TRIBAL FAULT LINES WITHIN THE TUAREG OF NORTHERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAMAKO 000239

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ML
SUBJECT: TRIBAL FAULT LINES WITHIN THE TUAREG OF NORTHERN
MALI

REF: 07 BAMAKO 00994

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: Divisions within the Malian Tuareg rebel
Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) and the emergence of
the Mali-Niger Tuareg Alliance (MNTA) led by Ibrahim ag
Bahanga have highlighted internal differences between Tuareg
groups in northern Mali. This cable attempts to lay out the
tribal sub-divisions of Malian Tuaregs and identify key
leaders within various tribes and fractions. A similar cable
on northern Mali's Arab communities will follow septel. This
breakdown of Tuareg hierarchies is not intended to serve as a
definitive tool for predicting the tendencies of individual
decision-makers or entire Tuareg tribes or fractions, but may
help evaluate possible outcomes. Each actor and group's
place within these hierarchies is just one of many variables
influencing decisions and local political developments. The
divisions outlined below were well known by the French during
the colonial era. Colonial French administrators and
subsequent Malian governments exploited these divisions on
numerous occasions, but with dubious success. While a more
nuanced understanding of the structure of Mali's Tuareg
community may not translate into the direct ability to shape
events, it can provide a useful insight into northern Mali
that will enable us to better comprehend contemporary
developments and trends.

2.(C) Summary continued: An analysis of these trends though
the lens developed here yields several possible scenarios for
2008 and 2009. Each of these scenarios, which are sketched
in Para 22, depend on the actions of the Malian government,
Algeria, and Tuareg leaders. The worst case, which could
emerge as either collateral damage from a military offensive
by the Malian government on Bahanga's positions or the
failure to take concrete steps toward implementing the 2006
Algiers accords, could produce several "mini-Bahangas"
representing different Tuareg, Arab or Songhrai factions in
northern Mali somewhat akin to what occurred in 1991 during
the second Tuareg rebellion. The lawlessness that would
accompany such a development would result in a serious
deterioration of the security climate in northern Mali,
likely benefiting AQIM and others in the extreme north whose
operations depend on rampant insecurity. Perhaps the most
important aspect of this cable, however, are the restive
Tuareg youth who came of age after the rebellion of the 1990s
- an issue that merits further study and attention. This
cable draws on material assembled by Ibrahim ag Litney, a
Tuareg from Kidal, who is the Embassy's specialist on the
north. End Summary.

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Malian Tuareg Hierarchies
--------------

3.(C) Malian Tuaregs are loosely divided into a three-tiered
system of tribes, fractions and sub-fractions (also described
variously as "clans" or "tents") differentiated by lineage
and geographical region. The following is an attempt to
break down the composition of Malian Tuaregs by group and by
region. We have also listed some key decision-makers
associated with each group. Where possible we note which
individuals held leadership roles in former rebel groups from
the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s - such as the Popular
Movement for the Azawad (MPA),the Revolutionary Army for the
Liberation of the Azawad (ARLA) and Front for the Liberation
of the Azawad (FPLA) - or current rebel groups like the ADC
and MNTA. Although some fractions and sub-fractions have
traditionally subservient roles, this dynamic of dominance
and subservience broke down since the end of the colonial
era.

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Tuaregs in Kidal
--------------

4.(C) IFOGAS (or Iforas) is the tribe of the northern Mali's
traditional Tuareg nobles. Ifogas have ruled over other
Malian Tuaregs since the colonial era. The current Amenokal,
or traditional leader of Malian Tuaregs, is an Ifogas from
Kidal. Kidal Ifogas were at the center of the first Tuareg
rebellion, the second Tuareg rebellion, the 2006 attacks in
Menaka and Kidal, and the on-going hostage crisis in
Tinzawaten. During the 1991-1996 rebellion, most Ifogas
rebels belonged to the Popular Movement for the Azawad (MPA)

led by Iyad ag Ghali. According to Malian government
records, there are more than 60 Tuareg fractions in the
region of Kidal alone. The Kidal Ifogas tribe, however, can
be subdivided into four main fractions: the Kel Affella, the
Ifergoumessen, the Kel Ireyakkan, and the Kel Taghlit.

Kel Affella - this is the traditional fraction of the
Amenokal and consists of 20 smaller sub-fractions and dozens
of smaller groups spread throughout Tessalit, the Adrar and
Tin-Essako in the region of Kidal. Kel Affella leaders
include:

-- Intallah ag Attaher, the current and aged Amenokal
-- Alghabass ag Intallah, son of Intallah, National
Assembly Deputy from Kidal
-- Mohamed ag Intallah, son of Intallah, National Assembly
Deputy from Tin-Essako
-- Ahmada ag Bibi, ex-MPA, National Assembly Deputy from
Abeibara, current ADC Spokesman
-- Cheikh ag Aoussa, split with Iyad ag Ghali during 1990s
rebellion, now ADC's Secretary for "Internal Relations"
-- Mohamed ag Acherif, advisor without portfolio to
President Amadou Toumani Toure
-- Abderahmane ag Ghalla, ex-ARLA leader, current Malian
diplomat based in Tamanrasset; belongs to the Iradjanaten
sub-fraction traditionally under Affella dominance; ag Ghalla
now autonomous due to actions during 1991-1996 rebellion

Ifergoumessen - divided into 5 sub-fractions and other
groups across Edjerer, Kidal and the Tamensna region
bordering Niger. The Ifergoumessen's key leaders have broken
with the ADC to pursue a separate rebellion against the
Malian government under the banner of the Mali-Niger Tuareg
Alliance (MNTA). Ifergoumesse leaders include:

-- Ibrahim ag Bahanga, ex-MPA, ex-ADC "Conflicts and
Reconciliation" Officer, now leader of the MNTA
-- Hassane ag Fagaga, ex-MPA, ex-ADC second in command,
member of MNTA
-- Hama ag Sid'ahmed, ex-MPA, ex-ADC Secretary for
"External Relations," MNTA spokesman based in Paris,
Bahanga's father-in-law

Kel Ireyakkan (also called Kel Ouzeyen) - this fraction is
broken into 6 sub-fractions and other groups located in
Ouzeyen, Abeibara and Edjerer. Key leaders include:

-- Iyad ag Ghali, ex-MPA leader, current leader of the ADC
-- Elladi ag Alla, credited with starting the first Tuareg
rebellion in 1963, now living in Boughessa
-- Bayen ag Akhawali, former Mayor of Kidal
-- Assoufah ag Alkhader, living in Abeibara
-- Cheick ag Baye, Kidal Coordinator of Mali's Agency for
Youth Employment (APEJ)
-- Ablil ag Albacher, businessman in Kidal
-- Bah Moussa, ex-MPA, ex Malian army Colonel, ADC
Officer, led ADC's 23 May 2006 attack on Malian military
outpost in Menaka
-- Haroun Saghid, ex-MPA, ADC member, Malian army
Commandant in Kidal
-- Ibrahim ag Banna, ex-MPA, ADC member, Malian army
Captain in Kidal

Kel Taghlit - this fraction can be divided into 10
sub-fractions located in Tahlits, Tessalit, Abeibara and
Tassik. Key Kel Taghlit individuals include:
-- Ghousmane ag Ahmad, Fraction Chief in Tassik
-- Lamine ag Bissada, ex-MPA, Malian soldier in Kidal
-- Oubrem ag Oussaghid, Fraction Chief in Abeibara
-- Albakader Kabyl, living in Kidal
-- Ibrahim ag Litny, currently employed by the U.S.
Embassy, former spokesperson for various rebel groups in the
1990s, including ARLA, while a student in Paris.

5.(C) The TAGHAT MELET tribe is also based in the region of
Kidal. The Taghat Melet can be divided into two main
fractions, the Kel Telabit and the Kel Oukenek. During the
Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s, many Taghat Melet broke with
the Ifogas rebel leader Iyad ag Ghali to form a splinter
rebel group known as the Revolutionary Army for the
Liberation of the Azawad (ARLA).

Kel Oukenek - members of the Kel Oukenek are generally
closer to the Ifogas largely due to matrimonial ties. They
are located in the Tadjmart and Telia zones. Key leaders
include:

-- Attaher ag Inguida, Chief in Edjrer.
-- Mahmoud ag Abag, Mayor of Essouk
-- Ghissa ag Hiba, elected local government official in
Kidal
-- Tokhia ag Hiba, Fraction Chief in Essouk
-- Hama ag Malik, elected local government official in
Kidal

Kel Telabit - members of the Kel Telabit are generally
closer to the Idnane (para 6) due to matrimonial ties. They
are based in Telabit and Anmalen. Kel Telabit leaders
include:
-- Zeid ag Hamzata, failed National Assembly candidate
rom Kidal, Chief in Djounhan
-- Abdoussalam a Assalat, ADC member, President of Kidal
Chamberof Commerce
-- Ada ag Massamad, ex-ARLA, ADC ember, Malian solider
based in Kidal
-- Abeadj ag Abdollah, representative to High Council of
Territorial Collectivities from Aguelhoc
-- Ahmed ag Hamzata, ex-ARLA, brother of Zied ag Hamzata,
junior Malian military officer based in Kidal


6.(C) The IDNANE tribe can be divided into two fractions, the
Talkast and the Taitoq. There are at least seven
sub-fractions under the Talkast and Taitoq as well as several
dependent groups. In 1991 most Idnane rebel fighters joined
with the Taghat Melet to create ARLA and distance themselves
from the Ifogas dominated MPA.

Talkast - can be found throughout the Adrar, in Tadjmart,
Alket and Eghachar-Sediden. Key leaders are:
-- Choghib ag Attaher, Chief in Eghachar-Sadiden
-- Momahed ag Erlaf, former Malian government Minister,
Director of the Malian Agency for Local Investment (ANICT)
-- Eghlaf ag Cheikh, retired Malian soldier, fought for
Malian government during first Tuareg rebellion in 1963
-- Sidati ag Cheikh, Eghlaf ag Cheikh's brother, retired
solider in Kidal, fought on Malian side in 1963
-- Matachi ag Bakrene, government administrator in Kidal
-- Hamedi ag Ahmad, businessman in Kidal
-- Madame Nina Walett Intallou, Kidal representative to
High Council of Territorial Collectivities
-- Leche ag Didi, ex-ARLA, Malian army Commandant
-- Wari ag Ibrahim, ex-ARLA, National Guard Officer based
in Bamako
-- Al Hamdou ag Illyen, Governor of Kidal; considered an
Idane Talkast through his mother, which is somewhat unusual
for a patrilineal society. Illyen's father is unknown but
believed to have been either Songhrai or a black
Tamachek/Bella.

Taitoq - located in region of Adagh Timtaghen, Tinkar and
the Telemse valley. Key leaders include:
-- Deyti ag Sidimou, ADC "Finance Secretary," National
Assembly Deputy from Tessalit
-- Baye Diknene, transporter in Tinkar
-- Eghless ag Oufene, works for UN agricultural
development project (FIDA) in Kidal
-- Attaher ag Sidilamine, businessman in Kidal
-- Najem ag Bakaey, ex-ARLA, Gendarme Commandant in Tarkint

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Tuaregs in Gao and Menaka
--------------

7.(C) There are four major Tuareg tribes in the region of
Gao and Menaka: the Idnane, the Iwellemmeden, the Kel Essouk
and the Chaman-Amas. The Idnane of Gao are distinct from the
Idnane of Kidal. The Gao/Menaka Chaman-Amas should not be
confused with the Chaman-Amas sub-fraction which are attached
to the Kel Affella fraction of the Ifogas tribe in Kidal.

IDNANE leaders from Gao include:
-- Ahmed ag Boya, local Chief and Customs officer
-- Khat ag Baye, former National Assembly Deputy from
Bourem
-- Ibrahim ag Mohamed-Assaleh, current National Assembly
Deputy from Bourem

IWELLEMMEDEN were, until the colonial era, the dominant
Tuareg tribe in Mali. They were supplanted by the Kidal
Ifogas while under French rule. Their territory stretches
through Mali to Niger and includes several important
sub-fractions such as the Kel Denneg and the Kel Ataram. Key

leaders in the Gao and Menaka regions are:
-- Bajan ag Hamato, local Chief, National Assembly Deputy
from Menaka
-- Aroudeyni ag Hamato, Mayor of Anderamboukane
-- Guisma ag Hakeyri, ex-ARLA, reportedly a Commandant or
Lt. Col. in Malian Army

KEL ESSOUK are often regarded as the religious wing of the
Kidal, Gao and Menaka Tuaregs. Their leaders include:
-- Zeid ag Anara, local Chief of Tamkoutat near Ansongo
-- Alghateq ag Saghdudin, respected marabout in Tamkoutat
-- Ibrahim ag Issouf, international consultant based in
Bamako

CHAMAN-AMAS - once under the traditional protection of the
Iwellemeden, now largely independent. The Gao/Menaka
Chaman-Amas can be divided into several different
sub-fractions. During the 1990s rebellion many Chaman-Amas
joined the Front for the Liberation of the Azawad (FPLA) led
by Rhissa ag Sidi Mohamed. Key individuals include:
-- Abdelmoument ag Kiyou, local chief, mayor of Tin-Aouker
-- Aghatam ag Alhassane, current Minister of Environment
-- Sikaye ag Ekawel, development specialist in Gao
-- Mossa ag Chekod, businessman in Kidal
-- Assalat ag Habbi, ex-FPLA, Lt. Col. in Malian army
based in Menaka
-- Intalla ag Assaid, ex-FPLA, Lt. Col in Malian army
based in Sikasso
-- Hassanat ag Mehdi (aka "Jimmy),ex-FPLA, Lt. Col
assigned to Gendarmarie in Timbuktu
-- Dghaymar ag Alhousseyni, ex-FPLA, Commandant,
Republican Guard in Timbuktu
-- Rhissa ag Sidi Mohamed, founder of FPLA, now retired
near Gao
-- Zeidan Sidilamine, ex-FPLA, Malian diplomat assigned to
China.

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Tuaregs in Timbuktu
--------------

8.(C) There are two main Tuareg tribes in the region of
Timbuktu: the KEL INSTAR and the IWELLEMMEDEN. The Kel
Instar may also be called Kel Antessar. Iwellemmeden of
Timbuktu are generally distinct from the Iwellemmeden of Gao
and Menaka. The Kel Instar regard themselves as descended
from Arab ancestors and are therefore more closely tied to
northern Mali's Arab population. Kel Instar leaders include:
-- Mohamed Elmehdi ag Attaher, local Chief
-- Mohamed Aly ag Elmokta, Chief in Farach and Essakane
-- Ghoumar ag Intaha, President of Timbuktu's regional
circle
-- Many ag Hamanna, organizer of Timbuktu's annual
Festival in the Desert
-- Madame Zakietou Walett Halatine, former Minister of
Tourism and Arts
-- Anasser Lansari, Customs officer assigned to Bamako
International Airport

9.(C) The Timbuktu Iwellemeden tribe can be divided in to
three fractions roughly located in Dire, Goundam and Gourma.
Key individuals include:
-- Nokh ag Attcha, Fraction Chief and National Assembly
Deputy from Dire
-- Oumeyata ag Chibani, Fraction Chief in Gourma Rharouss
-- Atta ag Houd, National Assembly Deputy from Gourma
Rharouss.

-------------- --
Acheriffen, Imghad and the "Jews" of the Sahara
-------------- --

10.(C) There are a handful of Tuareg tribes best categorized
by lineage rather than geographical zone. These include the
ACHERIFFEN, the IMGHAD and the D'AOUISSAHAK (who claim
descent from Isaac and the ancient Jews of the Sahara,
although still devout Muslims). The Acheriffen live in all
three of Mali's northern regions. Although they are regarded
as vassals attached, at least in Kidal, to the Kel Affella of
the Ifogas tribe, the Acheriffen wield a certain amount of
religious power and political independence. In Kidal
important Acheriffen leaders are:
-- Mohamed Ahmed ag Alhassane, Mayor of Djebock
-- Hamad Idda ag Mohamed, retired government official
living in Djebock
-- Mohamed ag Hamad Idda, school director in Djebock


11.(C) In Timbuktu the Acheriffen are often regarded as more
numerically important and better politically organized than
the Iwellemmeden and Kel Instar. Some Tuaregs refer to the
Timbuktu Acheriffen as the armed wing of the Kel Instar.
Their leaders include:
-- Ahmed Mohamed ag Hamani, former Prime Minister (who
claims direct descent from the Prophet)
-- Oumarou ag Mohamed Ibrahim, President of the High
Council of Territorial Collectivities
-- Ahmedou ag Ghabdalla, local Chief in Koigoma
-- Mohamed ag Hamed Hama, local Chief in Tin Telout

12.(C) Although the Imghad are also regarded as vassals,
those living in the zones of Gossi, Gourma Rhaours, Tessit
and Menaka are largely autonomous. During the 1990s
rebellion Imghad leaders like Col. Elhedj Gamou formed an
important component of the ARLA rebel movement. Key Imghad
leaders are:
-- Elhedj Gamou, ex-ARLA, Malian Army Colonel now based in
Kidal
-- Mohemed Akline, Director of the Malian Agency for
Northern Development, based in Gao
-- Azaz ag Doudagdag, local leader in Bourem
-- Assarid ag Imbarkawen, Vice President of the National
Assembly
-- Issouf ag Alloudi, member of the High Council of
Territorial Collectivities, from Immenass
-- Ekhya ag Nokh, Chief in Immenass

13.(C) Many Tuareg believe the D'Aouissahak tribe is
descended from Isaac. This is a thesis the D'Aouissahak
generally embrace. As a result, they are often regarded as
the surviving remnants of ancient Saharan Jews even though
today most D'Aouissahak belong to the Quadriyya brotherhood
of Sufi Islam. Key D'Aouissahak leaders include:
-- Ouness ag Iyouba, businessman based in Tamanrasset,
Algeria
-- Mohamed ag Adargazoz, Fraction Chief in Talatayt in
Menaka
-- Baye ag Mohamed, Mayor of Menaka
-- Taha ag Mohamed, Customs Officer in Lere

--------------
Applying the Ethnic Lens to Tuareg Rebellions
--------------

14.(C) A quick review of the first two Tuareg rebellions and
internal dynamics within the ADC and MNTA reveals that a
working knowledge of internal divisions within Malian Tuareg
groups is useful - up to a point. Intallah ag Attaher became
Amenokal - the traditional leader of Malian Tuaregs - in

1963. His father, also a Kidal Iforas from the Kel Affella
fraction, died in 1961 and the Malian government appointed
Intallah's older brother, Zied ag Attaher, as Amenokal. In
1963, however, Zied cast his lot with Elladi ag Alla who
favored Tuareg independence. The 1963 rebellion, which began
in Boughessa, started as a largely Kidal Ifogas and Idnane
affair. Members of the Taghat Melet and Imgrad tribes also
participated. The rebellion did not enjoy the support of all
Ifogas, Idnanes, Taghat Melets or Imgrads, however. Intallah
ag Attaher, for instance, opposed his brother's position on
Tuareg independence and instead worked with the young Malian
government. His decision to collaborate with the Malian
government rather than rebel enabled him, with Malian
support, to replace his brother as Amenokal in 1963. Other
non-ethnic factors, such as the spirit of independence
popular in the 1960s, Tuareg ties to French colonial leaders
and events in neighboring Algeria therefore provide more
powerful explanations of the dynamics behind the first Malian
Tuareg rebellion.

15.(C) The initial hostilities of the second Tuareg
rebellion, which simmered from 1990 to 1996, were led by Iyad
ag Ghali against the Malian military outpost in Menaka in
June 1990. In response, and with the help of Algerian
mediators, the Malian government and Tuareg leaders signed a
peace agreement in January 1991 known as the Tamanrasset
Accords. Many of the key tenets of the Tamanrasset Accords
ironically reappeared, fifteen years later in the 2006
Algiers Accords. The Tamanrasset agreement failed instantly.
The fall of Mali's military dictator Moussa Traore in March
1991 increased levels of uncertainty and helped accelerate
the rebellion in the north. In the spring of 1991, as the
Tamanrasset agreement was failing and Traore was toppling,
internal differences between Iyad ag Ghali's Ifogas dominated

Popular Movement for the Azawad (MPA) and non-Ifogas Tuaregs
sparked several spin-off rebel groups. These included the
Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of the Azawad (ARLA)
led by Rhissa ag Sidi Mohamed, and the Front for the
Liberation of the Azawad (FPLA). While the ranks of the MPA
were primarily Ifogas, ARLA's membership was primarily
Idnane and Taghat Melet. Chaman-Amas from Gao and Menaka
formed the backbone of the FPLA.

16.(C) Although it did not begin as such, the second Tuareg
rebellion devolved into multiple rebel movements generally
divided along tribe or fractional lines. The existence of
these divisions, however, is not sufficient to account for
the ferocity of the second rebellion. Massive social
dislocations triggered by extensive droughts in the Sahel
during the mid 1970s and 80s, and the influx of a new cadre
of young Tuaregs fresh from military training in Libya and
other points in north Africa were likely more important.
Restive youth formed the core of combatants during the second
rebellion. Their militarization, revolutionary spirit and
desire to dismantle the traditional master-vassel
relationships between Tuareg groups that the French and
Malian government worked so hard to codify and exploit,
ushered in a break with the older generation of Tuareg
leaders. One must also not discount the impact of the fall
of the Moussa Traore regime as an unforeseen shock that
severely altered the balance of power not just in Bamako but
in northern Mali as well.

17.(C) Intra-Tuareg tensions also divided the ADC, Mali's
next large-scale Tuareg rebel movement (also led by the
Ifogas Iyad ag Ghali). In late 2006 the ADC engaged with
elements of what is now AQIM in northern Mali. ADC members
who participated in the AQIM attacks later reported that ag
Ghali had quietly directed fellow Ifogas to pull back just as
the ADC prepared to attack AQIM. This forced the ADC's
Idnane and Taghat Melet members to face AQIM alone.
Afterwards, Ifogas reportedly refused to help fellow Idnanes
and Taghat Melets negotiate for the release of prisoners
captured by AQIM. One disaffected ADC member, who said he
was eventually forced to speak with AQIM leader Bel Moctar
directly to win the release of a captured relative, described
the ADC as weakened to the point of dissolution following
this episode (Ref A).

18.(C) Interestingly, Ibrahim ag Bahanga's MNTA also divides
along ethnic lines. Although Bahanga originally attracted
some support from younger non-Ifergoumessen Ifogas when he
first took Malian soldiers and government officials hostage
in 2007, northern contacts indicate that this support
evaporated as Bahanga became increasingly isolated. The MNTA
now appears to be a largely Ifergoumessen phenomenon managed
by northern Mali's three most visible Ifergoumessen: Bahanga,
Hassan ag Fagaga and Bahanga's Paris-based father-in-law,
Hama ag Sid'Ahmed. Bahanga's decision to attack the Malian
military has often been portrayed as an attempt to protect
his smuggling fiefdom in Tinzawaten, but in a larger sense,
he may have seen it as striking a blow for the commercial
interests of his family and for the Ifergoumessen fraction as
a whole.

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Restive Youth and Comparisons to 1991
--------------

19.(C) All of the names listed above are either Tuareg elders
or veterans of the second rebellion. No Tuaregs from the
generation that came of age following the second rebellion
are listed, largely because they have not yet distinguished
themselves and are unknown outside of Tuareg circles. Like
their predecessors in the 1980s and 90s, many of these
younger Tuaregs are unemployed with little to no education,
and they likely filled out the fighting ranks of the ADC in

2006. Some are certainly with Bahanga in Tinzawaten. Others
are involved in northern Mali's increasingly lucrative
business of smuggling arms, cigarettes and drugs. Tuareg
leaders are clearly concerned about the direction of Tuareg
youth, as evidenced by repeated campaigns by Tuareg elders to
"sensitize" youth in Kidal about the dangers of joining up
with Bahanga or taking matters into their own hands.

20.(C) Although each of Mali's rebel movements is unique,
there are some common themes that may provide clues to
potential future developments. One element that links 2008
with the 1990s is restive, unemployed youth. Another is a
stalled peace agreement, negotiated with Algerian support, to

resolve rebel attacks mounted by a group led by Iyad ag Ghali
against Malian military outposts. Given the similarities
between the 1991 Tamanarasset and 2006 Algiers Accords, and
the results following the collapse of the former, the failure
of Algiers would prove significant. Unfortunately, Mali and
Algeria have made little progress toward implementing key
aspects of the 2006 agreement. Whether Mali has the
political will and financial means to meet the terms of
Algiers are open for debate. Bahanga's mini-rebellion in
Tinzawaten has further diverted attention away from
implementing the Algiers accords and blocked the very
development that could forestall future violence.

21.(C) What differentiates contemporary developments from
the 1990s is the absence of an unforeseen shock such as the
fall of Moussa Traore in 1991. While the democratically
elected President Amadou Toumani Toure is much more secure in
his position than Moussa Traore ever was, continued
foot-dragging over the Algiers Accords could encourage other
disaffected northerners to follow Bahanga's example. Another
unknown is the line of succession for the current Amenokal,
who has been gravely ill since at least 2005. Presumably one
of his two sons would take over as Amenokal. Given the
continued break down of traditional Tuareg hierarchies,
however, an Ifogas from a fraction other than the Kel Affella
(i.e ag Ghali, Bahanga or another),could conceivably seek to
position himself as the Amenokal's successor.

--------------
Potential Scenarios
--------------

22.(C) One can envision several potential scenarios for 2008
and 2009 based on previous developments in northern Mali.
The rosiest of these would entail the implementation of at
least the key security and socio-economic development aspects
of the Algiers Accords coupled with a successful attempt by
Tuareg leaders to bring Bahanga and Fagaga back into the
fold, thereby returning northern Mali, at least temporarily,
to the pre-May 2006 status quo of occasional banditry and
rampant illicit trafficking. A continued stand-off between
the Malian government and Bahanga, producing no progress on
the Algiers accords, could spark an alternative scenario that
would lead to increased levels of Tuareg impatience and/or
desperation. An attempt by the Malian military to neutralize
Bahanga - which is unlikely given the Malians track record in
Tinzawaten - could spark a new backlash. Both the second and
third scenarios have a high potential for creating new
"mini-Bahangas" drawn from the cadre of youth about which we
know little to nothing. Tuareg leaders based in northern
Mali have repeatedly raised this as a serious concern. A
Bahanga copy-cat phenomenon could reproduce the alphabet soup
of rebel acronyms that characterized the second rebellion.
The appearance of just one or two new mini-Bahangas could
spark restless members of other important constituencies in
Mali, such as the Arab Berabiche or the Songhrai, to form
their own militias as they did in the 1990s.

23.(C) Such a worst-case scenario would clearly have an
impact upon AQIM's operations in northern Mali. On the one
hand, increased instability could open the door for
individual actors to settle old scores with AQIM. Increased
lawlessness, however, is more likely to prove a boon to AQIM
as well as Tuareg and Berabiche traffickers of arms, drugs
and cigarettes.

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Comment: Pressure Points
--------------

24.(C) These scenarios highlight the importance of ensuring
at the very least the partial success of the Algiers Accords.
Perhaps the most important aspect for the future stability
of northern Mali, however, are the cadres of unemployed youth
in Kidal and elsewhere. Many of these have formed
associations and groups intended to increase local
development, yield basic skills and provide at least a
minimal level of income. Without significant exterior
support, however, these groups are likely to flounder. When
they do, the law-abiding Tuareg youth of today are likely to
look toward other, more illicit means of survival. There are
some indications that this is occurring already. Heading off
this trend by working to ensure that vocational, development
and education programs in Kidal and other remote regions of
northern Mali is therefore of vital importance.
MCCULLEY