ENGAGING WITH MALI ON NORTHERN INSECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000357

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2025
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS ML
SUBJECT: ENGAGING WITH MALI ON NORTHERN INSECURITY

REF: A. BAMAKO 339

B. BAMAKO 325

C. BAMAKO 320

D. BAMAKO 217

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Classified By: Ambassador Terence P. McCulley, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: Concerned by continuing instability in the
north and the absence of a clear path towards its resolution,
the Ambassador called separately on President Amadou Toumani
Toure (ATT) and Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane on April 8 and
9 to exchange views on the evolution of the situation and
Mali's next planned steps. The Ambassador praised Mali's
history of a peaceful approach to its restive northern
populations, and he encouraged the Malian leadership to
pursue a higher profile public campaign to counter Bahanga's
propaganda on lack of progress with the Algiers Accords.
Noting that involving northerners in efforts to secure the
region was a key component of the Accords, the Ambassador
suggested that, if Mali wished, the U.S. might consider how
U.S. mil-mil engagement in Mali could be adjusted to
incorporate the mixed special units provided for in the peace
agreement. Both ATT and FM Ouane expressed irritation with
the Algerians, dating from their tepid response to last
fall's besieged garrison at Tinzawaten; Algeria, based on a
read-out from the Algerian Ambassador in Bamako, is incensed
by Mali's recourse to Libyan negotiation, and is presenting a
cold shoulder in response. Notwithstanding this
non-productive, if perhaps temporary, standoff from a key
player, Mali still claims it plans to organize a regional
summit on security within the next few weeks in Bamako, and
FM Ouane is on a mission to neighboring states (to include a
stop in Algiers). End Summary.

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ATT on Security in the North - "I'll organize a round table"
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2. (C ) In an April 8 meeting with President Toure, the
Ambassador praised Mali's long-standing commitment to a
peaceful approach to insecurity in the North, an area which
remains unstable and worrisome even as the recent truce
brokered by Libya seems to be holding. The Ambassador
suggested that while Mali's people carry no affection for
Bahanga or his violence, the rebel claims that the Algiers
Accords are simply not advancing have gained currency, and
competing Algerian and Libyan mediation risked fanning
regional rivalries that were not necessarily in Mali's
long-term interest. He recalled that the President's signal
speech delivered from Kayes after the attacks of May 2006 had
laid out a road map for peace, unity, and tolerance and
suggested that the current situation argued for a similar
defining moment. This would kick off a public process
outlining progress to date under the Algiers Accords and
establish a timeline for implementation that would at once
counter Bahanga's messages and reassure both domestic public
opinion and Mali's friends in the international community.


3. (C ) Regarding specific elements of the Accords, the
Ambassador noted the importance of the special mixed military
units composed of both loyalist Tuaregs and southerners to
make northern populations feel they had a stake in securing
their region. He added that if Mali found this to be useful,
the U.S. might explore how our military to military
cooperation and training could help make these operational.
Noting that donor coordination had been advanced following
the Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s by a focus group on the
north, he suggested that Mali's partners would be responsive
to a Malian initiative to revive such a process. On a
bilateral basis, he added that the U.S. had responded to a
request from the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create
and distribute mine safety information materials in the Kidal
region. (Note: via our resident MIST.)


4. (C ) President Toure responded positively to the
Ambassador's suggestion of a public campaign, but framed that
less in terms of a persuasive speech by the head of state
than as a round table debate of experts on the Algiers
Accords to explain the status of their application. He added
separately that he hadn't wanted to speak out personally on
the Algiers Acccords for fear of undermining ongoing Libyan
negotiations. The President railed against Bahanga and
Fagaga as threats to both national security and national
unity, characterizing them as close relatives who had been
joined by a few youth to defend illicit activities in a swath

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from Niger to Chad; he also accused them of participating in
attacks in northern Niger.


5. (C) With regard to the Algerian role, ATT lamented that
while he received encouraging signs from President
Bouteflika, Algerian actions on the ground remained an
enormous source of frustration, from their inaction when
Mali's garrison was surrounded at Tinzawaten, to their
self-interested hopes to use Bahanga against Salafists in
northern Mali. Fed up with Algeria, he accepted Libya's
offer of involvement during the most recent hostage crises.
As for U.S. help, ATT said Mali needed assistance to train
and equip Mali's military contingent based at Tessalit, and
he recalled his conversation with General Ward during the
AFRICOM commander's recent visit (Ref D),noting that Mali
needed vehicles, combat helicopters, secure communications,
training, and intelligence support. The Ambassador replied
that U.S. - Mali intelligence sharing was very developed, and
that the U.S. continued to work (via SOCEUR) a list of
requests for non-lethal equipment that Mali had submitted in
August 2007.

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The FM Blames Algiers
--------------


6. (C ) Ambassador repeated his points to FM Ouane April 9,
emphasizing the need to maintain Mali's approach on a
peaceful resolution, and urging Malian leadership to launch a
public diplomacy campaign on the application of the Algiers
Accords. Ouane agreed the special units were key, but
expressed reservations given Fagaga's betrayal of trust in
deserting his command of the special units, taking men,
vehicles, and weapons. Responding to the Ambassador's point
that it was important to retain Algeria as a full partner in
their implementation, Ouane argued with somewhat tortured
logic that the recent Tripoli Entente were not "new
negotiations," and represented the intervention of Khadafi
Foundation rather than the Libyan Government (sic). He too
said Mali had only accepted Libya's offer of mediation out of
frustration with repeated disappointment by Algeria. Ouane
complained that Algeria wanted to have it both ways; they had
not helped, but now seemed to be annoyed that another nation
had stepped forward.

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Algerians Miffed (but not out of the game)
--------------


7. (C ) And, indeed, the Algerians are quite annoyed. In an
April 9 meeting with the Ambassador to discuss the north,
Algerian Ambassador Karim Abul Gheraieb said he had received
explicit instructions from President Bouteflika to stand down
from any mediation between Mali and the Tuareg
rebels/bandits, and to refrain from any "facilitation" of the
Algiers Accords. Reading from his dispatch to Algiers, he
described his tart reply to Malian FM Ouane on being informed
after the fact of Mali's decision to permit Libyan mediation
in the Bahanga hostage crisis "outside the context of the
Algiers Accords," and in effect "being treated as a
sub-contractor to another mediator."


8. (C ) The Algerians apparently take particular exception
to a series of articles in a Malian newspaper they believe to
be Libyan financed (and reportedly directed by a close
associate of ATT),which criticized Algeria's actions in
northern Mali, characterized Bahanga and Fagaga as "agents of
Algiers," and accused Algerian security officials of
involvement in drug trafficking. (Note: Both ATT and other
senior Malian officials have repeatedly made the same
claims.) The Algerian ambassador admitted that they would
re-engage after an unspecified "cooling off period."
Virtually this same series of complaints and suggestion of
eventual renewed engagement were featured in an April 10
report on Radio France International.

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Comment: Need for Leadership and Risk-Taking
--------------


9. (C ) As the Ambassador observed to both ATT and FM Ouane,
the paths of peaceful engagement and faith in Tuareg
participation in security arrangements in the North require
taking risks (something the consensus-devoted ATT is averse
to doing). Such courageous moves are vital, however, as
Bahanga's continued rebellion is creating a climate of

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insecurity that others, be they AQIM or opportunistic Tuaregs
unrelated to Bahanga, could exploit. According to FM Ouane,
plans will continue for a regional summit on security despite
Algeria's tiff with its Malian and Libyan neighbors, and he
is now travelling in the region to tender formal invitations
from ATT to his counterparts. The Algerian Ambassador
acknowledged that the current state of the affairs was not an
obstacle to planning the regional security conference - which
we took to mean the event is too far from reality to bother
blocking planning. Meanwhile, with the truce holding and
major mediator Algeria in standoff mode, we will continue to
encourage the Malians to seize the public debate to counter
Bahanga's corrosive influence on nothern Mali's confidence
and security.
MCCULLEY