Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD886
2008-03-24 08:38:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQI NSA RUBAI ON AHMEDI-NEJAD'S VISIT -

Tags:  PREL PRGO IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2544
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0886/01 0840838
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 240838Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6404
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000886 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PRGO IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI NSA RUBAI ON AHMEDI-NEJAD'S VISIT -
CORRECTED COPY

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Corrected Copy of Baghdad 706

Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000886

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PRGO IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI NSA RUBAI ON AHMEDI-NEJAD'S VISIT -
CORRECTED COPY

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Corrected Copy of Baghdad 706

Summary
--------------


1. (S) National Security Advisor (NSA) Muwaffaq al-Rubai
shared his views on the purpose and meaning of the Iranian
President Ahmedi-Nejad's recent visit with Embassy PolMil
MinsCouns Amb. Marcie Ries and NSC's Brett McGurk in two
hour-long conversations, one each on March 5 and March 7.
(S/I Ambassador David Satterfield participated in the March 7
meeting.) Rubai first indicated that the visit had focused on
economic issues, but on March 7 he revealed further details
of discussions on security and diplomatic issues. Rubai also
discussed his views on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
and Strategic Framework (SF),septel. End summary.


2. (S) Rubai said that a significant amount of time during
the PM's meetings was spent discussing economic issues,
including the nine to eleven MOUs that the two countries had
signed during the visit, renovation of the Najaf and Samarra
shrines, oil and gas pipelines including a pipeline from
Kazakhstan, the 1 billion dollar loan (Note: apparently for
Iranian products/services. End Note.),new power stations
for Sadr City and Najaf, prospective rail links, and the
movement of pilgrims across the border, etc. Curiously,
Rubai noted that throughout the visit, Ahmadi-Nejad never
once mentioned the United States during his private meetings
and indeed acted "as if there were no foreign troops in
Iraq."


3. (S) The topics of U.S. forces in Iraq and Iranian lethal
aid to militants were not raised in the meetings with
Ahmadinejad. This was left to a lower rung of advisors.
Ahmadi-Nejad had asked Prime Minister Maliki if the Iranian
Chief of Intelligence could meet his counterpart, INIS
Director Shahwani. Maliki instead suggested that Rubai talk
privately with the Iranian Chief, Mohammad Pur Amini. Amini
and two other Iranians met at Rubai's home; Amini's primary
topic of interest was the impending U.S.)Iraq long term
security negotiations. Unlike Ahmadi-Nejad's meetings, in
which the topic of the US and the long-term security
agreement was never brought up, Amini repeatedly returned to
the issue throughout their conversation, inquiring about the

start date of negotiations, U.S. goals for permanent bases,
and more generally what U.S. goals and desired end state were
for Iraq.


4. (S) According to Rubai, the Prime Minister did not discuss
the issue of Iranian lethal aid with Ahmadi-Nejad. The visit
had "cemented" the Prime Minister's relationship with the
Iranian President, according to Rubai, "which is good because
it can stop the Iranians from meddling in Iraq." Rubai also
was interested in U.S. views on Iran's behavior in recent
months, since he believed that Iran has played a more helpful
role by reining in the Jaysh al-Mahdi and slowing the supply
of lethal aid to Iraq. Amb. Ries pointed out that it is
unhelpful to give credit to Iran for a decrease in
destructive behavior that Iranians themselves had initiated.
This was particularly true, Amb. Satterfield noted, given the
increase in EFP incidents in the past month, the increase in
attacks on Basrah base, and the use of more powerful 240mm
rockets.


5. (S) Rubai noted the contradiction and made it clear that
Iran could do more. He said he personally pressed the
following three points with Amini during their meeting:
(1) the Iranians must stop the provision of EFPs to militants
- the Americans are in Iraq at the request of the Iraqi
Government so the Iranians are killing our friends and this,
in turn, weakens the GoI;
(2) Iranians should tell the JAM special groups under their
control to stand down, just as Sadr has done with those
groups under his control, and
(3) The Iranians should stem the flow of small arms across
the southern border to militia groups - the Iraqis know
through years of experience that if Iran wants to control
their borders they are capable of doing it.
Amb. Ries hoped that the Prime Minister was still planning on
receiving a briefing on Iranian nefarious activities in Iraq
from Gen. McCrystal, just as Rubai had received.


6. (S) Rubai noted that Ahmedi-Nejad's visit was a public
relations success for the Iranians: Iran was portrayed as a
regional power and, while they had missed an opportunity with
the Sunni, their reception was largely positive. (Note:
Sunni leaders largely boycotted the Ahmedi-Nejad visit; Vice
President Hashimi made a short appearance at the meeting with
the Presidency Council; but reportedly arrived late, and left

BAGHDAD 00000886 002 OF 002


early. End note.) Rubai was hopeful that the visit would
send a strong message to Arab capitals and encourage them to
send permanent diplomatic representatives to Baghdad, though
he noted that it was likely that the visit would only
heighten Arab fears of Iranian encroachment and influence in
Iraq. He confirmed that he will be traveling to Saudi
Arabia, to prepare a readout on the trip, and to encourage
the Saudis to finally send their ambassador. He asked for
U.S. assistance with meetings while in Saudi Arabia. McGurk
noted that while we favor strong neighborly relations between
Iraq and Iran, there appeared to be no public statement from
any Iraqi leader about Iran's negative influences in Iraq.
He said this causes problems in the United States, as well as
the region, where critics of our policy claim the Iraqi
government is falling under Iran's sphere of influence and
may not warrant sustained support.


7. (S) Rubai said Ahmadi-Nejad appeared to be obsessed with
occultation and the "Hidden Imam." Rubai described one of
the Iranian President's last meetings in Iraq, held at Abd
al-Aziz al-Hakim's house. In a room full of 30-40 people,
Ahmadi-Nejad lectured for an hour about the return of the
Mahdi, claiming that the wait united both Arab and Persian
Shia. Shia senior leaders, including the Prime Minister,
Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi, Ahmad Chalabi, and Mohammed Bahr al-Ulum
attended. After about an hour, Kazemi-Qomi passed
Ahmadi-Nejad a note after which he ended his talk. Rubai
noted that some Shia had been quietly bewildered by the
display and that Bahr al-Ulum had joked about Ahmadi-Nejad's
religious fervor, claiming that "he should go back to the
hawza."


8. (S) Comment: Rubai's characterization and description of
the visit comports with others who provided first hand
accounts, including Foreign Minister Zebari, Vice President
Adil Abd al-Mahdi, Ammar al-Hakim, and President Talabani. A
common theme is that this visit should prod Arab states to
send diplomatic representation to Baghdad. We have noted
that the visit on its face will not have this effect, and
Iraqis need to take the initiative to support U.S. efforts
with Iraq's Arab neighbors. Rubai claims his visit to Saudi
Arabia is designed for this purpose.
CROCKER