyan
meddling, would let the situation in northern Mali fester for
as long as three weeks before making any attempt to restart
negotiations. Acherif also provided further details on the
April 2 helicopter gunship attack on Bahanga's positions
south of Kidal. He said the cease-fire negotiated last week
in Tripoli was effectively dead and that future attacks were
imminent barring some unforeseen intervention. End Summary.

--------------
Libyan Detour a Dead End
--------------

2.(C) Acherif ag Mohamed told the Embassy on April 10 that
peace talks in Tripoli between the Malian government and
representatives of Bahanga's ATNMC failed to produce any
agreement. Although Acherif is employed as an advisor to
President Toure, he has been sidelined since the Alliance for
Democracy and Change's (ADC) July 2006 attack on Malian
military outposts in Menaka and Kidal. He maintains,
however, close contact with ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi.
Once Mali's consul to Tamanrasset, Acherif is also in close
contact with the Algerian Ambassador to Mali. Acherif felt
that differences over cease-fire terms, Bahanga's demand for
the drawdown of Malian military forces from northern Mali,
and confusion over whether the two sides were expected to
sign a side agreement to the Algiers Accords framework
contributed to the Tripoli talks' failure.

--------------
Adrift in Bamako
--------------

3.(C) Acherif described President Toure as "asleep," stating
that the Malian government was interested in neither war nor
peace with Bahanga. He reported that, to his knowledge, no
one in the presidency has called any meetings on the crisis
in the north or attempted to draw out any kind of action
plan. Acherif said the level of inaction at the presidency
was akin to firefighters deciding to sleep through alarm
bells at the firehouse. Acherif said no one was advising
President Toure on the north because the President was not
seeking any advice.

-------------- --------------
Helicopter Gunships Attacked Bahanga and Tuareg Rock Band
-------------- --------------

4.(C) Acherif confirmed that one Ukrainian or Russian pilot
was killed in the April 2 helicopter attack on Bahanga about
20km south of Kidal (Ref B). He said the Malian in the
damaged helicopter was wounded. According to Acherif, the
helicopter pilots were as surprised to see Bahanga as Bahanga
was to see them as they apparently came up on Bahanga's
positions earlier than expected.

5.(C) Members of Tinawaren, the internationally-known Tuareg
musical band that had been on the road from Kidal to Gao at
the time of the attack, told Acherif that the gunships were
so close that they could see the expressions on the pilots'
faces. They could have, said Acherif, shot them with a
pistol. In addition to running into Bahanga earlier than
expected and finding themselves apparently at too short a
range, the helicopters reportedly fired from smaller caliber
machine guns mounted on the sides rather than from HIND-D's
front mounted gun. Acherif said that two members of
Bahanga's group were killed and only one vehicle was
destroyed.

6.(C) When asked if the Malian military or Bahanga had won
the engagement, Acherif indicated that the April 2 battle was
a draw. He said the helicopters were intended as a diversion

BAMAKO 00000364 002.2 OF 002


to allow a resupply column of more than 40 vehicles and 14
BRDMs to move from Anefis to Kidal. He noted, however, that
the Lieutenant Colonel commanding the Malian column was a
Tuareg who was afraid to engage Bahanga directly despite
having more than a dozen armored vehicles. Acherif said that
Mali was unlikely to use its HIND-Ds against Bahanga again
now that Bahanga had damaged one and killed an Eastern-bloc
pilot trainer.

--------------
Cease-fire? What Cease-fire?
--------------

7.(C) The failure of talks in Tripoli has left uncertain the
status of the cease-fire, proclaimed just on the third of
April in Libya. Acherif reported that neither the Malian
government nor Bahanga had any illusions about a cease-fire
holding for long. While Bahanga's forces have apparently
withdrawn from positions around Kidal, they are poised to
prevent any attempt to resupply the Malian garrison in
Tinzawaten. He said he did not believe Bahanga planted any
land mines while positioned on the road between Kidal and
Gao. He reported that ADC Spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi, who
traveled to Kidal two months ago for what was intended to be
a two week visit, is afraid to leave Kidal for fear that ADC
fighters currently with him will defect to Bahanga the moment
he returns to Bamako (ag Bibi remains there for now, but the
ADC troops have now left Kidal, septel).

8.(C) Tuaregs are also concerned about Bahanga's deputy,
Hassan ag Fagaga. Fagaga and the Mayor of Tessalit may have
played a tangential role in the March 26 attack on Aguelhok
that was orchestrated by a group of youth apparently without
military training. Acherif said the plan was to take the
commander of the Malian military detachment in Aguelhok
hostage, but it failed because the Tuaregs who carried it out
"couldn't even shoot a chicken." Acherif said there are
rumors that other groups of youth are forming their own
militias north of Kidal, either with or without support from
Fagaga.

-------------- --
Comment: Options Dwindling for President Toure
-------------- --

9.(C) Acherif's connections with other Tuaregs are solid,
but he has been sidelined within the Presidency, and may have
been intentionally left out of the loop--if there was one--on
ATT's response to the crisis. Letting the situation in
northern Mali fester could be a concerted policy response
(although perhaps not a good one) by the Malian government as
at least one presidential insider has told the Embassy that
Mali was betting that if the situation got bad enough,
Tuaregs would turn on Bahanga and take matters into their own
hands. It seems more likely, however, that President Toure
is simply running out of policy responses: his military is
unable to match ATNMC on Bahanga's home-turf, the Libyans
have failed twice in two months to cobble together any kind
of lasting agreement, and the Algerians have suspended their
facilitation. Like other Tuareg leaders grasping for a
solution, Acherif also stressed the need to create and equip
mixed special units including a blend of southern Malians,
Tuareg loyalists, ex-ADC and ATNMC fighters (Ref C). Acherif
said only the creation of these units could force Bahanga to
back down. Recent discussions with President Toure and
Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane, however, suggest that these
units remain a long way from reality (Ref D).
MCCULLEY