GOI AGREES UPON MODALITIES FOR IRAQ-TURKEY-USA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003598

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2028
TAGS: IZ TU PREL PTER KSEC MARR MOPS
SUBJECT: GOI AGREES UPON MODALITIES FOR IRAQ-TURKEY-USA
TRILATERAL ON SECURITY ISSUES

REF: A. ANKARA 1933

B. BAGHDAD 3509

Classified By: POLMIL MINISTER COUNSELOR MICHAEL C. CORBIN
FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: GOI spokesman told Ambassador and MNF-I
CG November 11 that GOI needs more time to make arrangements
for the security trilateral with Turkey and the U.S. He
explained the idea is the GOI's and that the goals are to
both achieve tangible results (absent from Turkish visits to
Baghdad and discussions with KRG) and to avoid a strong
Turkey-KRG track on issues that are important for Iraq's
central government. Ambassador and CG proposed technical
committees as a way to ensure movement and emphasized that
the GOI needs to work with the KRG to ensure the Iraqi side
will speak with a unified voice and will not turn the forum
into a squabble between GOI and KRG in front of the Turks.
Al-Dabbagh agreed. Ambassador noted it might help the
strategic, bilateral process if the PKK issue could be
removed and dealt with in the trilateral format. On the
substance, al-Dabbagh agreed that perhaps two standing
technical committees could be formed: one would focus on
trilateral intelligence exchanges and the other would focus
on Turkish actions on the Turkish side of the border and
Iraqi actions on the Iraqi side to control PKK movement and
supply. CG Odierno stressed that this is a very emotional
issue for the Turks and the GOI has to be sure that it is
ready to be fully involved in the process. End summary.


2. (S) GOI spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh (who is still
coordinating the Iraq-Turkey-U.S. trilateral until Minister
of State for National Security Affairs Shirwan al-Waeli --
just returned from Egypt -- can take over the operational
details as GOI delegation head) met with Ambassador and MNF-I
Commanding General Raymond Odierno November 11 to brief them
on GOI thinking on the trilateral.


3. (S) Al-Dabbagh said the trilateral is a GOI idea and
that the Iraqi side needs to convince a reluctant GOT that
there is merit to the proposal as this format had gone
nowhere in the past. Al-Dabbagh said he argued to the GOT
that nothing concrete came from envoy Murat Ozcelik's visits
to Iraq and his meetings with all parties. Al-Dabbagh said
once the Turks agreed to the concept, he argued for the
trilateral, rather than bilateral format for the meeting. He
then asked the GOT if it would halt all cross-border
operations (CBOs) in the lead-up to the trilateral meeting.
The Turks responded that that is impossible due to intense
domestic pressure to respond to terrorism in the run up to
the Turkish elections. Al-Dabbagh said he asked whether at
least the GOT would consider giving the GOI more than
one-hour notice on CBOs, noting that by the time the
information got to PM al-Maliki the operations were always
over. The Turks had responded with operational security
concerns, al-Dabbagh said, but he noted this remains very
important for PM al-Maliki. He asked if there is some way
the U.S. could help set up a secure channel that would allow
direct GOT-GOI notification.


4. (S) Remaining on the subject of GOI concerns, al-Dabbagh
said while PM al-Maliki had encouraged PM Erdogan to enter
into direct contacts with KRG figures such as Prime Minister
Nechirvan Barzani, the PM is concerned about too much direct
KRG-GOT contact. He said the PM wants to avoid a parallel
track between the KRG and the GOT: the GOI should deal with
the Turkish Government. CG Odierno noted that the GOI needs
to be aware that if it takes on the security issue of the
PKK, the GOI opens itself up to strong criticism from the
Turks if the PKK continues to act. Al-Dabbagh acknowledged
the point but said the KRG needs to show commitment to
tackling the PKK. The GOI is already under criticism on
allegations that PM al-Maliki had agreed to Turkish CBOs and
the GOI needs to fulfill its responsibility to help counter
the PKK. He mentioned specifically PKK members' use of
airports in the KRG and their access to logistics such as
fuel supplies. While the GOI needs to be responsible,
al-Dabbagh continued, the GOT needs to "be reasonable" in its
demands of the KRG.


5. (S) Turning to the timing of the trilateral, which had
originally been proposed for November 14-15 to get the
process going as soon as possible, al-Dabbagh noted that the
GOI has yet to invite the key KRG representative to
participate in the GOI delegation to the talks. He said that
former KRG Interior Minister Sinjari had been replaced by a
new PUK figure (note: Othman Hajji Mahmoud--former PUK
Minister of Interior in Suleymaniyyah. End note) and that
MSNSA Waeli would now invite him to attend the talks.

BAGHDAD 00003598 002 OF 002


Al-Dabbagh asked if the U.S. could participate next week, if
the talks could be organized then. Ambassador explained that
given the short notice it is too late to get a representative
from Washington but that he would participate in the talks
for the U.S. side. He noted that there are two important
considerations for the GOI to take into account: first, that
an appropriate trilateral agenda be developed with tangible
outcomes; and second, that the forum not turn into an
occasion for differences between the KRG and the central
government to be exposed. On the first point he said that
certain items, such as the bilateral GOI-GOT security
agreement might not be appropriate for this setting. That
could be worked directly between the two sides. Issues that
might be appropriate included intelligence sharing and
notifications of cross border operations. On the second
point he said it is vital that the GOI work with the KRG on
the trilateral process and ensured that the KRG
representative would act absolutely in concert with the rest
of the delegation.


6. (S) Al-Dabbagh acknowledged both points stating that he
agrees completely about the agenda. The bilateral security
agreement would be more appropriate for the Strategic
Cooperation Council meeting that Erdogan and al-Maliki had
agreed to and that al-Maliki wants to be held before the end
of the year. Al-Dabbabgh would be coordinating that effort
which also needs to address important Iraqi energy issues.
The Ambassador noted it might help the strategic, bilateral
process if the PKK issue could be removed and dealt with in
the trilateral format. On the substance, al-Dabbagh agreed
that perhaps two standing technical committees could be
formed. One would focus on trilateral intelligence exchanges
and the other would focus on Turkish actions on the Turkish
side of the border and Iraqi actions on the Iraqi side to
control PKK movement and supply. Al-Dabbagh noted this is a
good means of combating GOT complaints, for example, that the
KRG was allowing PKK members to be treated in KRG hospitals,
"the Turks complain directly to the KRG about this," he said,
and not to the GOI. "How can we determine if this is true or
not, if we are not told?" In response to the Ambassador's
question about where the technical committees should meet,
Baghdad or Irbil, al-Dabbagh said emphatically that the
Committee's should meet in Baghdad but could make site visits
to Irbil as needed.


7. (S) CG Odierno reiterated his point that this is a very
emotional issue for the Turks and the GOI needs to be sure
that it is ready to be fully involved in the process. The
Turks would be measured until the PKK made another deadly
attack on Turkish soil, he emphasized, then the GOT would
have to act because of enormous domestic pressure.
Al-Dabbagh said he understood, and had to convince the GOT
that the time is not right to publicize the trilateral
process until the first meeting is held. He had made a short
statement in Istanbul in response to Turkish pressure, but it
is important not to say anyting more until the trilateral
meets. He said he would brief MSNSA al-Waeli and understands
Embassy and MNF-I would do the same. He confirmed an MOD rep
would join the GOI delegation in response to the Ambassador's
question and said he would look at timing on November 17 or
later.


8. (S) Comment: Embassy and MNF-I will meet with MSNSA
al-Waeli and closely watch to ensure GOI-KRG coordination in
advance of the trilateral. We will also work to provide some
substance to technical committee ideas discussed with
al-Dabbagh. The delay in the meeting allows more time to
work on both issues.
CROCKER