Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAKU812
2008-08-27 13:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

FOREIGN MINISTER: RUSSIAN INVANSION SENDS MESSAGE

Tags:  AJ ENRG GG PREL RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 271351Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5898
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 2964
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1070
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000812 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018
TAGS: AJ ENRG GG PREL RS
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER: RUSSIAN INVANSION SENDS MESSAGE
THAT "WE'RE BACK;" AZERBAIJAN SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000812

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018
TAGS: AJ ENRG GG PREL RS
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER: RUSSIAN INVANSION SENDS MESSAGE
THAT "WE'RE BACK;" AZERBAIJAN SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador
August 26 that the Russian invasion of Georgia was primarily
intended to send a message to the U.S. that Russian power in
the region "is back." He warned that Russian insistence on
buffer zones in Georgia around the conflict areas will affect
key energy infrastructure assets, including rail lines, the
Baku-Supsa pipeline and the Azeri-owned Kulevi oil terminal.
He argued that Armenian President Sargisian will be under
strong pressure to take advantage of the opening provided by
Russia's actions in Georgia with respect to Nagorno-Karabakh.
He added that a serious USG signal with respect to
territorial integrity and Nagorno-Karabakh is needed to
ensure Armenia and Russia do not use the Georgia conflict to
exacerbate the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Underscoring
that Azerbaijan is also a country under threat, he said
Azerbaijan seeks the same level of political support as
Georgia. He suggested that agreement to establish a
"mechanism of strategic dialogue," including agreement to
"consult on various issues of mutual concern" could be a
"positive outcome" for the Vice President's visit, if
proposed by the U.S. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In an August 26 meeting with the Ambassador, Foreign
Minister Elmar Mammadyarov said, "(The Russian invasion of
Georgia) was aimed at you (the Americans),not at us. It was
a messag that 'we're back.'" He predicted that in the long
term that the Russians would be the losers for their actions.
He said that in the short term, however, there are costs and
dangers to address. The United States should directly ask
the Russians what they want out of all this. "They will ask
a price." Continued engagement is important "to stop"
further deterioration of the situation.


3. (C) The Foreign Minister said that Georgian President
Saakashvili made a "huge mistake" by mismanaging this
conflict. "Saakashvili is very emotional. A politician
cannot be emotional," Mammadyarov continued.

Concerns about Pipelines
--------------


4. (C) Concerning the buffer zones or "zones of

responsibility" Russia is establishing in Georgia, the
Foreign Minister thought that the Russian position was
particularly troubling. He commented that the same tactic
had been used during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict -- the
creation of buffer zones that were then never returned. The
current buffer zones around South Ossetia and Abkhazia
include key ports, energy infrastructure assets (including
the Azerbaijan-owned Kulevi oil terminal),railroads and
energy export routes. He said that the Russians are shooting
themselves in the foot by asserting that the Georgian port
city of Poti is in their sphere of influence, however.


5. (C) When asked whether he believed the Russians
intentionally targeted the pipelines, he said, "I think they
are still smart. Had they attacked the pipelines, this would
have been a whole different level of conflict. They did not
want to interfere with our interests." At the request of the
Azerbaijani Government, the Russians also did not attack
ethnic Azeri communities near Gori and in Kaspi, a position
Mammadayarov said he "had to appreciate." He continued that
the Russians don't want additional troubles. They could have
done more on the pipelines. With the train attack, for
example, the Kazakhs have made a decision to shift away from
rail transport through the Southern Corridor and instead are
putting their oil through the Novorossiysk Russian pipeline.

SHOULD NOT BE A PRECEDENT FOR NAGORNO-KARABAKH
-------------- -


6. (C) Mammadyarov said that the main issue in the immediate
term for Azerbaijan is whether the Armenian reaction to the
Georgian crisis will be responsible. He indicated that the
Armenians have so far been quiet, but there should be a
strong signal that warns them against taking advantage of the
Georgian developments with respect to Nagorno-Karabakh. "The
reaction of the international community, particularly the
U.S. and EU, will be important," he added.


7. (C) The Foreign Minister said that Russia wants to make
clear their ability to enforce their will in the South
Caucasus. "I don't think the Russians will press (Armenian
President Sargisian). He's more responsible than

Saakashvili, but he will be under great pressure from the
Dashnak parties." He did believe that the Russians were
seeking to send a message by using their base in the Armenian
city of Gyumri to launch planes that bombed civilians, ports
and railroads. He said that they could have easily
accomplished the same missions from Russian bases but they
chose to use this base in Armenia.


8. (C) Mammadyarov urged that the U.S. and Russia, having
now disagreed about Kosovo and Georgia, stop the spiraling
conflict and agree to settle Nagorno-Karabakh. He stressed
that the way to do this would be for both countries to
pressure Armenia to settle on the basis of territorial
integrity. A "very serious signal that this must stop" is
needed in the form of a strong USG statement on territorial
integrity and NK. "After Georgia, the rhetoric should be
that conflicts should be resolved on the basis of territorial
integrity, as a very serious signal to Sargisian not to
escalate."


9. (C) Saying he was "just brainstorming," he suggested that
a new document on the level of the Helsinki Final Act is
needed to ensure no one has "aspirations or the temptation to
use Kosovo as a precedent . . . Russia does not accept that
Kososvo is sui generis . . . if there is no harsh reaction
(to recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia) Russia will
continue and we're next in line. We have to be very careful
not to provoke or irritate. It is a question of survival for
Azerbaijan."

We want to be Treated like Georgia
--------------


10. (C) The Minister said that "if you do not support us,
Russia will feel they can do whatever they like, that they
can do the same thing with us." Russia's actions in Georgia
are a "very serious signal" in this regard. Azerbaijan is
under threat, and needs and requests the same level of
political support and attention as Georgia. The USG, in
fact, should simply replace the word "Georgia" with the word
"Azerbaijan" in its statements and actions.


11. (C) The Minister suggested that one of the "positive
outcomes" of the Vice President's visit could be the
establishment of a "mechanism of strategic dialogue." He
noted that the U.S. and Azerbaijan already engage as
"strategic partners" on a range of issues. Saying that "we
need to do more within these talks," including "consultations
on various issues of mutual concern," he suggested that a
strategic dialogue could be a "very important element" for
intensified engagement. He said that Azerbaijan seeks
"political support" with respect to security concerns. A
strategic dialogue could, for example, provide political
support for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
and political protection of the South Caucasus energy
corridor. The Minister indicated Azerbaijan would welcome
such a proposal from the U.S.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) The Foreign Minister's comments are consistent with
those of the President and other senior leaders. They see a
clear Russian effort to intimidate countries on their border
with the aim of reasserting Russian dominance in the region,
with bitterness towards Saakashvili for falling into the
Russian trap and providing Russia the opportunity,
endangering everyone's interests. The focus on the
repercussions for Nagorno-Karabakh is also a frequent
refrain, with the clear hope that the U.S. drumbeat on the
territorial integrity of Georgia will translate into greater
sympathy and support for the Azerbaijani position on
Nagorno-Karabakh. Mammadyarov's comments on a possible
"strategic dialogue" echo President Aliyev's to Senator Lugar
that we "need to elaborate a mutually agreed and predictable
format of relations . . . that treats the three South
Caucasus countries equally," with "a unified USG approach to
us and others (septel)."
DERSE