Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD4064
2008-12-30 14:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
PRT SALAH AD DIN: APPREHENSION OVER COMING SOI
how-toVZCZCXRO7119 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #4064/01 3651455 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 301455Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1059 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004064
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS KCRS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: APPREHENSION OVER COMING SOI
TRANSITION
REF: A. BAGHDAD 4057
B. BAGHDAD 3922
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John Fox for Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004064
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS KCRS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: APPREHENSION OVER COMING SOI
TRANSITION
REF: A. BAGHDAD 4057
B. BAGHDAD 3922
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John Fox for Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).
1. (U) This is a PRT Salah ad Din reporting cable.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Provincial leaders are concerned that the
upcoming transition of responsibility for Sons of Iraq (SOI)
contracts from Coalition Forces (CF) to the Government of
Iraq (GOI) could undermine security improvements in Salah ad
Din (SaD). While SOI transition in SaD is not scheduled to
take place until April 2009, local leaders are already
carefully tracking progress in other regions. Many SOI
sheikhs in SaD are reluctant to see the CF or GOI implement
any transition arrangement that removes operational control
of the SOI program from the Sheikhs' direct supervision. SOI
members themselves, however, appear primarily concerned with
having a steady salary. Rank and file members of the SOI in
SaD are largely unskilled workers with few alternative
sources of income. The PRT and CF in SaD have been seeking
opportunities to shift SOI members into long-term civilian
employment, but the lack of comprehensive jobs or training
programs will limit the reach of these efforts. END SUMMARY.
--------------
SaD LEADERS TRACKING SOI TRANSITION ELSEWHERE
--------------
3. (SBU) In SaD, SOI registration is scheduled to begin in
March, and transition to GOI responsibility will begin in
April. (NOTE: As of December 28, SaD province had 124 SOI
contracts incorporating 8,521 individuals. END NOTE).
Leaders at all levels of the provincial government, however,
have already begun to express concern that a poorly managed
transition to GOI control would lead to a rapid decrease in
security.
4. (SBU) Provincial and local officials are tracking the
progress of the SOI transition in Baghdad. They have so far
commented favorably on CF and GOI management of the process,
which they view as predictive of how events will unfold in
SaD. On December 27, PRT officers spoke with one Sheikh who
controls a security contract for 65 men along Route Tampa
outside Tikrit. He said that the SOI transition was going
smoothly in Baghdad, which would bode well for the SoI
transition in his area.
--------------
SOI ADMIRED IN SAD
--------------
5. (C) Provincial leaders and many citizens in SaD credit the
SOI with the rapid improvements in security over the last
year and a half. Bayji Oil Refinery Director General Ali
Obeidi commented in a September meeting with PRT officers
that "there should be some sort of monument to them (the
SOI)." Deputy Governor Abdullah Jebara has often credited
the SOI with "defeating al-Qaida" during conversations with
the PRT. The achievements of the SOI are all the more
politically significant for SaD residents, since they are the
local, Iraqi face of the counterinsurgency.
6. (U) Many SOI sheikhs and members derive great satisfaction
from their service, which has enabled them to provide income
to their families and linked them with a force that is
praised for improving security. On market walks and
community engagements, PRT officers are often approached by
young men introducing themselves as SOI members with evident
pride. Likewise, many SOI sheikhs have used the income and
status they derive from SOI contracts to expand their role in
politics and business (refs).
--------------
BUT ALSO FEARED
--------------
7. (C) At the same time, many local observers speak fearfully
of the SOIs' brutality and general lack of discipline. PRT
Qof the SOIs' brutality and general lack of discipline. PRT
officers have received unconfirmed reports from local
contacts of the involvement of off-duty SOI members in crimes
ranging from extorting fuel trucks to sexual assault. During
engagements with local leaders, PRT officers have often noted
the youthfulness of the SOI members and their poor discipline
(e.g., their tendency to accidentally discharge their
weapons). On a few occasions, PRT locally hired staff has
related fearful, late-night encounters with SOI members at
checkpoints around the province. On one occasion, a PRT
contact from the banking sector insisted that CF warn SOI
sheikhs not to display their guns in his office or "make a
lot of noise about their relationship with the Americans"
BAGHDAD 00004064 002 OF 002
before he would agree to collaborate on a project involving
several powerful local SOI sheikhs.
8. (C) PRT contacts frequently accuse SOI members of
maintaining contact with both the CF and insurgent groups,
and thus should not be fully trusted. As a local business
contact commented to the PRT in November, "al-Qaida used to
pay them (the SOI) to place IEDs, now you (CF) are paying
them to fight al-Qaida." Some in SaD fear that, without CF
control, some SOI will revert to insurgents. Asked if the
men under his control would do this, one Bayji-based Sheikh
denied that this would be a problem with his men, but that
SOI members from "other groups" could fall under al-Qaida
influence again if they were left off the payroll.
--------------
SOI SHEIKHS LOOKING TO MAINTAIN STATUS
--------------
9. (C) Many SOI sheikhs that the PRT has spoken to are
reluctant to see any arrangement that would remove
operational control of the SOI, or payment of SOI salaries,
from them. Asked what jobs his men would seek after the SOI
contracts expire, one Bayji area Sheikh told us that his men
would only accept jobs that allowed them to "carry our own
guns and protect our own villages;" i.e. preserve the status
quo. Nonetheless, most of the SOI "soldiers" that we have
met said they would eagerly accept any well-paying job of
equal status.
--------------
SOI SALARIES SUPPORTING POOREST FAMILIES
--------------
10. (C) SOI salaries are a major source of income for some of
the most economically vulnerable workers in SaD and their
extended families. A Human Terrain Team study by CF in SaD
found that over half the SOI in SaD (63.6 percent) have no
marketable skills or training. Few of them that we have
interviewed have completed secondary school. (NOTE: SOI
members in SaD are paid $250 U.S./month, which is considered
a good salary for unskilled workers. END NOTE). Furthermore,
the 8,581 SOI members on contract in SaD as of December 28
support a median family size of ten people. This will
magnify the effect of any loss of income.
11. (SBU) During conversations with the PRT, very few SOI
members said they had any good prospects for new employment.
Many of them have told us they wish to join the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF). This may reflect SOI members'
favorable perception of ISF jobs as well as a lack of
confidence in their ability to obtain any other desirable
employment. In Samarra, approximately 600 former SOI members
are expected to complete police training and be sworn into
the force by the end of December.
--------------
TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS LIMITED
--------------
12. (SBU) In coordination with CF in SaD, the PRT is working
to develop employment opportunities for former SOI. The PRT
has persuaded one contractor linked with our hoop house
agricultural initiative (building plastic greenhouses) to
hire 24 SOI members for a short-term construction project.
(NOTE: We expect the number of former SOI employed in this
project to quadruple as the hoop house project moves forward.
END NOTE). Iraqi Business and Industrial Zone (IBIZ) Skills
Enhancement training programs have helped more than 92 former
SOI members to get jobs at COB Speicher.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
13. (SBU) Finding stable employment for the 8,500-strong
force of experienced fighters will be one of the primary
challenges in SaD for the PRT, CF, and GOI in the coming
year. Current funding ceilings for programs such as Quick
Qyear. Current funding ceilings for programs such as Quick
Response Funds and Iraqi Rapid Assistance Projects are
insufficient to address this challenge in a comprehensive
manner. Tapping into appropriate funding sources--whether
from the GOI or the U.S.--will enable us to increase the
number of former SOI members that are prepared for civilian
employment. END COMMENT.
CROCKER
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS KCRS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: APPREHENSION OVER COMING SOI
TRANSITION
REF: A. BAGHDAD 4057
B. BAGHDAD 3922
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John Fox for Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).
1. (U) This is a PRT Salah ad Din reporting cable.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Provincial leaders are concerned that the
upcoming transition of responsibility for Sons of Iraq (SOI)
contracts from Coalition Forces (CF) to the Government of
Iraq (GOI) could undermine security improvements in Salah ad
Din (SaD). While SOI transition in SaD is not scheduled to
take place until April 2009, local leaders are already
carefully tracking progress in other regions. Many SOI
sheikhs in SaD are reluctant to see the CF or GOI implement
any transition arrangement that removes operational control
of the SOI program from the Sheikhs' direct supervision. SOI
members themselves, however, appear primarily concerned with
having a steady salary. Rank and file members of the SOI in
SaD are largely unskilled workers with few alternative
sources of income. The PRT and CF in SaD have been seeking
opportunities to shift SOI members into long-term civilian
employment, but the lack of comprehensive jobs or training
programs will limit the reach of these efforts. END SUMMARY.
--------------
SaD LEADERS TRACKING SOI TRANSITION ELSEWHERE
--------------
3. (SBU) In SaD, SOI registration is scheduled to begin in
March, and transition to GOI responsibility will begin in
April. (NOTE: As of December 28, SaD province had 124 SOI
contracts incorporating 8,521 individuals. END NOTE).
Leaders at all levels of the provincial government, however,
have already begun to express concern that a poorly managed
transition to GOI control would lead to a rapid decrease in
security.
4. (SBU) Provincial and local officials are tracking the
progress of the SOI transition in Baghdad. They have so far
commented favorably on CF and GOI management of the process,
which they view as predictive of how events will unfold in
SaD. On December 27, PRT officers spoke with one Sheikh who
controls a security contract for 65 men along Route Tampa
outside Tikrit. He said that the SOI transition was going
smoothly in Baghdad, which would bode well for the SoI
transition in his area.
--------------
SOI ADMIRED IN SAD
--------------
5. (C) Provincial leaders and many citizens in SaD credit the
SOI with the rapid improvements in security over the last
year and a half. Bayji Oil Refinery Director General Ali
Obeidi commented in a September meeting with PRT officers
that "there should be some sort of monument to them (the
SOI)." Deputy Governor Abdullah Jebara has often credited
the SOI with "defeating al-Qaida" during conversations with
the PRT. The achievements of the SOI are all the more
politically significant for SaD residents, since they are the
local, Iraqi face of the counterinsurgency.
6. (U) Many SOI sheikhs and members derive great satisfaction
from their service, which has enabled them to provide income
to their families and linked them with a force that is
praised for improving security. On market walks and
community engagements, PRT officers are often approached by
young men introducing themselves as SOI members with evident
pride. Likewise, many SOI sheikhs have used the income and
status they derive from SOI contracts to expand their role in
politics and business (refs).
--------------
BUT ALSO FEARED
--------------
7. (C) At the same time, many local observers speak fearfully
of the SOIs' brutality and general lack of discipline. PRT
Qof the SOIs' brutality and general lack of discipline. PRT
officers have received unconfirmed reports from local
contacts of the involvement of off-duty SOI members in crimes
ranging from extorting fuel trucks to sexual assault. During
engagements with local leaders, PRT officers have often noted
the youthfulness of the SOI members and their poor discipline
(e.g., their tendency to accidentally discharge their
weapons). On a few occasions, PRT locally hired staff has
related fearful, late-night encounters with SOI members at
checkpoints around the province. On one occasion, a PRT
contact from the banking sector insisted that CF warn SOI
sheikhs not to display their guns in his office or "make a
lot of noise about their relationship with the Americans"
BAGHDAD 00004064 002 OF 002
before he would agree to collaborate on a project involving
several powerful local SOI sheikhs.
8. (C) PRT contacts frequently accuse SOI members of
maintaining contact with both the CF and insurgent groups,
and thus should not be fully trusted. As a local business
contact commented to the PRT in November, "al-Qaida used to
pay them (the SOI) to place IEDs, now you (CF) are paying
them to fight al-Qaida." Some in SaD fear that, without CF
control, some SOI will revert to insurgents. Asked if the
men under his control would do this, one Bayji-based Sheikh
denied that this would be a problem with his men, but that
SOI members from "other groups" could fall under al-Qaida
influence again if they were left off the payroll.
--------------
SOI SHEIKHS LOOKING TO MAINTAIN STATUS
--------------
9. (C) Many SOI sheikhs that the PRT has spoken to are
reluctant to see any arrangement that would remove
operational control of the SOI, or payment of SOI salaries,
from them. Asked what jobs his men would seek after the SOI
contracts expire, one Bayji area Sheikh told us that his men
would only accept jobs that allowed them to "carry our own
guns and protect our own villages;" i.e. preserve the status
quo. Nonetheless, most of the SOI "soldiers" that we have
met said they would eagerly accept any well-paying job of
equal status.
--------------
SOI SALARIES SUPPORTING POOREST FAMILIES
--------------
10. (C) SOI salaries are a major source of income for some of
the most economically vulnerable workers in SaD and their
extended families. A Human Terrain Team study by CF in SaD
found that over half the SOI in SaD (63.6 percent) have no
marketable skills or training. Few of them that we have
interviewed have completed secondary school. (NOTE: SOI
members in SaD are paid $250 U.S./month, which is considered
a good salary for unskilled workers. END NOTE). Furthermore,
the 8,581 SOI members on contract in SaD as of December 28
support a median family size of ten people. This will
magnify the effect of any loss of income.
11. (SBU) During conversations with the PRT, very few SOI
members said they had any good prospects for new employment.
Many of them have told us they wish to join the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF). This may reflect SOI members'
favorable perception of ISF jobs as well as a lack of
confidence in their ability to obtain any other desirable
employment. In Samarra, approximately 600 former SOI members
are expected to complete police training and be sworn into
the force by the end of December.
--------------
TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS LIMITED
--------------
12. (SBU) In coordination with CF in SaD, the PRT is working
to develop employment opportunities for former SOI. The PRT
has persuaded one contractor linked with our hoop house
agricultural initiative (building plastic greenhouses) to
hire 24 SOI members for a short-term construction project.
(NOTE: We expect the number of former SOI employed in this
project to quadruple as the hoop house project moves forward.
END NOTE). Iraqi Business and Industrial Zone (IBIZ) Skills
Enhancement training programs have helped more than 92 former
SOI members to get jobs at COB Speicher.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
13. (SBU) Finding stable employment for the 8,500-strong
force of experienced fighters will be one of the primary
challenges in SaD for the PRT, CF, and GOI in the coming
year. Current funding ceilings for programs such as Quick
Qyear. Current funding ceilings for programs such as Quick
Response Funds and Iraqi Rapid Assistance Projects are
insufficient to address this challenge in a comprehensive
manner. Tapping into appropriate funding sources--whether
from the GOI or the U.S.--will enable us to increase the
number of former SOI members that are prepared for civilian
employment. END COMMENT.
CROCKER