TUAREG LEADERS FROM GAO AND TIMBUKTU: TIME FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000339

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018
TAGS: ASEC PINS PINR ML
SUBJECT: TUAREG LEADERS FROM GAO AND TIMBUKTU: TIME FOR
PEACE RUNNING OUT

REF: A. BAMAKO 00239

B. BAMAKO 00305

C. 07 BAMAKO 00995

D. BAMAKO 00256

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Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: Three Tuareg leaders from Gao and Timbuktu
said on April 1 that they feared northern Mali was on the
brink of rebellion. Azaz ag Doudagdag, Ghoumar ag Intaha and
Mohamed Issouf ag Ghallas described the March 26 attack on
Aguelhoc by a previously unknown group of disaffected Tuareg
youth - or, in the words of Azaz, "neo-rebels" - as a
harbinger of things to come. Azaz, who is reportedly one of
the few Tuaregs other than Alliance for Democracy and Change
(ADC) leader Iyad ag Ghali to advise President Amadou Toumani
Toure on northern Mali, said neither ag Ghali, nor Algeria
nor Libya were reliable mediators and that Mali and the
international community must find an alternative formula to
peaceably return to the Algiers Accords framework. Azaz
described Ibrahim ag Bahanga as a trigger-happy illiterate,
yet stressed that while Malian Tuaregs reject Bahanga's
methods they support his key demands of a Malian military
withdrawal from the north and the application of the Algiers
Accords. Azaz argued that the rapid implementation of just
one aspect of the Accords, such as the creation of mixed
military units comprised of southerners and northerners,
would immediately undercut Bahanga's message and momentum.
He urged the U.S. to help stand up these units and also
support the creation of a donor coordination group for
northern Mali similar to the one created by former President
Alpha Oumar Konare after the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s.
End Summary.

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Who's Advising ATT?
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2.(C) With the situation around Tinzawaten and Kidal
deteriorating (septel),it has become increasingly difficult
to ascertain who from northern Mali, other than Iyad ag
Ghali, is advising President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) on
Mali's response to growing Tuareg unrest. Mohamed ag
Acherif, the most senior Tuareg advisor at the presidency,
has been largely sidelined since the ADC's 2006 attacks on
Malian military bases in Kidal and Menaka.

3.(C) Two names that have surfaced are Assarid ag
Imbarcaouane, the vice president of the Malian National
Assembly, and Azaz ag Doudagdag, a member of the High Council
of Collectivities (HCC),Mali's largely ceremonial 75 seat
lower house of parliament. Both Imbarcaouane and Azaz are
Imghad Tuaregs from the Gao region (Ref A). On March 28
Imbarcaouane told Reuters news that the two Austrian
nationals captured by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
were not on Malian soil. If they were, said Imbarcaouane, "I
would know and our President would know." In light of this
statement, any advice Imbarcaouane may be providing to
President Toure would seem questionable at best.

4.(C) Unlike Imbarcaouane, Azaz does not seek attention and
his name rarely figures in press headlines. Fellow Tuaregs
sometimes describe him as the Tuareg Fidel Castro on account
of his impressive beard and the years he spent as a student
in Havana. The hulking Azaz bears a closer resemblance to
Harry Potter's Hagrid. During the Tuareg rebellion of the
1990s he was one of the leaders of the Revolutionary Army for
the Liberation of the Azawad (ARLA). He now represents the
town of Bourem, on the road from Gao to Kidal, as the 5th
vice president of the HCC.

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Neo-Rebels
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5.(C) Azaz and two elected leaders from Timbuktu, ag Intaha
and ag Ghallas (who are also Imghad Tuaregs),said they were
seriously concerned by renewed fighting in northern Mali.
"Unlike you," said ag Ghallas referring to American diplomats
in Bamako, "we risk dying if things go off the rails." Ag
Ghallas said the current crisis is not limited to Tinzawaten.
"If you believe that," he said, "you're dreaming." Ag

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Ghallas noted that the current instigators - Bahanga, Hassan
Fagaga, Hama ag Sid'Ahmed, Mohamed ali Baye and Mohamed ag
Ahraib - are all Ifergoumessen from Tinzawaten yet warned
that that prolonged fighting will sweep up non-Ifergoumessen
Tuareg youth. "Even my own sons," he said, "will be swept
away."

6.(C) Azaz portrayed the March 26 attack in Aguelhoc (Ref B)
as the first armed attack orchestrated by what he labeled
"neo-rebels", meaning young Tuaregs who were under the age of
10 when the last Tuareg rebellion ended in 1996 and are now
unemployed, under-educated and ready to run a rebellion of
their own. Similar attacks, he said, could just as easily
occur in Gao and Timbuktu. Over the past six months, other
Tuareg leaders have issued similar warnings about potential
"mini-Bahangas" taking matters into their own hands (Ref C).

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Tuaregs Reject Bahanga's Methods but Embrace Message
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7.(C) Azaz attributed the current violence between Bahanga
and the Malian army to competing interpretations of the
Algiers Accords. Azaz questioned whether Bahanga even had
the ability to read the Algiers agreement and said Bahanga
assumed implementation of the accords would begin immediately
after the document was signed by Mali and the ADC. The
Malian government, on the other hand, regarded implementation
as a long-term proposition that could not occur under the
threat of armed rebellion. When Bahanga, Fagaga and their
allies decide that an agreement has not been met, said Azaz,
they are incapable of a measured response. "Bahanga does not
realize that there are other ways of expressing discontent,"
said Azaz. "Violence is his only language."

8.(C) Yet the Tuareg position on Bahanga is somewhat
ambiguous. Nearly all Tuareg leaders, excepting Iyad ag
Ghali, have staunchly condemned Bahanga's decision to resort
to violence. No Tuareg leaders, however, have denounced
Bahanga's demands regarding a military withdrawal from
northern Mali, increased development and the implementation
of the Algiers Accords. A very small percentage of Tuaregs,
said Azaz, just three or four fractions, are currently in
rebellion. Azaz claimed the rebels' objectives, however, are
shared by one hundred percent of Malian Tuaregs.

9.(C) Tuareg desire to distance themselves from Bahanga's
methods while at the same time embracing his message has left
leaders like Azaz conflicted. It also suggests that if the
Malian government mounts an offensive that ends up killing
Bahanga, many Tuaregs who do not support Bahanga's current
escapades could close ranks because Bahanga remains, in the
end, one of their own.

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Ag Ghali, Algeria and Libya
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10.(C) If Tuareg leaders' response to Bahanga is ambiguous,
the role of ADC leader Iyad ag Ghali is inscrutable. Azaz,
ag Intaha and ag Ghallas laughed when asked if ag Ghali - who
is currently in Libya negotiating with the Malian government
and members of Bahanga's Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for
Change (ATNMC) - represented the interests of Tuaregs from
the regions of Gao and Timbuktu. There is apparently no
communication between ag Ghali and non-Kidal Tuaregs. When
asked if ag Ghali was negotiating on behalf of northern
Malians, Malian Tuaregs, Tuaregs from Kidal or just members
of the ADC, Azaz said ag Ghali negotiated for ag Ghali and no
one else. Azaz and his colleagues were equally dismissive of
Algeria and Libya's mediation abilities, noting that both
nations put their own interests first. What is good for
Algeria and Libya, said Azaz, it not necessarily good for
Mali.

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A Simple Plan
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11.(C) Azaz believes the most important aspects of the
Algiers Accords for Bahanga are those pertaining to the mixed
military units. The micro-finance and economic reinsertion
programs also outlined in the Accords, said Azaz, mean

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nothing to Bahanga. Azaz believes Mali could undercut
Bahanga's momentum and neutralize his compaints about Algiers
Accords implementation by standing up and properly equipping
one or two mixed military units. Mali's previous attempt to
create these units failed, said Azaz, because after
appointing Fagaga as commander in Kidal, the Malian army
failed to provide basic items. "They had no cars, no fuel,
nothing," said Azaz. "I can't blame Fagaga for deserting."
If new mixed units could be assembled, Azaz believes they
could replace Malian army units currently in Tinzawaten,
which would meet Bahanga's demand of a military withdrawal
while at the same time allow the Malian army to save face and
avoid an embarrassing retreat.

12.(C) He also encouraged the U.S. to recommend the creation
of a donor coordination group with a rotating chair for
northern Mali. This group would be open to all donors - from
Algeria to Libya to China - interested in participating. It
would also help enforce a timeline for the implementation of
targeted aspects of the Algiers Accords. Former President
Alpha Oumar Konare founded a similar group following the end
of the 1990s rebellion. Azaz said that while he had not
broached this topic with President Toure directly, he felt
confident that Toure would embrace it.

13.(C) Azaz ruled out any future role for Bahanga and
Fagaga. He said the two are no longer "reliable" and need to
be "taken out of circulation" by being posted as advisors to
some far-flung Malian consulate.

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Comment: Searching for a New Formula
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14.(C) We share Azaz's pessimistic assessment of ag Ghali,
Libya and Algeria's ability to broker a lasting settlement.
The last "settlement" reached by Libya lasted less than two
weeks. So far Malian reliance on Algerian and Libyan
mediation has further fanned the flames of regional
insecurity, and perhaps in Libya's case even funded it (Ref
D). Although we do not believe the U.S. should take a lead
role, as Azaz and other Tuaregs have recommended, there is
still some room to look for new formulas that could reverse
northern Mali's downward spiral. If there is one bright spot
in an increasingly grim situation, it is President Toure's
continued dedication to a peaceful solution. Focusing on
just one aspect of the Algiers Accords, such as the mixed
military units, could break the current cycle of violence by
providing both Bahanga and the Malian government with an
acceptable middle ground. Creating a donor coordination
group for peace and security in northern Mali, similar to the
one created to manage the aftermath of the 1990s rebellion,
could reduce some of the regional tensions hampering current
negotiations, provide a place at the table for individuals
other than Iyad ag Ghali, and help Mali hammer out a
realistic timeline for Algiers Accords implementation.

15.(U) Tripoli minimize considered.
MCCULLEY