AHMADINEJAD VISIT MOSTLY PR; STRONG SIGNAL THAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000631

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/I - JDAVIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: AHMADINEJAD VISIT MOSTLY PR; STRONG SIGNAL THAT
IRAQ'S ARAB NEIGHBORS MUST ESTABLISH MISSIONS

REF: BAGHDAD 621

Classified By: PolCouns Matt Tueller for Reasons 1.4d/b


1. (C) SUMMARY. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's overnight
visit largely confirmed its advance billing as a PR exercise.
The substance, centered around the signing of seven MOUs,
including a USD 1 billion loan package, will require time to
evaluate. The trip did send a strong visual that should
remind Iraq's Arab neighbors of their own interests in Iraq
and spur them, at the very least, to end their diplomatic
inertia and establish Embassies and assign Ambassadors to
Baghdad. Despite initial plans for key visits outside of
Baghdad, Ahmadinejad did not visit Kurdistan for a meeting
with KRG President Barzani, and most notably, did not visit
Karbala and Najaf for meetings with the religious leadership.
Septel will report the Foreign Minister's comments on the
visit. END SUMMARY.

INITIAL BUZZ--VISIT IS PUBLIC RELATIONS EXERCISE--SOME THINK
MORTARS DID THE ADVANCE WORK


2. (C) Both Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in meetings
with Embassy staff, and Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh,
in a meeting with Codel Costa, said the visit was primarily a
public relations exercise that would be long on platitudes
and light on substance. (Note. Before the visit, Post
circulated a schedule to the Department via e-mail. End
Note.) What substance there was revolved around the signing
of seven Memoranda of Understanding on issues such as
industrial infrastructure development, transportation and
customs sector cooperation, and a USD 1 billion loan. The
symbolic aspect did not leave many Iraqis indifferent; the
visit triggered demonstrations in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Anbar,
where protesters in the latter marched carrying the old Iraqi
flag--with its overtones of the 1980-1988 Iran/Iraq war. One
Sunni wag in Baghdad brandished a sign reading "Welcome
Ahmadinejad, your mortars preceded you."

SUNNI REACTION--HASHIMI DECLINES ONE-ON-ONE MEETING;
MASHADANI HOPES VISIT TRIGGERS MORE ARAB ENGAGEMENT


3. (C) Vice President Hashimi was the only senior GOI
leader to decline a one-on-one meeting with the Iranian
President. Hashimi did participate in Ahmadinejad's meeting
with the Presidency Council where, according to press
reports, he castigated Ahmadinejad over Iranian interference
in Iraq. In a March 2 meeting with PolCounselor, Council of
Representatives Speaker Mashadani complained that President
Talabani did not consult other GOI senior leaders before
inviting Ahmadinejad but took some consolation that the visit
might spur greater engagement from Iraq's Sunni neighbors.
(reftel) Iraqi National Dialogue Front leader Saleh Al
Mutlaq, speaking on Al Jazirah, recognized that the two
countries were inextricably bound, but stressed that Iraq
should have waited for tangible evidence of Iran's
constructive intentions before inviting Ahmadinejad to visit.

LATE NIGHT AT THE ISCI COMPOUND


4. (C) Ahmadinejad met with Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Chairman of
the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI),at the later's
sprawling compound the night of March 2. According to senior
Hakim aide Haitham al-Husseini, the two and one-half hour
event included a 30-minute meeting, a dinner, and a press
conference. Haitham characterized the meeting as a set-piece
event in which both parties took turns in making speech-like
statements that were full of bromides about brotherly
relations between fellow Muslim nations and peoples.
Ahmadinejad reportedly expressed solidarity with the Iraqi
government and the Iraqi people; noted the changes that Iraq
has experienced in the last few years; and remarked that it
is a "miracle" that Iraqis are now enjoying freedom, but said
nothing about how such freedom was achieved. Haitham said
Hakim, speaking in Arabic although he is fluent in FARSI
after many years of exile in Iran, spoke of Iraq and Iran's
historical friendship. Haitham asserted that the United
States was not mentioned in any context, and that Hakim did
not raise the issue of Iranian support for Iraqi militias or
other destabilizing actors. At the press conference,
Ahmadinejad replied to a question about Iran's support to
militias by declaring that Iran itself is a victim of
terrorism but that no purpose is served by alleging blame as
to who might be responsible.

SHIA REACTION--PR BONANZA FOR AHMADINEJAD


5. (C) Anecdotal soundings among Shia contacts confirmed a
general view that Ahmadinejad's visit was short on substance
but long on media exposure and press conferences for the


camera-loving Iranian President. Sheikh Abdul Halim
al-Zuhairi, Dawa Party executive council member and Prime
Minister Maliki's spiritual advisor, stated that while any
direct contact with leaders of Iraq's neighboring states is a
good thing in and of itself, the Ahmadinejad visit struck him
as a "protocol event" that will be significant only if Iran
follows up on its MOU commitments. Shia Independent CoR
member Qassim Daoud told us he had been invited to
participate in Ahmadinejad's scheduled meeting with
parliamentarian leaders, but Qassim opted to forego the
opportunity because "the visit is only for Ahmadinejad's PR
benefit and nothing serious will be discussed." Fadhila
Party CoR member Kareem al-Yaqubi told us his party's bloc
leader also elected not to attend Ahmadinejad's meeting with
CoR leaders, and opined that the real purpose of the visit
was to embarrass the United States.

COMMENT: IRAQ'S ARAB NEIGHBORS MUST RISE TO THE CHALLENGE


6. (C) Initial reaction varied predictably and the true
impact of the visit will require time to evaluate. While
more temperate than normal, Ahmadinejad could not resist
rhetorically sparring with the United States--something
everyone fully expected. The visuals, however, should be a
potent reminder to Iraq's Arab neighbors that they have
vested interests of their own in Iraq that may be in danger
if they continue their current diplomatic inertia. The
Embassy will use this trip to continue pressing key Arab
neighbors, particularly the KSA, Kuwait and Egypt, to open
embassies and send ambassadors to Baghdad.
CROCKER