AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR FEARS RUSSIA'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000821

SIPDIS

EUR FOR MATT BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KPKO MARR AJ GG RU
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR FEARS RUSSIA'S
NEW ERA IN SOUTH CAUCASUS

REF: A. STATE 89769

B. STATE 87763

C. STATE 90980

D. BAKU 812

E. BAKU 813

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: President Aliyev's International Relations
Advisor sees Russian actions in Georgia as "the beginning of
a new era," with Azerbaijan's energy export routes, and
consequently, the country's independence and sovereignty,
ultimately at risk. Russia's acts were premeditated, with a
goal of reasserting Moscow's influence over the South
Caucasus and its important energy transport routes, and
Azerbaijan now fears the Russians will not withdraw.
Nonetheless, Moscow has not made any direct threats to
Azerbaijan; Baku has intentionally been "prudent" in its
relations with Russia. President Aliyev welcomes the visit
this week of Vice President Cheney, while being pessimistic
on prospects for near-term resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Regional stability and security are essential, as
Iran also continues to be a threat. Azerbaijan continues to
send assistance to Georgia, but Baku is skeptical of Turkey's
proposal to form a Caucasus "platform." End Summary

Russians Attack Weakest Link, Eye Energy Transport
-------------- --------------

2. (C) Echoing themes raised by President Aliyev and Foreign
Minister Mammadyarov in discussions on events in eorgia
(reftels),the President's International Relations Advisor
Novruz Mammedov told the Ambassador on August 29 that the
Russian invasion of Georgia is the "beginning of a new era,"
and one which poses very serious difficulties for Azerbaijan.
The main aim of the Russian move, Mammedov said, was to "cut
the route" that allowed the West access to Azerbaijani,
Caspian and Central Asian hydrocarbons by attacking "the
weakest, and the key, link in the chain -- Georgia."
Abkhazia and South Ossetia were just an excuse, and are lost
unless someone is willing to go to war for them, Mammedov
maintained.


3. (C) Mammedov suggested that the most serious long-term
danger from the current situation is the likelihood that "the
Russians won't leave." Moscow's forces are consolidating
positions in Georgia in buffer zones that are in close
proximity to key energy transport facilities, including the
railroad, Azerbaijani facilities at the port of Kulevi, and
pipelines crossing Georgia, which will give them effective
control over energy transport. Mammedov said that while
there is no hard proof, some in Azerbaijan are convinced that
the recent attack on the BTC pipeline in Turkey was a
Russian-inspired action, given Russia's close ties with the
Kurds.


4. (C) Mammedov said that the Russians had prepared their
actions in Georgia for some time, and that in retrospect it
was possible to see it coming. Medvedev and Putin have been
"united and firm" in their desire to re-establish Russian
influence in the Caucasus, and this has become increasingly
evident in their interactions with Azerbaijan in recent
months. Although Russia has not made any direct threats to
Azerbaijan after Georgia, Azerbaijan reads Putin's and
Medvedev's comments that what happened to Georgia "could
happen to you," and that "the South Caucasus belong to us,"
as clearly directed at Azerbaijan.


5. (C) Mammedov said that the Russians had now "shown their
true face" to the world by actions in Georgia in complete
defiance of international norms. Given its history with the
Russians, "Azerbaijan has always known they could do
something like this," and for this reason, Azerbaijan has
always been "prudent" in its dealings with Russia. Russia in
recent times has been "very irritated" by Azerbaijan's
support for Nabucco and the Odessa-Brody-Plotsk-Gdansk
pipelines; considering that the Russians sent troops to
massacre Azerbaijani citizens in 1990 "when there was nothing
here" that threatened Russia's vital interests, it is
entirely possible that they would take strong steps to
protect their interests today, given Azerbaijan's role as an
independent energy supplier.

Implications for Nagorno-Karabakh
--------------

6. (C) Mammedov said that President Aliyev is now more
pessimistic than ever with respect to a resolution of the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since a resolution, he said,
could mean that Azerbaijan would send its energy resources
west through Armenia, "the Russians will never permit it."
Aliyev believes that Russia will now support Armenia more
forcefully vis-a-vis Azerbaijan.

Iran Still A Worry
--------------

7. (C) Mammedov said that President Aliyev is "deeply
worried, deeply concerned" about developments and
Azerbaijan's difficult position, because "it is not only
Russia Azerbaijan has to worry about -- it is also Iran."
Given the opportunity, Mammedov said, Iran would "do even
worse" than Russia. It is critical to restore regional
stability. The most important thing the United States and
the West can do now from Azerbaijan's point of view is to
"coordinate the world" in a strong united response to make
the Russians realize they've committed a grave error, and to
work together to "save Georgia."

V.P. Visit Will Irritate the Russians
--------------

8. (C) "If the US and all its allies can coordinate the EU
and others, we can do something," Mammedov said. However,
Azerbaijan sees this as "problematic" given the political
transition in the United States. "We cannot be sure if
decisions taken in the coming months will endure." Mammedov
said the President is looking forward to the visit of Vice
President Cheney, but added that in his personal view the
visit "will irritate the Russians even more against us. We
know the visit was planned before events in Georgia. They
don't. They won't believe us even if we tell them so -- even
if they believe us they won't say so, it is not in their
interests to do so."

Azerbaijan Continues Assistance, Criticizes Turkish
Proposal
-------------- ---

9. (C) Mammedov outlined the support Azerbaijan has provided
to Georgia in the form of food, medicine, equipment and
finances and said Azerbaijan will continue to help Georgia.
Azerbaijan itself has suffered up to a billion dollars in
losses already from the conflict. The cutting of the
railroad line in Georgia had slowed exports and blocked many
imports, with "thousands" of railroad cars stranded on either
side of the border. He dismissed Turkey's proposal for a
"platform" for Caucasus stability
as amateur diplomacy, saying that Turkey was all over the map
-- first they had proposed a Caucasus Union to include the
US, Iran, Russia and the Caucasus countries ("impossible"),
then a "Caucasus forum," and now the platform. Aliyev had
agreed to look at the proposal in the event it developed into
"something good" for Azerbaijan, but remained very skeptical
anything would come of it.

Comment:
--------------


10. (C) Mammedov, like many high-ranking Azerbaijani
officials, sees Russia's actions in Georgia with a view to
energy exports and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, critical
interests for Azerbaijan. From Baku's perspective, Moscow's
main objective is control of Caspian energy resources, with
Georgia being the chokepoint on non-Russia access to markets
via Turkey or the Black Sea. Like other observers here,
Mammedov worries that Russia's military action in Georgia and
subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have
strengthened the hand of the Armenians, and weakened
Azerbaijan's leverage over Yerevan at the Nagorno-Karabakh
negotiating table. The USG message to Azerbaijan in coming
weeks and months should center on these two issues: regional
security and stability to enable oil and gas exports to the
West, and a strong message on Azerbaijan's territorial
integrity with a goal of reaching a peaceful solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
DERSE