IRAQI DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF SURVEYS IRAQI JOINT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000768

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2018
TAGS: IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PINS PNAT PTER
SUBJECT: IRAQI DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF SURVEYS IRAQI JOINT
FORCES

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. SUMMARY: (SBU) At the monthly Defense Attach Association
of Iraq (DAAI) meeting on March 4, the Deputy Chief of the
General Staff (DCOS),General Nasier Abadi, presented a frank
overview of the Iraqi military and the challenges it faces in
the coming years. He observed that the current
counterinsurgency focus necessitated rapid growth of mainly
the Army but said the Navy and Air Force would also grow once
the military transitioned into a more conventional role.
General Abadi revealed the Army was transforming its
Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) into more mobile
Light Infantry Battalions in order to patrol newly-developed
exclusion zones around key oil pipelines. The Army is also
creating an Infrastructure Repair Battalion (IRB) focused on
securing and maintaining the nation-wide electrical supply
and distribution grid. General Abadi candidly discussed
significant inadequacies, the remedying of which depended on
future technical and training assistance from Coalition
Forces. He concluded with an assessment that the Iraqi Joint
Forces could take over the lead for a substantial portion of
the counterinsurgency effort by the end of 2008 and become
self-reliant in logistics sometime in 2009. Regarding
external defense and long-term training and equipping of
forces, he acknowledged the long-term requirement for
Coalition Forces. These assessments echo those expressed by
Iraqi National Security Advisor Rubaie and Minister of
Defense Abdel Qadr. END SUMMARY.

Current Overall Situation
--------------


2. (SBU) At the monthly DAAI meeting, General Abadi presented
a frank overview of the Iraqi military and the challenges it
faces in the coming years. He pointed out that since the fall
of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq has faced difficulties in
establishing any new or reformed institutions because there
are few experienced leaders. Abadi also noted the significant
political and sectarian issues which divide Iraq and spill
over into the military. He acknowledged reconciliation
efforts by the government--especially towards former Sunni
officers and NCOs--and believed these would help alleviate
some of the military's leadership deficit. Regarding the
current security situation, General Abadi was upbeat on
security improvements, but cautioned that significant threats
remain. Of those, he assessed Al-Qaeda (AQI) as the most
dangerous, but suggested their organization had been severely
disrupted by Coalition and Iraqi actions. He stressed that
Baghdad remains the main focus of the security effort, but
noted that significant military operations continue
elsewhere, particularly in Ninewa province.

Strategic Military Priorities and Force Generation
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) Turning to strategic military priorities, General
Abadi listed the first priority as internal security and the
defeat of terrorists/violent extremists. Practically, teralis
translates into immediately developing the Iraqi Army as a
robust counterinsurgency organization. But Abadi emphasized
that as the internal security situation improves, the Iraqi
Joint Forces will transition into a more conventional
defensive posture, i.e. external defense of the State of Iraq
in conjunction with regional and international security
arrangements.

Iraqi Army
--------------


4. (SBU) Regarding the individual force components, General
Abadi summarized the Army's specific counterinsurgency
mission as defeating terrorists and extremists, denying them
safe-havens, protecting strategic infrastructure, and
disrupting terrorist lines of communication and support.
Abadi explained this mission necessitated a rapid force
generation--in 2004, the Iraqi Army numbered only 33,000, but
has since grown to over 200,000 personnel in less than four
years. As this growth progressed, the Army's priorities
changed. In 2006, it was rapid recruitment. This shifted to
the education/training in 2007. Now, the Army is focusing on
developing a robust logistical capacity particularly at the
division-level, where the Army is establishing regional
logistic centers capable of rapidly supplying forces locally.

Iraqi Navy and Air Force
--------------


5. (SBU) General Abadi reiterated that current slow growth

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rate of the Iraqi Navy and Air Force would rapidly accelerate
once the police became the primary internal security force
and the military resumed a more conventional role. For now,
these two forces will provide direct support to the
counterinsurgency mission using their limited available
forces. The Iraqi Navy, for example, will focus on the
protection of Iraqi territorial waters, search and rescue,
and countering smuggling and illegal activity at sea using
six patrol boats and sixteen small craft. The Iraqi Air Force
will support the effort with a very limited number of
helicopters and small fixed wing aircraft, although they are
programmed to receive more soon. The Air Force also has an
additional mission to provide limited VIP airlift.

Protecting Infrastructure: New Units
--------------


6. (SBU) Turning to Prime Minister Maliki's emphasis on the
provision of services to Iraqi citizens, General Abadi
revealed that the Iraqi Army will transform its 17 Strategic
Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs),which were formed to
directly counter terrorist and criminal destruction along oil
pipelines and electricity supply routes, into more mobile
Light Infantry Battalions (LIBs). These new units will
occupy and rapidly transit special exclusion zones currently
under development along key oil pipelines, particularly the
two between Kirkuk-Bayji and Baghdad-Bayji. During the first
half of 2008, the Army will also form a highly specialized
Infrastructure Repair Battalion (IRB) focused on assessment,
inspection, maintenance, and repair of the high voltage
distribution system. Abadi added that the IRB will also be in
charge of erecting new 400KV towers, installing conductors
and transformers, as well as developing the ability to
simultaneously repair major breaks at two different locations.

Significant Inadequacies
--------------


7. (SBU) Even though the Iraqi military is making good
progress, General Abadi lamented significant inadequacies
which will take years to rectify. As noted earlier, the Iraqi
Air Force is small and as yet unable to perform any kind of
close air support (CAS) missions. The Army also has no
significant fire support for its ground forces. There is no
combat medical evacuation system or military hospital
support. The military lacks a robust technical intelligence
and secure communications capability. Finally, the current
Iraqi military is geared almost exclusively towards
counterinsurgency with few resources trained and equipped for
conventional defense. Abadi said the Iraqi Joint Staff was
addressing these shortfalls, but admitted that their solution
depended on modern equipment and well-trained forces provided
by others. In that regard, he thanked the Coalition Forces--
particularly the Multi-National Security Transition Command
in Iraq (MNSTC-I)--for their critical support in Foreign
Military Sales (FMS)
and training.

Abadi's Conclusions
--------------


8. (SBU) General Abadi closed his presentation by reiterating
his two most important priorities: leadership and logistics,
both of which he declared would be tackled vigorously in the
coming months. He noted that significant force structure has
been added in the past few years but expressed his belief
that Coalition Forces support will still be necessary in the
future, especially for defense against external threats.
CROCKER