RUBAIE ON CURRENT SECURITY AND POLITICAL SITUATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000968

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2018
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL PTER EG IR IZ JO SA SY
SUBJECT: RUBAIE ON CURRENT SECURITY AND POLITICAL SITUATION

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: During a March 28 call on National Security
Advisor Mowafuq Rubaie, the Ambassador discussed the current
security situation in Baghdad, Basrah, and the southern
provinces, all of which were the scenes of intensified
conflict with criminal elements associated with Moqtada
al-Sadr (MAS). While there were serious challenges in all of
these areas, including the desertion of some ISF members,
Rubaie assessed that the security situation was "holding up."
They discussed security and political courses of action,
including the need to shore up support for the Maliki
government domestically and in the region in order to avoid a
no-confidence vote in the Council of Representatives (COR),a
vote which the Sadrists appeared to be pursuing. Rubaie
revealed that his conversations with Sayyed Mustafa
al-Yacoubi, a confidante of Moqtada al-Sadr, had not yielded
any results. The Ambassador urged the GOI to engage Iran in
order to end its malign influence which was now endangering
the Maliki government. Syria and the SOFA talks were briefly
discussed. Please see paragraph 16 for post's request that
the Department issue instructions to Embassy Cairo, Embassy
Amman, and Embassy Riyadh. END SUMMARY.

--------------
SECURITY SITUATION CHALLENGING
--------------


2. (S) Rubaie reported that he led a meeting regarding the
current situation in Baghdad with ISF and CF leaders earlier
in the day and that the Prime Minister had joined via
teleconference from Basrah. Rubaie felt that the leaders
were &fired up8 after the meeting and that they had a good
plan for Baghdad. A Crisis Action Cell (CAC) meeting tonight
would be chaired by DPM Barham Salih and include the deputy
ministers from all security ministries, since the ministers
remained in Basrah with the PM. The CAC would focus on the
security situation in provinces outside of Baghdad.


3. (S) Rubaie, who had returned from a trip to Saudi Arabia
the evening before, assessed that in general the security
situation was &holding up8, but the government was facing
serious challenges. Desertion, mainly of Iraqi local police
(IP),as well as some National Police (NP) and Iraqi Army
(IA) forces in both Basrah and Baghdad was a problem. To
compensate, the government was accelerating recruitment,
which the Ambassador acknowledged would provide an especially
good image of citizens backing up their government at a time
of crisis. While ammunition and weapons were not a problem
for the ISF, some of these had been lost to JAM when some 230
police in Shulla and Muthaq had surrendered and given up
several vehicles and all of their weapons to JAM. The
Ambassador noted that an IA unit in Kadhamiyah had been
overrun and that JAM had taken its Humvees. During fierce
fighting in Mahmudiyah, Rubaie asserted that 80 enemy had
been killed for the loss of four ISF.

--------------
SOUTHERN PROVINCES IN BAD SHAPE
--------------


4. (S) The situation in Kut was "not very good" according to
Rubaie's information, with unofficial reports indicating that
the ISF controlled only the main thoroughfare. Al-Amarah was
completely overrun by JAM, and the PM was incensed that the
Governor had declared he would no longer take orders from the
central government. Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi had
called Rubaie from Damascus (where he is leading the GOI
delegation to the Arab League Summit) to relate what he had
heard about the deteriorating situation in Nasiriyah.

--------------
PLAN FOR BAGHDAD: BUFFER FOR IZ
--------------


5. (S) Rubaie was confident that Multinational
Division-Baghdad Commander MG HAMMOND and Baghdad ISF
Commander General Abbud had a good plan to address security.
The goal was to push those launching rockets at least 1.5
kilometers back from their current positions so that they
would be out of rocket range from the International Zone.
NOTE: At least some rockets available to criminal elements
can reach the IZ even from beyond Sadr City. END NOTE. The
curfews in Baghdad and Basrah lasting until 0500 on Sunday

BAGHDAD 00000968 002 OF 004


would also thwart attempts to accelerate tension.


6. (S) Rubaie expressed concern that in some neighborhoods of
Baghdad JAM had been acting as a counterbalance to AQI, and
that this positive effect might be disturbed as some JAM
members moved to Basrah and others withdrew from mixed
neighborhoods to take up defensive positions in Sadr City or
otherwise attack ISF. The PM was also concerned that Sons of
Iraq volunteers (many of whom are Sunni) might take advantage
of tactical JAM withdrawals, and had already received reports
that some families (presumably Shia) were being expelled from
their homes. The Ambassador suggested that this be discussed
at the CAC, but indicated that JAM might actually be
expanding its area of operations rather than retracting it at
the moment.


7. (S) While the PM had mentioned encircling Sadr City and
cutting off electricity, water, and food to its residents as
punishment for harboring JAM, Rubaie said that he told the PM
the GOI needed to be seen as a provider of such necessities
in an effort to win over hearts and minds. The Ambassador
agreed with Rubaie's concept, indicating that there was a
danger of pushing the population towards JAM and that
Coalition Forces had been at pains to avoid causing
unnecessary civilian casualties even while the IZ came under
indirect fire attack.

--------------
NEXT STEPS IN BASRAH
--------------


8. (S) The Ambassador asked Rubaie to lay out the GOI's plan
for operations in Basrah. Rubaie began by noting that the PM
had announced a weapons buy-back program which had just been
extended until April 8. Basrah would be a good story for the
upcoming testimony of the Ambassador and General Petraeus, as
it was an example of an Iraqi-led nonsectarian operation.
The Ambassador agreed while noting that it was important that
ISF operations maintained momentum and did not get bogged
down. This could be highly dangerous, as ISF supply lines
were vulnerable and forces pinned down in an urban
environment could be extremely vulnerable.


9. (S) Rubaie confided that it appeared to him that the PM
would remain in Basrah until there was a clear perception
that he had won a victory. He admitted that he was thinking
of "creating" such a victory, but that nothing had yet come
to mind. The problem was that some of the targets which the
PM had set, such as all weapons in the hands of criminals
being given up, were not achievable.


10. (S) Rubaie asked whether the Ambassador had seen any
indication of Moqtada al-Sadr's orders to JAM, specifically
whether it had been ordered to aggressively attack the ISF
and CF, or whether it was only to react defensively. The
Ambassador replied that it seemed clear in Baghdad, at least,
that JAM was on the offensive against both the GOI and the
Coalition, with over 80 attacks occurring yesterday alone.

--------------
TALKING TO THE SADRISTS
--------------


11. (S) The Ambassador mentioned the idea, being floated by
some Sadrists including COR Member Baha al-Araji, of a
political accommodation in which senior Sadrists publicly
called for those resisting the GOI to lay down their arms in
return for an end to hostilities. Rubaie questioned Baha's
authority within the Sadrist leadership, indicating that in
his opinion only Sayyed Mustafa consistently could speak for
MAS. He went on to mention that he had spoken to Sayyed
Mustafa, located with MAS in Qom, three times recently, but
that the Sadrist had not offered him any answers regarding
MAS's intentions. Rubaie related that he had proposed that
mainstream JAM and the ISF cooperate against the Special
Groups, but Sayyed Mustafa told him to take this up with the
OMS leadership in Najaf. Nobody there could offer Rubaie
real answers.

--------------
SHORING UP DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPORT
--------------


12. (S) Rubaie complained that the PM was receiving little

BAGHDAD 00000968 003 OF 004


political support during this time of crisis. Tawafuq would
provide none and neither would the Kurds. Even the ministers
who were with the PM in Basrah had been invisible in the
press. The Ambassador countered that the Presidency Council
had issued a good statement supporting the government against
the criminals earlier that day which should be prominently
featured in the media. The Council represented Sunni,
Kurdish, and Shia approval for the PM's actions. President
Talabani and KRG President Barzani were to meet the same day
to provide unified Kurdish support for the government.


13. (S) The Ambassador passed on President Talabani's
comments that Sayyed Mustafa was telling him now was the time
to engineer a no-confidence vote in PM Maliki (an effort
which the Ambassador understood Baha al-Araji was
undertaking). Rubaie reported that former PM Jaafari was
seeking the 50 signatures necessary for an emergency session
of the COR, and a no-confidence vote was possible. The
Ambassador opined that he could not imagine a time in which a
no-confidence vote would be less attractive than right now.
It was possible that Tawafuq could be short-sighted enough to
support such a move, admitted the Ambassador. In any case,
the PM needed to work with Speaker Mashadani and Deputy
Speaker al-Attiya, as well as all of the bloc leaders, to
make any vote one of resounding confidence in the government.
ISCI was strongly behind Maliki, VP Hashemi had called the
PM, and the IIP had issued a statement of support.


14. (S) If some tried to engineer a vote of no-confidence,
the Ambassador emphasized that the government must ensure
that it fails utterly. The government should fight to ensure
that the fifty votes needed to bring a no-confidence motion
do not materialize. Beyond that, they should seek a COR
resolution in support of the Prime Minister's efforts to
assert the state's authority against criminal elements.
Rubaie agreed to discuss these matters with the PM urgently
before approaching COR leaders, remarking that if they did
not ensure the outcome, the effort might backfire. The
Ambassador assured Rubaie of the USG's full support, as we
had already demonstrated with our work to rally support
behind him.

--------------
SUPPORT OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
--------------


15. (S) The Ambassador offered that the U.S. could approach
key neighboring governments seeking statements of support for
the GOI. Rubaie agreed this would be helpful and undertook
to speak with Saudi FM Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Jordanian
intelligence chief Mohammed Dahabi, and Egyptian intelligence
chief Omar Sulayman. He also vowed to call on VP Abd
al-Mahdi to use the Arab League Summit to publicly call on
Arabs to support GOI efforts to assert state authority
against criminals seeking to undermine it.

--------------
REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS
--------------


16. (S) Post requests the Department to instruct posts in
Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to approach their respective
host governments at the highest appropriate level in order to
seek public statements of support for the efforts of the GOI
and PM Maliki in asserting the authority of the lawful
government of Iraq against criminal elements violently
seeking to undermine the authority of the state. The
instruction should also request these governments to urge all
Iraqi parties and leaders with whom they might privately
engage to show the same support.

--------------
SYRIA STILL A PROBLEM
--------------


17. (S) Rubaie noted that he had tried to convince VP Abd
al-Mahdi not to go to Damascus in order to demonstrate Iraqi
displeasure with Syrian tolerance of the foreign terrorist
flow into Iraq. While his efforts failed, he would tell Abd
al-Mahdi to raise the Abu Ghadiyah network with the Syrians.
The Ambassador agreed that this was the best that could be
done in the circumstances, but repeated his earlier
conclusion that Iraq would not see progress in this
relationship if they continued to play the Syrians' game:

BAGHDAD 00000968 004 OF 004


Syria sent suicide bombers to Iraq while getting visits from
high level Iraqi officials in return.

--------------
IRANIAN INFLUENCE
--------------


18. (S) Rubaie related that the PM had spoken with someone in
the Iranian leadership, though apparently not President
Ahmadinejad, regarding the current security crisis. The
Ambassador made it clear that Iran's current course was
extraordinarily dangerous. The Iranians needed to understand
that they had to unequivocally support the PM, who is now in
a fight for his political life. There is a risk of a Shia
civil war which would be hugely destructive for Iraq and for
the broader Shia community. Those who say the Shia cannot
govern would have the ammunition they were looking for, a
prospect which could not possibly be in Iran's interests.
The PM is fully committed to defeating criminal elements in
Basrah and Iran knows very well what to do to support him.
It needs to stop all of its actions which have led to the
current situation, including the weapons, funding, and
training it has provided to criminal groups. Iran must make
the decision: does it want to see Maliki fail or succeed?
Rubaie agreed with the Ambassador's observation that Iranian
leaders were so obsessed with gaining tactical advantages
from the situation that they failed to see the strategic
issue confronting them.

--------------
SOFA TALKS
--------------


19. (S) The Ambassador noted that SOFA talks were proceeding
well and that the U.S. supported the Iraqi delegation's
proposal to hold the next round of negotiations in
Washington. Iraqi delegation lead Mohammed Haj Hamoud had
told his U.S. counterpart that he was only allowed to
negotiate on the SOFA from the coming Saturday through Monday
and that these talks would need to be followed by talks on
the SFA the rest of the week. This was not in accordance
with the latest understanding between the respective
governments in which the SOFA would be negotiated by the SOFA
delegation, which would not have any responsibility for the
SFA. Rubaie agreed that this was the understanding and
undertook to relay this to Hamoud.
CROCKER