AZERBAIJAN: WORSHIPERS FRUSTRATED WITH CLOSURE OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000912

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KIRF AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: WORSHIPERS FRUSTRATED WITH CLOSURE OF
ABU BAKR MOSQUE

REF: A. BAKU 00779

B. 07 BAKU 01067

Classified By: DCM Donald Lu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Abu Bakr mosque, which is an important
symbolic mosque in Azerbaijan's Islamic landscape and was
attacked on August 17, is closed for prayers. On August 17,
an unknown attacker threw a grenade into the mosque during
prayers, killing three worshipers. The mosque ostensibly was
closed because local residents raised safety and sanitation
concerns, but no one knows the real reason or whether the
GOAJ plans to reopen the mosque. A group of Azerbaijani
Muslims who used to pray at the mosque told us they hope the
authorities will quickly re-open the mosque, which they
claimed serves as an intellectual counter to extremist
doctrines. The Muslims also complained that while the GOAJ
has the right to carry out an investigation, there are a
rising number of forced beard shavings and detentions in Baku
that include non-extremists. End Summary.

Background
--------------


2. (C) On September 15, Embassy officer met with
approximately thirty Muslims who regularly prayed at the Abu
Bakr mosque. The GOAJ closed the Abu Bakr mosque shortly
after it was attacked on August 17 (reftel). The mosque
ostensibly was closed in response to a letter from local
residents to local authorities, requesting that the mosque be
closed because it was unclean and unsafe. (NOTE: The
letter, reportedly signed by 1,000 Baku residents, probably
is not an authentic grass-roots effort. Former State
Committee on Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA) Chief
Rafiq Aliyev said a similar letter had been prepared by
either the Ministry of National Security (MNS) or the
Ministry of Internal Affairs in the 2001-2002 timeframe, when
the GOAJ previously was weighing the merits of closing the
mosque down.) No one knows the real reason why the mosque
was closed and if the GOAJ plans to reopen it. The meeting
was held at the Lezgi mosque, located in Baku's old city,
where most of the participants have begun regularly praying
since Abu Bakr was closed.


3. (C) After the August 17 attack on the Abu Bakr mosque,
the government appears focused on rounding up the attackers.
Several of their steps have caused frustration among
practicing Muslims, however. Local authorities prevented
Muslims from praying outside of Baku's mosques, requiring
Muslims to pray inside. (NOTE: During Friday prayers and
Ramadan, several of Baku's most important mosques are filled
to capacity and believers have to pray on the adjacent
streets.) The authorities said the restriction is temporary
and based on security concerns. In addition, there are a
number of reports of local police detaining and shaving the
beards of Muslims. (NOTE: Local law enforcement officials
traditionally resort to this tactic after a terrorist threat,
but this often occurs in Azerbaijan's regions -- especially
in the north -- not in Baku.) There has been a spike in the
number of calls the Embassy has received from Muslims
alleging beard shavings or detentions over the past few weeks.


4. (C) Authorities in Baku and several northern regions have
been rounding up suspects linked to the August 17 attack over
the past weeks. According to a September 2 public statement
from the MNS, the service detained thirteen suspects in late
August/early September. The statement claimed two
Azerbaijani citizens, Ilgar Mollachiyev and Samir Mekhtiyev,
who are part of the "Forest Brothers," were linked to the
attack. According to Interfax, the Russian services killed
Molachiyev on September 7. The detentions coincided with
several reported clashes in the Qusar area, including an MNS
raid on September 6 that killed three reported militants.


Participants' Deference to Jamiat Spokesperson
-------------- -


5. (C) Throughout the meeting with the thirty Muslim
believers, it was apparent the participants had an informal
leader or spokesperson, Brother Ramin. It was also clear

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that Brother Ramin had consulted with the Abu Bakr's imam,
Gamet Suleymanov, before meeting with Embassy officer. Ramin
began the meeting by reiterating some of Suleymanov's primary
talking points, specifically that President Aliyev is a "good
leader" and the Abu Bakr mosque teaches the need to support
the government, which is instated by Allah. (NOTE: Since
opening in 1997, several groups of Muslims have left the Abu
Bakr mosque. One of the reasons Muslims left was
Suleymanov's unwillingness to adopt a political message and
his argument that faithful Muslims need to support the
present government.) During the meeting, Ramin appeared
nervous about representing participants' concerns, while also
not directly criticizing the government. When other
participants were able to speak, they were decidedly less
restrained in their criticism of the government's handling of
the bombing investigation and subsequent closure of the Abu
Bakr mosque. These participants blamed "the authorities" or
"people around President Aliyev." All participants
emphasized they were true Azerbaijani "patriots," but also
practicing Muslims.


6. (C) Ramin told us the participants were concerned that
the mosque's temporary closure would drag on indefinitely.
Since the new restrictions on praying in outdoor spaces next
to mosques, some Muslims reportedly have had difficulty
finding a mosque to pray at. Ramin also said participants
were concerned that in the wake of the attack on the mosque,
the authorities were indiscriminately targeting extremists
and non-extremists. Ramin noted several examples of pressure
against Muslims in Baku since the attack, including beard
shavings, detentions, and loss of employment. Several
freshly-shaved participants claimed that Baku police officers
had recently forced them to shave their beards. Others
complained about veiled women's inability to wear a headscarf
for passport photographs and the difficulty in traveling
abroad to foreign countries for Islamic education or
pilgrimage.

Mosque Closure Increases Prospects for Radicalization
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Participants argued that the Abu Bakr mosque's
closure plays into the hands of Islamic extremists, who
regard Suleymanov as an infidel and want to eliminate
moderate Islamic teaching in Azerbaijan. While complaining
that there are limited opportunities for practicing,
non-extremist Muslims to learn more about Islam, participants
referred to Abu Bakr as the "key center of Islamic science in
Azerbaijan" that teaches Muslims to counter extremists'
arguments. Several participants claimed that extremists
sometimes attempt to recruit theologically untrained
attendees at Abu Bakr, but many well-educated Muslims attend
the mosque and are able to counter their arguments.

GOAJ's Side of the Story
--------------


8. (C) Aside from MNS public statements, GOAJ interlocutors
outside of the MNS do not appear to have much information.
On September 16, SCWRA Chief Hidayat Orujov told us he could
not comment on who attacked the Abu Bakr mosque until the
government finished its investigation. Orujov said he was
optimistic the mosque eventually would be reopened, but said
it may take some time for the repair work and the
investigation to be completed. When asked about the
increased number of forced beard shavings in Baku, Orujov
demonstrated only a minimal conceptual understanding that
having a beard did not necessitate intellectual assent to
radical theological or political positions.

Comment
--------------


9. (S//NF) There has been a disturbing number of attempted
or planned terrorist operations which have included
Azerbaijani citizens over the past two years. The majority
of these operations appear to be fairly amateurish, but the
level of Azerbaijani involvement in these operations is a
dangerous trend. The GOAJ battle against religious extremism
includes the difficult balancing act between legitimate
security demands and respecting a citizen's rights to

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practice a religion of their choice. The pattern of the
authorities throwing an overly broad net to catch any real or
suspected extremist -- alongside the forced beard shavings --
is a typical Azerbaijani reaction.


10. (C) The Embassy's chief concern is the GOAJ lacks a
long-term strategy for countering Islamic extremism. The
GOAJ is fairly capable of picking up people off the street,
but there appears to be little ability or political will to
distinguish between a practicing Muslim and an extremist.
There also appears to be little governmental thinking about
creating indigenous, authentic Islamic actors and
institutions that are best positioned to counter the
theological arguments of extremists. The chief complaint the
Embassy hears from practicing Muslims is that the GOAJ is
still working from a Soviet-era playbook that relies on the
Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) to administer Islam; the growing
interest in Islam -- especially among Azerbaijani youth --
far exceeds the CMB's capacities. Our contacts report that
the CMB has little or no legitimacy among practicing Muslims
and the GOAJ should open up the playing field for more
authentic, credible Islamic institutions (ref b). The
short-term danger with this suggestion is that
externally-financed extremists could seek to fill the vacuum.
DERSE