MALIKI CABINET APPROVES MOSUL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000422

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018
TAGS: IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER
SUBJECT: MALIKI CABINET APPROVES MOSUL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: On February 7, Prime Minister Maliki convened
a cabinet-level Crisis Action Cell (CAC) to review the
concept of operations for the upcoming campaign against
al-Qaeda (AQI) in Ninewa province. Major General Riyadh,
Commander of the Ninewa Operations, briefed a three-phased
plan that called for securing access routes into Mosul,
implementing district-by-district clearing operations against
AQI starting from the city center, and developing a sustained
reconstruction effort emphasizing renewal of basic
governmental services. The Cabinet approved the concept of
operations, but asked that the detailed strategic plan
include specific timelines, increased emphasis on the police
and judiciary, and operations to secure the border checkpoint
at Rabiah. During the meeting, the senior Iraqi leadership
demonstrated a clear understanding of counterinsurgency
fundamentals by their questions and critiques. The presence
of Vice-President Hashimi--who has strongly criticized Maliki
in the past--also sent a strong signal that Iraqis are
uniting against a dangerous foe. This Iraqi-led major
operation--with Coalition Forces in a support role--will
provide significant insights into ISF capabilities. END
SUMMARY.

Maliki Sets the Stage
--------------


2. (S) Prime Minister Maliki convened a cabinet-level CAC on
February 7 to review the concept of operations for the
upcoming campaign against AQI in Ninewa province. In addition
to his senior security cabinet members, the Prime Minister
invited Vice President Hashimi, Governor Kashmoula of Ninewa
Province, and senior MNF-I commanders to attend and critique
the plan. Maliki conducted the two-hour meeting in an
organized, direct fashion yet allowed the cabinet and
military commanders broad leeway in critiquing the concept of
operations and its consequences.


3. (S) Maliki opened the CAC by defining the strategic goal
for the Mosul operation--"eliminate AQI influence in Ninawa
province". He instructed his cabinet and military commanders
to use the lessons learned from the ongoing Baghdad campaign
and apply them to Mosul. Maliki laid out the process by which
the cabinet would do strategic planning for the operation and
how the CAC discussion would proceed. He then invited General
Riyadh to present his concept of operations.

Mosul Concept of Operations
--------------


4. (S) Riyadh began with an assessment of the AQI threat to
Ninewa province citing the most significant potential targets
as Mosul Dam, Tigris River bridges, the Christian community,
and government and social infrastructure. To counter this
threat, he described his three-phase concept of operations:

-- Phase I: Continue current and extensive military
reconnaissance of Ninewa province while redeploying military
forces around the city of Mosul. Strictly control access into
and out of Mosul using eleven checkpoints--some yet to be
built--on major access routes into the city. Block, secure,
or eliminate all other access routes. Starting from the
center of Mosul, secure individual city districts by
disrupting ongoing AQI operations, clearing out AQI
operatives, controlling the area with robust 24/7 ISF
deployment, and retaining each district with security and
basic services. Police will maintain responsibility for
security in the city center. The Second Iraqi Army (IA)
Division will control the outer districts of the city, check
points into the city, and the eastern part of the province.

-- Phase II: Reinforce strategic positions on the east side
of the province with Second Iraqi Army (IA) Division and in
the west--from Tall Afar to the border--with the Third IA
Division. Police emergency brigades (note: similar to
National Police, end note) and civilian police will assist
these army units. Improve infrastructure/border security and
continue ongoing reconstruction.

-- Phase III: Make Iraqi Police (IP) primarily responsible
for community security; renew IA focus on external threats.
Concentrate other government ministries on completion of
reconstruction and delivery of services. Extend the process
throughout Ninewa province until AQI-influence is eliminated.

Timelines
--------------

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5. (S) When pressed by the cabinet for actual phase dates,
General Riyadh insisted they should be "conditions-based"
without regard to a calendar. Later in the meeting, under
pressure from MinDef Abdel Qadr and Vice President Hashimi,
Riyadh relented slightly and described Phase I as starting
immediately and continuing roughly until the middle of May,
Phase II lasting until the end of July, and Phase III
continuing from August onwards. But Riyadh insisted these
dates were only estimates and not cast in stone.

Securing the Border
--------------


6. (S) After Riyadh finished his formal briefing, Maliki
asked Interior Minister (IntMin) Bolani to begin the
discussion and offer his critique. Bolani concurred with the
basic concept of operations but asked for a more robust plan
for the police and judiciary, urging formation of independent
legal panels from outside the region to process the large
number of anticipated detainees. He also suggested additional
focus in the plan against local AQI financial resources such
as kickbacks from black market distribution of kerosene and
gasoline. Bolani also expressed serious concern with
corruption and lack of security at the Iraqi-Syrian border
Port of Entry (POE) at Rabiah, calling it a major threat to
the battle for Mosul.


7. (S) General Riyadh concurred with Bolani on the problems
at Rabiah POE, saying it might be necessary to close it
completely during some of his anticipated military
operations. General Mosin, Commander of the Iraqi Border
Guards, disagreed arguing that closure of the largest trade
route into the city would strangle the economy of Mosul. He
urged Riyadh to explore other alternatives like establishing
additional military checkpoints between Rabiah and Mosul.
While Mosin admitted to serious corruption problems at
Rabiah, he said he was already considering changing out
personnel at Rabiah every six months and replacing them with
border guards from other regions. He also believed it
necessary to move the POE checkpoint outside the town of
Rabiah into a less-congested area, but he lamented that
severe limitations in funding and personnel within the Border
Guards prevented implementation of these solutions.

Maliki and the Provincial Governor "Get It"
--------------


8. (S) Ninewa Provincial Governor Kashmoula urged General
Riyadh to deploy security forces from their camps into the
populated areas as soon as possible. Maliki echoed that
sentiment with a query about locations of Joint Security
Stations (JSS) inside Mosul. Riyadh acknowledged their
importance and pointed out the JSS locations to Maliki and
Kashmoula on a map of Mosul. (Comment: The JSS combines
Coalition Force (CF),IA, and IP forces together in a
neighborhood command post, much like a local police station
and is considered one of the key elements in improving
Baghdad security over the past year. End Comment.)


9. (S) Concerning Rabiah POE, General Petraeus agreed that
its closure for an extended period would cripple Mosul. He
suggested that General Mosin use the technical and procedural
solutions recently developed for the Al-Qaim POE in Anbar
province and adapt them to the Rabiah POE. General Petraeus
also offered Coalition Force assistance, especially for
improving biometric data collection and processing.


Pressure for Actual Timelines
--------------


10. (S) MinDef Abdel Qadr also agreed with the operations
concept but criticized Riyadh's presentation as lacking
specific timelines. On the other hand, he took note of
Riyadh's request for more troops and offered him additional
Special Forces and mechanized units as required. The MinDef
also questioned reports of shortages in uniforms and
equipment in the 2 IA and 3 IA Divisions, but relented when
General Petraeus reminded him that equipment shortages with
these units were due primarily to the high rate of "battle
losses" in Mosul that Coalition Forces were also experiencing.


11. (S) Vice-President Hashimi said he was happy with the
concept of operations, but concurred with the MinDef on the
need for specific timelines. He also expressed concern that
the number of ISF forces committed to the Mosul operation was
too small. He urged Riyadh to develop a more comprehensive
intelligence plan, especially regarding AQI intentions.

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Hashimi requested that the more detailed plan--currently
under development--put additional emphasis on local councils
and governmental institutions, particularly in the service
sector. The Vice President concluded with a cautionary note
about the necessity for limiting civilian casualties and
collateral damage during operations in Mosul.

Detailed Plan Coming
--------------


12. (S) National Security Advisor (NSA) Rubaie pointed out
this particular meeting was meant to focus on the overall
concept of operations and not the detailed plan. He
explained that many of the issues raised by the MinDef,
IntMin, and VP had been discussed extensively during the
survey visit to Mosul and in subsequent planning sessions. He
assured them the comprehensive strategic plan would also
include robust plans for police, intelligence, and civilian
operations. Additionally, he said that all members of the
Council of Representatives (CoR) from Ninewa province would
receive a detailed briefing so the government and legislature
could speak with one voice.


13. (S) Multi-National Division - North (MND-N) Commander,
Major General Hertling, told the Prime Minister that the ISF
and CF were in close coordination and assured him the ISF
would have access to the tactical intelligence they needed.
He reiterated General Petraeus' offer to work with the IP and
Border Guards to help re-equip their forces, especially
up-armored humvees. The General urged the IntMin to focus on
the prison and detainee issues because they would be critical
factors in this campaign, noting that assistance from all the
other Iraqi ministries was absolutely necessary for a
successful outcome. In conclusion, Hertling echoed Riyadh's
caution about the timelines, pointing out that not all ISF
units were yet in place.


14. (S) General Riyadh closed the two-hour meeting with an
urgent request for Ministry of Justice assistance in securing
the Baddush prison which--because it is Mosul's major
detention facility--will figure prominently in this
counterinsurgency campaign. Riyadh cautioned that even
though security forces had recently subdued rioting prisoners
there, the prison remained very volatile.

Comment
--------------


15. (S) This was a landmark meeting for several reasons.
First, Prime Minister Maliki showed strong leadership during
the CAC by keeping the participants focused on the agenda and
follow-on discussions. Second, the senior Iraqi government
leaders demonstrated a clear grasp of counterinsurgency
fundamentals in their critiques and requested additions to
the plan. Clearly, they had internalized many of the lessons
learned from Baghdad operations. Maliki's invitation to Vice
President Hashimi--who has been a harsh critic of the Prime
Minister's policies--sent a strong signal that Iraqis are
uniting in this campaign against a very dangerous foe.
Finally, the ISF will lead this operation with the CF in a
support role. How well the ISF performs will provide evidence
of their growing capacity or reveal weaknesses to be
addressed through further CF mentoring and training. End
comment.
CROCKER