Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAKU541
2008-06-10 11:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT ALIYEV "HURT" BY U.S. CRITICISMS, SEEKS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PBTS ENRG AJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS ENRG AJ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV "HURT" BY U.S. CRITICISMS, SEEKS
CLARIFICATION

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000541

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS ENRG AJ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV "HURT" BY U.S. CRITICISMS, SEEKS
CLARIFICATION

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: On May 30, President Aliyev bluntly
detailed his personal sense of "hurt" over statements by the
Secretary and President that were critical of Azerbaijan's
democracy and human rights record. He views the statements
as part of a trend -- the UNGA vote, the Presidential
statement on media freedom day, and the Secretary's
comparison of democratic progress in the Caucasus -- that is
creating the perception that Azerbaijan is "under attack" and
subjected to "double standards." He said that in light of
the purported U.S.-Azerbaijan partnership, Azerbaijan wants
to know why these events have taken place, and where they
will lead. If these statements are part of a "pre-election
plan," Aliyev said "We will go back to 2005, which was not
the best period in our bilateral relationship." Given
important new energy security initiatives, Aliyev argued that
the U.S. and Azerbaijan cannot afford to have political
tensions in the relationship, and stated that international
reaction to Azerbaijan's October presidential election would
have implications for Azerbaijan's foreign policy. End
summary.


2. (SBU) On May 30, President Aliyev met with visiting EUR
DAS David Merkel and the Ambassador, following an
energy-focused meeting with visiting SCA A/S Richard Boucher
(septel). Aliyev, who had just returned from Finland, was
clearly relaxed with DAS Merkel because of their previous
relationship, and was accompanied by Foreign Minister
Mammadyarov and International Relations Advisor Novruz
Mammadov.

REGIONAL COMPARISONS "NOT FAIR"
--------------


3. (C) Merkel urged President Aliyev to take steps in the
run-up to Azerbaijan's October presidential election to
strengthen Azerbaijan's democratic institutions, noting that
the election was an opportunity to demonstrate regional
leadership. Aliyev responded acerbically that Azerbaijan was
not competing with its neighbors, "especially when they are
considered much more democratic than we are." Aliyev
detailed events surrounding recent elections in Georgia and

Armenia that he argued were undemocratic yet were not
criticized by the international community. Aliyev emphasized
that the Armenian Army had killed protesters in the wake of
fraudulent elections, yet Armenian President Sargsyan was
embraced by the international community. "It's not fair,"
Aliyev said. "If I did one percent of what Sargsyan did, I
would be declared a bloody dictator."


4. (C) Affirming his commitment to free and fair elections,
Aliyev argued that Azerbaijan is the most democratic country
in the South Caucasus, yet "we are the only ones to be
criticized." He said he can understand the reasons that the
U.S. is reluctant to publicly criticize Georgia's democratic
record but blamed Armenia's special treatment on the
influence of the Armenia lobby. Based on widespread,
documented fraud in the Armenian election, Sargsyan did not
win in the first round of voting and should have had a second
round, Aliyev argued, yet the OSCE and the Council of Europe
said Armenia's election demonstrated democratic "progress."
"We expect a fair evaluation in October," Aliyev continued.
"But it is our sense that no matter what we do, we will be
criticized. This really hurts us."


5. (C) Aliyev said that the lack of international reaction
to "terrible" events in Georgia and Armenia made it difficult
to accept the constant stream of criticism from the U.S.
Georgian President Saakashvili had closed a TV station yet he
was invited to Washington. Referring to the case of
opposition journalist Agil Khalil, Aliyev said that in
Azerbaijan, in contrast, "a journalist is pushed by unknowns
and it becomes a big deal." Aliyev said that U.S. double
standards "create a spirit in society I don't like. There is
the sense that we are under attack, especially when compared
(to neighboring countries) by high-level officials."

A NEGATIVE TREND IN THE RELATIONSHIP?
--------------


6. (C) Aliyev detailed three events that he views as a
negative trend in the relationship. First, the U.S. "no"
vote on Azerbaijan's UNGA resolution regarding
Nagorno-Karabakh was the first time in the history of the
bilateral relationship that the U.S. had succumbed to Russian

or French pressure within the OSCE Minsk Group. "You
shouldn't have voted like that," Aliyev said. "The UNGA
resolution was not against the Minsk Group principles and
included language supporting the Minsk Group." Second,
President Bush's statement on international press freedom
day, putting Azerbaijan in the same category as Iran, China
and Cuba, and identifying Azerbaijan as a jailer of
journalists, was of concern. "Azerbaijan is a strategic
partner of the U.S., yet it is in this category?" Aliyev
asked. Third, he added, Azerbaijan was very concerned by
Secretary Rice's public ranking of Azerbaijan's democratic
progress as behind that of Georgia and Armenia, particularly
as the statement was made after "the bloody events in Armenia
and the attack on the opposition in Georgia."


7. (C) Aliyev said he wants to know why these events have
taken place, and where they will lead. "If this is part of a
pre-election program, we'll go back to 2005, which was not
the best period in our bilateral relationship," Aliyev said.
"We need to have some clarification. These are our questions
and we want answers."

OCTOBER REACTION WILL BE A TEST
--------------


8. (C) Aliyev repeated his intent to hold a free and fair
presidential election in October. He noted that he had taken
steps in 2005 to address electoral fraud, firing several
local officials accused of manipulating election results and
ordering the cancellation and re-running of races in ten
parliamentary districts with particularly egregious fraud.
"We're not perfect," Aliyev said, and if the U.S. had also
criticized democratic shortcomings in Ukraine, Georgia and
Armenia, "then we would be silent." "We expect a fair
approach to elections," Aliyev continued. He argued that the
Azerbaijani Government doesn't need to manipulate the
electoral process in order to win. "We will have good
elections." Aliyev questioned whether the international
community would give Azerbaijan a fair assessment, noting
that "international statements regarding fraud and voter
manipulation will play a negative role in our future foreign
policy planning."

ENERGY
--------------


9. (C) Following up on his earlier discussion of regional
energy issues with Merkel and visiting SCA A/S Boucher
(septel) and characterizing the Western effort to promote a
Southern Corridor for Caspian gas to Europe as "chaotic,"
Aliyev stressed the need for the U.S. to play a much stronger
coordinating role in new trans-Caspian energy initiatives.
He said Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov was not interested
in the Nabucco pipeline, telling Aliyev during his recent
visit to Baku that "I don't need Nabucco. I have Russia,
China and Iran but if you need Nabucco, we can discuss it."
Aliyev said the EU was incapable of coordinating the many
complex pieces of trans-Caspian gas initiatives and urged the
U.S. to work with Azerbaijan to develop a "step-by-step"
roadmap that could address the pressures and complications
posed by Russia and Iran. For example, Aliyev offered,
Azerbaijan would be willing to buy Turkmen gas if
Berdimuhamedov is unwilling to sell gas directly to Europe.
Similarly, the U.S. and its partners must determine who will
build the 60-km connector pipeline, and who will purchase
Turkmen gas that is delivered through a new East-West
corridor. Aliyev added that the U.S. and Azerbaijan must
also keep in mind the Shah Deniz consortium partners'
significant commercial interests in Russia, noting that the
President of Gazprom would soon make his first visit to
Azerbaijan.


10. (C) Given the complexities of these energy security
issues, Aliyev noted that the U.S. and Azerbaijan "should
work shoulder-to-shoulder. We shouldn't have disagreements."
He added that new gas initiatives are a "big headache" for
Azerbaijan. New gas deals expose Azerbaijan to Russian
pressure, and put Azerbaijan at cross-purposes with its
staunch ally Turkey, which seeks to increase its own gas
purchases from Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has subsidized gas
sales to Georgia, to promote its independence from Russia,
but has gone without compensation. Finally, Azerbaijan also
faces pressures from Iran, which seeks to promote its own
energy agenda. "We're in the middle of this," Aliyev said,
"and at the same time we are under attack from the U.S. We
have to think about this."


NAGORNO-KARABAKH
--------------


11. (C) Noting that he would meet Armenian President
Sargsyan for the first time on the margins of the June 6-8
informal CIS summit, Aliyev said it will be difficult for
Sargsyan to take "responsible steps" in the Nagorno-Karabakh
peace process. Aliyev said Sargsyan is weak domestically and
faces significant domestic opposition which leads Aliyev to
believe Sargsyan will be unable to make decisions based on
the Madrid Basic Principles document. However, Armenia will
have to liberate Azerbaijan's territories "sooner or later."
"Every month and year brings us closer. They won't be able
to keep them for many more years," Aliyev said. The key
question from Aliyev's perspective is whether Sargsyan will
respect the agreement reached by Kocharian that the
"so-called referendum will never happen." "It is important
to see whether Sargsyan supports this," Aliyev repeated.
Overall, Aliyev added, the Madrid documents are "not bad, the
Kosovo precedent is the only danger." In light of the Kosovo
precedent, peacekeeping will be especially important for a
future NK solution.


12. (C) Returning to the Co-Chairs' position on Azerbaijan's
UNGA resolution, Aliyev said he is concerned that the Russian
position is increasingly prevailing within the Minsk Group
Co-Chairs' deliberations. "We know the U.S. wasn't lobbying
against us. France and Russia lobbied against us. Then the
U.S. joined the Russian initiative. Other elements in the
Minsk Group show that the Russian position is becoming more
decisive. If that happens, we know the outcome."

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) In the months following the Co-Chairs' "no" vote on
Azerbaijan's UNGA resolution, we have heard with increasing
frequency and frankness that Aliyev and his closest advisors
are concerned that U.S. actions - including completely
unrelated and well-founded public criticisms of Azerbaijan's
human rights record - are evidence of a new, calculated USG
effort to pressure Azerbaijan, leading to a downward trend in
the bilateral relationship. Aliyev's message in this meeting
is by far the most blunt and personal that we have heard. In
the personality-driven Caucasus, recent statements by senior
U.S. officials critical of Azerbaijan's human rights record
are playing to Aliyev's core insecurities, reminding him of
the turbulent events surrounding his own election in 2003 and
his conviction that the U.S. sought to promote a "color
revolution" in 2005. With another presidential election
looming, he seems ready to be persuaded by his Soviet-era
coterie that the U.S. is planning to use the election to
tarnish his credibility or worse. Personal engagement by
senior U.S. officials is needed to help reassure Aliyev and
ensure continued progress on our key security, energy and
reform interests.


14. (U) DAS Merkel cleared this message.
LU