FRENCH DIPLOMATS WELCOME VISIT; GUARDED ABOUT IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000434

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/I - JDAVIS, EUR/WE CPALMER
PARIS FOR JROSENBLATT, WJORDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: FRENCH DIPLOMATS WELCOME VISIT; GUARDED ABOUT IRAQ
ENGAGEMENT


Classified By: PolCounselor Matt Tueller for Reasons 1.4d/b


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. In a February 12 meeting - the first on
French Embassy premises with U.S. Emboffs in at least 18
months, if not since 2003 -- French DCM Alexandre Garcia and
Political Counselor Sylvain Fourriere (protect both) told
DepPolCounselor that ongoing security concerns and pervasive
corruption would limit the scope of French Government and
private engagement throughout Iraq. They appeared open to
Erbil-based training, but unenthusiastic about Baghdad-based
programs. Garcia stressed that France, in its capacity in
Baghdad as acting EU President, would press for common
GOF/USG priorities, particularly in legislation and Arab
diplomatic representation. The French mission, staffed with
both FARSI and Arabic speakers, appeared particularly attuned
to Iranian influences in Iraq. They worried about the
allegiances of key ISCI players and urged greater USG
engagement with the Sadr trend. END SUMMARY.


2. (C/NF) DepPolCounselor and PolOff met on February 12 at
the French Embassy in Baghdad with French DCM Alexandre
Garcia and Political Counselor Sylvain Fourriere. Garcia,
who has been in Baghdad for 18 months, commented that the
visit marked the first time during his tour, and perhaps
since 2003, that U.S diplomats had called at the French
embassy, which is located across the Tigris river in
Baghdad's Karadah District, approximately one mile northeast
of the Palace complex.


3. (C/NF) While the French have raised their profile in
Iraq with the opening of an Embassy Branch Office in Erbil,
both Garcia and Fourriere cautioned that fundamental
obstacles -- corruption in the KRG and security in other
parts of Iraq -- limited the scope of engagements that the
French Government and French investors would undertake in
Iraq. Fourriere was particularly blunt about KRG corruption
(and later in the conversation extended his indictment to the
whole of the country),describing a system of "nepotism and
mandatory payments" and concluding that, sooner or later, the
problem would have to be "referred to by name" and tackled
head-on.


4. (C/NF) The security situation in the rest of Iraq
remains the GOF's primary concern, though both took pains to
praise Coalition Forces' effectiveness and stressed that
conditions in Baghdad, which they monitor daily from their
Red Zone headquarters, had significantly improved. They
tempered their assessment by underscoring that the lull could
end "overnight" since it depends on an array of factors, some
of which, like the Jaysh al Mahdi "freeze", were beyond our
direct control. The main problem, they continued, was that,
despite security gains, basic service provision remained
"disastrous, a catastrophe." Local Iraqi staff and Iraqis
resident near the French embassy reportedly were limited to
an hour of electricity daily and lacked running water;
foodstuffs, too, were limited and the supply chain
precarious. Neither thought the Maliki government, which
they saw as incompetent and out of touch with daily reality,
was up to the service challenge.


5. (C/NF) Both Garcia and Fourriere placed heavy analytic
emphasis on Iran's influence in Iraq, which they believed to
be pervasive. (Note: Fourriere and Ambassador Jean Francois
Girault, who was absent, have both served in Iran.
Fourriere, who claims to speak fluent FARSI, will transfer to
Teheran when his Baghdad tour ends in May. Girault, Garcia
and Fourriere all speak Arabic. End Note.) Fourriere said
that in dealing with ISCI boss Abdel Aziz al Hakim's family,
and especially his sons, he was struck by the "extraordinary
hold Iran has on them." He described them as
"indistinguishable from Iranians" in their speech (they use
FARSI in private and with Fourriere) and their habits.
Fourriere left no doubt where he thinks their sympathies lie.


6. (C/NF) Turning to the Sadr trend, Fourriere declared
that, while the movement was clearly tainted by association
with Iran, it was fundamentally hostile to Iranian ambitions,
since Iraqi nationalism was its driving principle. He
thought the trend's "honorable elements" would push for an
extension of the JAM freeze, but that the movement was so
fragmented that there was no way to be sure who would
prevail. Fourriere urged us, to the extent possible, to
broaden our engagement with the Sadr trend.


7. (C/NF) Asked about French-sponsored training in Iraq,
Garcia admitted that the French thus far had only considered
the possibility of language and cultural seminars, likely in

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Erbil, where France recently opened an embassy office.
Garcia appeared open to the suggestion that the GOF could
provide training for Iraqi judges in Erbil. He also agreed
to look into Baghdad-based training, even briefly raising the
prospect of using the Al Rashid hotel in Baghdad for training
as he was introducing DepPolCounselor to a colleague who
handles legal and cultural affairs. (Note: That colleague's
response lacked enthusiasm.) Asked also about French
thinking on a potential surge in IDP and refugee returnees,
Garcia and Fourriere responded flatly that the latest numbers
belied the alleged urgency. With regard to refugees, more
Iraqis were still leaving the country each month than
returning, Garcia claimed. Fourriere added that the recent
spate of returns from Syria had been driven by financial
necessity and had now languished.


8. (C/NF) Garcia stressed that the French, in their
capacity as EU President, were already pressing key GOF/USG
priorities, particularly on legislation and expanded Arab
representation in Baghdad. (Note: France, which formally
assumes the EU Presidency in July, is now the acting EU
President, since Slovenia has no diplomatic presence in
Baghdad.)


9. (C/NF) Comment: The French analysis was striking for its
emphasis on the Iranian undercurrents in Iraqi political
developments. While that approach plays to the linguistic
strengths of staff, it is a message we hear just as often
from Iraqi interlocutors. Also notable was the judgment on
the precariousness of recent security gains coupled with the
indictment of the Maliki administration and the diagnosis of
grave, systemic corruption, stretching to the KRG. Our
French interlocutors freely acknowledged Coalition
achievements and volunteered to be helpful in their EU
Presidency role. The impression remains, however, that the
French diplomatic presence in Baghdad functions primarily as
an analytic perch from which they are not quite ready to
stir. Greater engagement will likely come in baby steps.
The new French office in Erbil, where the incumbent has
deeper ties to FM Kouchner than to the MFA itself, is the
more probable platform, but we should not give France a pass
on engagement in Baghdad itself. The verdict of corruption
could also be a pivot for launching training projects turning
on Rule of Law. Pooling views on Iranian inroads into Iraq
may equally prove a worthwhile line of exchange. End Comment.
CROCKER