Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAKU850
2008-09-10 12:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

AZERBAIJAN'S 2008 ELECTION: FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM AJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 101222Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5959
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1079
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000850 

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S 2008 ELECTION: FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

REF: A. BAKU 00524

B. BAKU 00764

C. BAKU 00687

D. BAKU 00730

E. BAKU 00763

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000850

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S 2008 ELECTION: FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

REF: A. BAKU 00524

B. BAKU 00764

C. BAKU 00687

D. BAKU 00730

E. BAKU 00763

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Azerbaijani performance in assuring freedom
of assembly has been positive from the standpoint of new
legislation and presidential statements. The Venice
Commission positively assessed Azerbaijan's revised law on
freedom of assembly. From a legal and technical point of
view, the law generally meets European standards. The
Embassy and the Venice Commission believe, however, that
implementation will be critical and in particular, the
authorities need to demonstrate a presumption in favor of
assemblies, rather than using the law as a mechanism for
preventing lawful demonstrations. Since the law was approved
by Parliament in May 30, there have been several small
attempted rallies in areas explicitly off limits under the
new law, which have not represented a sufficient test of the
authorities' implementation of the law. End Summary.


2. (SBU) This cable is part of a series on the broader
political environment before the October 15 Presidential
election. Septels will address the media freedom environment,
religious issues, and the judiciary.

What does the law say?
--------------


3. (C) The Azerbaijani law on freedom of assembly was
amended on May 30 by the Parliament (ref a). The GOAJ worked
closely with the Venice Commission during the drafting
process. In most respects, the Venice Commission positively
assessed the new law as consistent with international
standards. The Venice Commission's final review of the draft
law concluded, however, that implementation of the law will
be key and in that regard, the GOAJ "must show a presumption
in favor of assemblies," rather than using the law as a
mechanism for preventing lawful demonstrations.


4. (C) The law outlines procedures for demonstration
organizers, including the requirement to notify the local
executive authority five days prior to the event. Local
authorities in turn are required to respond to the
notification at least three days prior to the event.
According to the Azerbaijani Constitution, demonstration

organizers are not required to seek government approval for a
public rally, but the preceding notification process could in
practice serve as a de facto approval mechanism. The new law
stipulates that public rallies or demonstrations cannot be
held within 200 meters of government buildings. The new law
allows authorities to restrict assemblies through a broad
clause, which cites the "interests of national security and
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others." Since the authorities
could use the preceding clause to restrict demonstrations --
citing the need to prevent "disorder" or protect "morals" --
the Embassy agrees with the Venice Commission's conclusion
that implementation will be critical and local authorities'
practice should illustrate they are not using the law as a
tool for preventing demonstrations.


5. (C) During an August 5 Cabinet of Ministers' meeting,
President Aliyev made several positive election-related
commitments, including supporting the ability of presidential
candidates to meet with their supporters, even in Baku (ref b
). It is unclear whether Aliyev's comments on candidates
being allowed to meet with electors refers to a new-found
GOAJ willingness to allow parties to peacefully conduct
rallies or simply permitting candidates to meet with
potential voters.


Law Not Tested
--------------


6. (C) Since the law was amended, several small-scale
protests have been attempted, but all failed to meet the
conditions of the new law. These rallies do not represent a
sufficient test of the new law as the protests were small and
perhaps spontaneous or the organizers proceeded despite being
denied permission for holding their rallies because their
demonstration clearly violated the new law. The Musavat
Party organized rallies on July 11 and August 1, but police
disrupted both demonstrations. In both cases, the Baku
Mayor's office denied Musavat permission to hold the
demonstrations because the planned venue violated the law's
restriction on holding rallies within 200 meters of a
government building (refs c and d).


7. (C) There also have been several small protests in Baku
linked to Russia's military operations against Georgia. In
most or all of the cases linked to the Russia-Georgia
conflict, the organizers failed to comply with the legal
requirement to notify local authorities of the planned
demonstration. On August 9, the Dalga youth group
successfully organized a small pro-Georgian rally in front of
the Georgian Embassy, according to IRFS. Photographs show
this minor protest included less than a dozen participants;
the police did not disrupt the action. On August 11, police
disrupted two small demonstrations in front of the Russian
Embassy by members of several youth groups. On the same day,
there was another small pro-Georgian demonstration outside of
an Azerbaijani military recruiting station; it is unclear if
police disrupted this gathering. Police also disrupted an
attempted rally next to the Russian Embassy on August 13.

Large Demonstrations Not Expected
--------------


8. (C) The new law cannot be seen in isolation from the
broader political context and long-term societal trends.
Many opposition and civil society actors are weak and lack
the finances and institutional capacity to conduct
large-scale demonstrations. These actors' general weakness
stems from a mixture of government steps to weaken and
discredit them; the opposition and civil society's infighting
and inability to produce credible leadership; and the
public's general political apathy, stemming from the Soviet
period. Per ref e, the key opposition figures' recent
decision not to participate in the election reinforces the
sense that there will be no large rallies before or after the
election. Based on recent conversations with the deputies of
the Popular Front Party and Musavat, the opposition appears
divided about the prospects for organizing and gaining
permission to hold election-related rallies.


9. (C) The general public has little interest in
participating in political rallies. For the overwhelming
number of average Azerbaijanis, there is no incentive to take
part in a rally -- particularly one linked to the
presidential election. From the viewpoint of the general
public, President Aliyev will easily win the election and the
opposition is a spent force with no alternative political
vision or platform. We have heard from local observers that
segments of the general public have no interest in going to
the polls on election day. Civil society activists also
report that some swathes of the general public simply are not
interested in the presidential election.


10. (C) In the run-up to the October 15 presidential
election, Azerbaijan's domestic political landscape lacks
credible alternatives to President Aliyev that could
galvanize a generally apathetic population to go to the
streets. While the Embassy does not rule out the possibility
for pre-election demonstrations, they likely will be small
and the government likely will retain its official and
unofficial mechanisms for controlling such activities. The
critical question is whether following the elections there
will be large-scale demonstrations and the prospect for
violence. While the opposition parties have reduced
incentive and ability to bring demonstrators to the streets,
the government also is hyper-sensitive about the risk of
civil unrest because of the post-election problems in Georgia
and Armenia. Moreover, there is a widespread belief in the
wake of the Russian invasion of Georgia that stability is now
a higher domestic priority. The government has in the past
overreacted and was quick to resort unnecessarily to force
against demonstrators. The Embassy regularly raises the need
for restraint with government leaders, the heads of the
security services, and opposition leaders.
DERSE