AZERBAIJAN'S INTENTIONAL AMBIGUITY TOWARD NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000044

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2025
TAGS: PREL MARK MASS PBTS NATO AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S INTENTIONAL AMBIGUITY TOWARD NATO

REF: A. BAKU 1408


B. BAKU 1384

C. BAKU 1383

D. BAKU 1382

Classified By: Charge Donald Lu for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of Azerbaijan (GOAJ) has not
publicly defined its ultimate goal with respect to NATO
membership, nor do we expect it to do so. Azerbaijan's NATO
policy appears to be movement toward the organization while
intentionally remaining silent on the question of ultimately
seeking NATO membership. This policy of intentional
ambiguity toward NATO is consistent with Azerbaijan's broader
foreign policy of regional balance, which favors
Euro-Atlantic integration, while at the same time seeking to
maintain good relations with Russia and Iran. While, in some
respects, Azerbaijan has been successful in moving closer to
NATO, the GOAJ's reluctance to disclose the content of its
NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) has prevented
the true purpose and utility of NATO integration from being
fully understood by the general public. The Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict further complicates Azerbaijan's relationship with
NATO, leading many to believe that Azerbaijan will never be
able to join NATO until the conflict is resolved. Georgia's
accelerated NATO membership plans have sparked intense
interest from Azerbaijani officials and, if successful, could
cause them to rethink their current, intentional ambiguity
toward NATO. End summary.

PARSING THE GOAJ RHETORIC
--------------


2. (C) The GOAJ's policy toward NATO can be most accurately
described as one of intentional ambiguity. GOAJ statements
on Azerbaijan's relations with NATO tend to focus on movement
toward and integration with the alliance organization, but
Azerbaijan's intended end goal seems to be deliberately vague
-- and often contradictory -- in public statements. In a
typical, recent example, Deputy Prime Minister Yaqub Eyyubov
told the press on November 20 that Azerbaijan "plans to join
the alliance." Eyyubov's statement was then flatly
contradicted by Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev who, in
widely reported remarks at the CIS Defense Ministers,
conference, on 27 November said that
Azerbaijan has "no intention" to join NATO. The Foreign
Minister recently told the Ambassador behind closed doors
that Azerbaijan's goal is eventually to join NATO. He has
never, however, voiced this position publicly. Working-level
MFA and MOD officials in both official and unofficial
conversations regarding potential NATO membership often
quickly dismiss the idea as something that is neither
necessary nor important for Azerbaijan.


3. (C) The public statements of Deputy Foreign Minister Araz
Azimov, one of the strongest GOAJ proponents of Azerbaijan's
engagement with NATO, reflect the GOAJ's unwillingness to
clarify its intentions toward the question of whether
Azerbaijan seeks NATO membership. In public statements
carried by Interfax in December, Azimov emphasized the themes
of cooperation and integration, while skirting the
membership issue. Azimov observed that "Azerbaijan is one of
the nations most actively cooperating with NATO and we are
ready to continue our activity in terms of Euro-Atlantic
integration," while remaining elusive about membership:
"Whatever or positive assessment of NATO, if this membership
does not correspond to our interests, we shall not advance
toward it. On the other hand, if we see that it corresponds
to our interests and in fact our membership in NATO will
contribute to the solution of potential Azeri problems, then
a different situation will emerge."


4. (C) President Aliyev, who regularly affirms that
Azerbaijan's overall foreign policy goal is Euro-Atlantic
integration, in his public comments has firmly cast
Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO as that of partnership.
In February 2007 comments about possible NATO membership,
Aliyev said, "It is clear both to us and to NATO that our
country is not yet prepared for this. Therefore, we need to
continue working as partners." Aliyev's apparent
unwillingness to publicly declare a more clear position on
NATO membership reflects Azerbaijan's broader goal of
pursuing a balanced approach in its foreign policy. Aliyev
and his closest advisors regularly tell us that Azerbaijan's
geopolitical location requires it to pursue a foreign policy
of balance that allows the GOAJ to protect its interests
vis-a-vis its more powerful neighbors, Russia, Turkey and
Iran. At the same time, this need for balance --
particularly with regard to Russia and Iran -- makes
Euro-Atlantic integration, albeit within certain bounds, a
priority for Aliyev's government.

GEORGIA ENVY
--------------


5. (C) Georgia's changing relationship with NATO could prove
a catalyst for Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO. In the
past, Azerbaijan has viewed Georgia's "all in" approach
toward NATO, the EU, and the WTO with a great deal
of skepticism, accusing the Georgians of intentionally
pursuing a provocative approach toward Russia, which will
yield little result. The more cautious Azerbaijanis, who
actively seek stability and balance in their foreign policy,
say that they "do not want to be like Georgia" and that while
this may be "fine for Georgia" it is not a good policy for
Azerbaijan. In general, GOAJ officials seem to believe that
Georgia's reforms have moved too fast, too soon and that the
subsequent disruption of political stability is something
that Azerbaijan will not accept. GOAJ officials say that
they desire to keep their relations with Russia, at the very
least, on a cordial and non-confrontational basis, a factor
that most certainly affects Azerbaijan's approach toward
NATO.


6. (C) Yet Georgia's recent decision to pursue accelerated
NATO membership seems to be promoting at least some
Azerbaijani officials to rethink their approach toward NATO.
Some Azerbaijani officials appear to have a confused view of
NATO's position toward Georgia, and believe that Georgia and
Azerbaijan (and in some cases the South Caucasus in general)
are linked in the eyes of NATO. GOAJ officials frequently
make statements such as "once NATO accepts Georgia, they will
accept us" or "if NATO gives Georgia a MAP (Membership Action
Plan),they should give us a MAP." The basis and logic for
such views is not clear, but it seems to show a lack of
understanding that comprehensive political and military
reforms need to be carried out prior to deepening ties with
NATO.


7. (C) The GOAJ is watching the development of ties between
Georgia and NATO very closely, and the success or failure of
Georgia's "all in" policy will likely have a trickle down
effect on both the GOAJ and the general population's
perceptions of NATO. Azerbaijani officials also seem to be
paying careful attention to NATO's handling of Georgia's
territorial integrity issues, given the implications for
Azerbaijan's own relationship with NATO. Yet, lurking behind
Azerbaijan's intense interest in Georgia's NATO accession is
a constant feeling of "Georgia envy." Azerbaijani officials
routinely complain that
Georgia -- which they believe faces equally difficult
corruption and political reform problems -- is held to a
different standard than Azerbaijan. As such, key officials
such as Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, believe that
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashviili was manipulating the
NATO accession process to bolster his domestic standing (ref
b).

GOAJ OFFICIALS, UNDERSTANDING OF NATO
--------------


8. (C) Our experience with a wide range of working-level MFA
officials, both from the Americas section and the Security
Affairs department -- almost all of whom can be described as
pro-American and pro-reform -- indicates that there is still
a general lack of understanding about what NATO is and does,
and what NATO membership would mean for Azerbaijan. In
addition to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) (see paragraph
10),most GOAJ officials' personal opinions seem to be in
line with Azerbaijan's broader foreign policy goal of
"balancing" Iran and Russia. They seem to agree that
Azerbaijan's carefully calibrated relations with NATO should
simultaneously afford the GOAJ some protection from Russia
and Iran and refrain from provoking these two regional
powers. As such, GOAJ officials appear to view their
relationship with NATO more as a strategic tool than as a
vehicle by which reform could be implemented.

9. (C) In both everyday conversations and in official
ministerial-level meetings with senior USG visitors, there
seems to be a general misunderstanding in the MOD about the
difference between NATO "standards" and NATO "structures."
Often Ministry of Defense (MOD) officers and Minister Abiyev
himself will comment that the MOD has integrated "all its
units" to "NATO standards". In reality, this means that the
MOD has changed the names of various units from Soviet to
NATO structures. In general these changes are nothing more
than cosmetic, and have little do to with units being up to
NATO "standards." However, Azerbaijani MOD officers have
told Embassy officers that the simple integration to NATO
structures has had a positive psychological effect on the
mindset of mid- and junior-level officers, as they move away
from the Soviet model.

NAGORNO-KARABAKH
--------------


10. (C) As with almost any public policy issue, the NK issue
permeates any discussion of Azerbaijan's relationship with
NATO. Many in the GOAJ view NATO through the prism of the
conflict, specifically NATO's position toward NK and any
peacekeeping role NATO could play in the conflict. It is
clear that GOAJ officials, especially those in the MFA and
MOD, believe that NATO would not seriously consider accepting
Azerbaijan into NATO until the NK issue is resolved. Once
Azerbaijanis are told that NATO simply supports the Minsk
Group process and wants to see the peaceful settlement of NK,
the sentiments toward NATO turn much more pessimistic, with
the interlocutor generally throwing their hands up and saying
that "NATO would never take us until NK is solved" or that
NATO was only interested in Azerbaijan's energy resources.
NATO's neutral stance toward the NK issue does not endear it
to the general public, which seems increasingly to believe
that the international community -- and the Minsk Group in
particular -- holds Azerbaijan to a double standard.

PUBLIC OPINIONS AND DISCUSSION
--------------


11. (C) Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO is a frequent
topic of discussion in newspapers, radio and television.
Information about NATO appears in both the official and
opposition press, and ranges from official press releases
about Azerbaijan-NATO cooperation, and the visits and press
conferences of visiting NATO international staff (which often
includes NATO's criticisms of Azerbaijan),to persistent
rumors as to who may be appointed the first civilian Minister
of Defense as a result of NATO-related reforms. Azerbaijan
also hosts a semi-annual NATO International School, which
attracts wide coverage in the media.


12. (C) In spite of this wide coverage of NATO-related
issues, the media alost never touches upon the specific,
fundamental eforms -- political, economic, and military --
tat must be undertaken as part of the NATO accessio
process. The GOAJ, which insists on treating is NATO
Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) as classified
documents, is largely to blame. As a result, the general
public seems entirely unaware of the real changes -- and real
benefits -- that would result from a serious NATO accession
effort. This skewed coverage of NATO also appears to have
created the mistaken impression that Azerbaijan's potential
acceptance into NATO depends solely on NATO member states,
not on any reform steps taken by the GOAJ. As such, public
discussion of NATO focuses on broader political-military
issues, such as missile defense and the international
community's standoff with Iran, and how these issues might
affect Azerbaijan's chances of NATO membership.

COMMENT: PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE
--------------


13. (C) Given Azerbaijan's carefully structured pursuit of
balance in its foreign policy, its ultimate goal with NATO
may be very similar to its goals with respect to the EU. As
President Aliyev recently told a senior U.S. official, the
GOAJ recognizes that it has no possibility of actually
entering the European Union any time soon. Yet the
structures and values of the EU, according to Aliyev, offer a
model and system that the GOAJ can strive to achieve as part
of its political and economic reform agenda. Given the
GOAJ's concerns about Russia and Iran, and the leading role
that Soviet-era relics such as Minister of Defense Abiyev
continue to play in Azerbaijan's national security policy,
our best hope seems to be that the GOAJ will look to NATO,
like the EU, as a model that the GOAJ can strive to replicate
in its ongoing reform efforts, rather than as the ultimate
goal of its national security policy. While this
relationship with NATO -- pursuing reform while at the same
time refraining from embracing future membership -- will
prove beneficial in some key areas, the GOAJ should pursue a
more open public discussion of its NATO IPAP goals in order
to maximize the reforming impact of NATO. Unfortunately, to
date the serious structural reforms, consistent with a EU or
NATO aspirant, have not been put forth. The GOAJ's
close-hold treatment of its IPAP commitments may indicate
that the senior levels of Azerbaijan's political-military
structure are not yet ready to embrace the far-reaching
reforms required for true NATO integration.


14. (C) Some have started to suggest that, in the lead up to
the April 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit that there may be a
internal debate taking place within the Azerbaijani
government regarding going further in stating their desire to
become a NATO member or that Azerbaijan may present more
defined objectives. There is certainly increased attention
to NATO in the media, as well as a series of comments by
senior officials suggesting the possibility of an internal
dialogue. However, given our initial reading of Azerbaijan's
second proposed Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP-2),
it does not appear to be any more ambitious, and in some
respects less so, than IPAP-1, which included goals for the
upgrading of an airbase and toward civilian control of the
military. Additionally, it would be difficult to expect that
any serious movement would be made during an election year
(the Azerbaijani presidential elections are in October 2008).
During a November 2007 meeting with the Ambassador, DFM
Azimov raised the prospect of an "intensified dialogue" but
he was quick to point out that there may only be the
possibility for such a move in a few years, and at least not
before 2010 or 2011 after the term of IPAP-2 ended. NATO
Special Representative to the South Caucasus Robert Simons
said that Azimov had told him that Azerbaijan was not even
ready to seriously consider an intensified dialogue. If
there is such an internal debate about NATO membership, it
has yet to produce any tangible public steps in the direction
of reversing the policy of moving slowly and guardedly toward
a greater role in NATO.


15. (C) DAO Comment: The Defense Attache agrees that the
GOAJ's policy toward NATO can generally be characterized as
"intentional ambiguity," although this ambiguity parallels
many other former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet countries'
early relations with NATO. The GOAJ's ambiguity also stems
from the perception that the West has not yet decided to
stand with Azerbaijan. While the GOAJ often has unrealistic
expectations of what the West should do to demonstrate its
support for Azerbaijan, the GOAJ's sense of unmet
expectations exists. Senior GOAJ officials have also
privately suggested that Azerbaijan has a long-term intention
to join NATO, but the GOAJ is not yet ready and it is worried
about Russia and Iran's responses. While the MOD is not
capable of planning genuine, far-reaching defense reforms,
Azerbaijan's interactions with NATO -- including providing
troops for coalition efforts in Afghanistan -- have at a
minimum pushed the MOD to understand that its military future
lies in adopting NATO standards.
LU