IRAQI NSC MEETING ON NOV 2 REVIEWS SITUATION IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003504

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2028
TAGS: MOPS MARR MASS PREL PTER SY IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI NSC MEETING ON NOV 2 REVIEWS SITUATION IN
MOSUL

REF: BAGHDAD

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary. At the November 2, 2008 meeting of the
Iraqi National Security Council, Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki received the reconstruction report for Mosul. The
report indicated that while many infrastructure projects were
planned, implementation was slow and the province appeared
unable to effectively use the funds available to it.
Discussion of the report highlighted the embezzlement and
extortion of funds from Government of Iraq (GOI) development
projects by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in Mosul. The NSC also
heard the investigation results on Christian displacement in
Ninewa Province. The investigation report pointed to the
poor performance of and a total lack of coordination between
the provincial government and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
The report also suggested that leaders in the Christian
community in Mosul may have played a role in spreading the
fear that produced the mass flight of Christians out of the
city. PM Maliki, acknowledging deficiencies in the
performance of the ISF in Mosul, noted that Ninewa Province
was not yet assumed provincial Iraqi control (PIC),stated
that Multi National Force Iraq (MNF-I) has an important
security role, and called on all parties to work together to
solve the problems in Ninewa. End Summary.

Reconstruction Report: Mosul


2. (SBU) Minister of Communications Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi
delivered a report to the Prime Minister on the progress of
reconstruction efforts in Ninewa. Allawi painted a mixed
picture as he describe the progress of programs intended to
improve the city's infrastructure, enumerating the projects
planed, completed, awaiting bids, and still under study. The
scope of infrastructure work included:
--Road construction, primarily in the form of widening and
paving dirt streets, as well as general repairs;
--Public rest rooms primarily to service congested areas such
as markets and other public spaces;
--Improvements to public parks, including fountains;
--Construction of new sports and youth facilities, including
stadiums;
--Rebuilding the city water intakes from the Tigris River,
which had been intermittently unusable because of low water
levels, but now function normally with increased daily flow;
--Installation of new electrical lines, transformers, and
high voltage shut-offs;
--Installation of new utility poles and street lights;
--Installation of fiber-optic communications cable;
--Bridge maintenance and repair;
--Construction of new sewage lines and repair of existing
infrastructure;
--Repair of airport facilities; and
--Construction of a new passport office.
The Minister noted that both the electrical system and the
sewage lines in Mosul were in especially poor condition. He
also reported that funds had been provided to Shia, Suni, and
Christian charities for some development projects, but that
none had been completed yet.


3. (C) Allawi said that Mosul continued to resemble a
battlefield, with streets still littered with debris, damaged
storefronts, and few tangible indicators of improvement. He
stated that Mosul needed to liquidate the funds it had more
rapidly, so that it could move forward with infrastructure
projects and get people back to work. He noted that workers
and technocrats alike were in need of employment, and it
would benefit the city's security if fewer unemployed were
wandering its streets.


4. (C) The Prime Minister commented that he wanted to see
Mosul cleaned up. He stated that the GOI needs to move
development projects in the city forward, and to get the
funds already in city accounts flowing into activities that
would help the citizens. He noted that the sewage system
remained a problem, to which Allawi added that the
uncontrolled release of industrial pollutants was further
aggravating the situation. The PM then reiterated that the
streets needed to be cleared of debris.


5. (S) The Minister of Communications then stated that
improvements in security were essential if the development
projects in Mosul were to move ahead. National Security
Advisor Mowaffaq Rubaie cautioned that in awarding contracts
for development projects in Mosul, the GOI must assure that
public monies were not being skimmed or extorted to support
terrorist groups. He recommended paying for all contracts by
electronic funds transfer (EFT),rather than cash. Allawi
responded that effective action to improve the overall

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security situation by the ISF was the key to ending AQI
activity, not pressure on companies who were themselves
merely the victims of terrorist groups. He suggested that
the GOI should consider establishing Sons of Iraq (SOI) like
militia in Mosul to combat extremists. Maliki reacted
sharply to that suggestion, stating that Mosul was not ready
for SOI.


6. (S) Deputy Prime Minster Essawi proposed that the GOI
should establish a joint committee to provide command and
coordination of security operations and development programs
in Mosul. He said that if the Provincial Council (PC) proved
unable to liquidate the development funds provided to it,
then the joint committee should assume control of the funds
so that projects could move forward. The PM stated that the
proposal to shift program funds to the control of a joint
committee could be submitted to the Council of Ministers
(COM); if funds available to the PC are vulnerable to
embezzlement or extortion by AQI, then the funds should be
taken out of their control.


7. (S) The PM, Minister of Defense Al Qadir, Allawi, and
Rubaie then entered into a general discussion of the
complicity of local companies in funding extremists. Al
Qadir asserted that the problem was not as serious as some
had charged, and that reports claiming that up to thirty
percent of public project funds were being diverted were an
exaggeration. Rubaie insisted that some companies were
directly involved, part of a network in northern Iraq that
funds AQI, and that the GOI knew who some of companies were.
Allawi continued to put forward his position that the
companies were not at fault, merely afraid of the
consequences if they did not pay. PM Maliki stated that the
diversion of funds from companies to AQI was very dangerous,
and that the GOI should form a new committee to determine
which companies were involved. He called for all of the
agency heads present to work together to dry up the flow of
resources to extremists. The PM cited specific
examples--Asiacell, state cement factories, cigarette sales,
and sympathetic imams in some mosques, as known sources of
revenue for terrorist networks.


8. (S) General Odierno commented that first the security
situation would have to continue to improve, then political
issues needed to be resolved. Upcoming provincial elections
in Ninewa are extremely important. General Odierno said that
when AQI's second-in-command, Abu Qaswarah, was killed in
October, MNF-I discovered documents indicating that up to $1
million per month had been raised in Mosul for AQI, some of
it extracted from firms that included cell phone and cement
companies. Unfortunately the documents had not revealed
names of specific companies, only types of business. He
stated that the Coalition and ISF would have to get the
individuals who were paying extortion to work with them
against the extremists, and that this would take time. He
also said that as the information of extremist financing in
Mosul was six weeks old, it was tougher today for terrorists
to raise funds because of recent security operations.

Investigation Results on Christian Displacement in Ninewa


9. (S) Iraqi Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Ali
Gaidan delivered the report to the NSC of the Committee
charged by the NSC to investigate the recent displacement of
Christians from Mosul. He explained that the committee had
spoken with a broad range of interlocutors, including the
displaced families, Christians living on both sides of the
river, religious figures, the PC, prominent citizens, the
Governor, the Military Commander, and officers down to
company level. He said that the committee delivered a
message to the internally displaced persons (IDP): that the
GOI would react forcefully against the terrorist responsible
for the intimidation.


10. (SBU) General Ali said 8 Christians were killed and 3
Christian houses were destroyed by terrorists.


11. (S) Ali detailed the findings of the report, copies of
which were provided (in Arabic, translation to follow).
General Ali cited both security and political findings for
the crisis in Mosul. He noted that interviews had uncovered:
--The lack of communication and cooperation between the
Governor, the Chief of Police, and the military Commander in
Mosul;
--The weakness of ISF command and control and Province
governance;
--The slow pace at which information on the violence directed
at the Christians in Mosul was acquired and analyzed by the
ISF;
--The lack of a timely and effective reaction by the ISF

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after the initial reports of intimidation and killing had
been received;
--The premature, uncoordinated removal of some security
barriers protecting Christian neighborhoods;
--The presence of a segregated unit, the Iraqi Second
Division, in Mosul for four years continuously;
--High unemployment that created a ready pool of recruits for
extremists.
--A strong sense among Christians that the ISF could not
protect them.
General Ali noted that MNF-I remained responsible for
security in Ninewa, and that the province had not yet been
transferred to Iraqi control.


12. (S) On the political level the Ground forces Commander
also suggested that leaders in the Christian community had
contributed to the scope of the displacement by reacting
disproportionately to fear from the initial violent acts.
Suggesting there were Christian leaders seeking to set up an
autonomous region, General Ali said the large number of new
residential areas and the influx of Christians to the region
led some to suggest politics were involved in the incidents.
Christian leaders, supported by some "elements" reportedly
had built housing developments in the area to create new
Christian population centers and it was there that they hoped
to direct Christians fleeing Mosul. General Ali did not
provide any indication of who had directly been responsible
for the attacks but suggested AQI was likely involved. He
said another committee would have to be formed to determine
who had done the actual killing.


13. (S) He pointed to specific problems in the conduct of
the military and police and said that commanders had not
responded appropriately to the attacks. Ali also stated that
the report recommended taking action against the Army and
Police Commanders.


14. (S) Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bulani reacted to
the report, questioning its credibility, claiming a lack of
MOI participation in the investigating committee. National
Security Advisor Rubaie responded that the PM had established
two committees to investigate the displacement of Christians
from Mosul, and that the composition of the committee who had
prepared this report was appropriate.


15. (S) Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari (clearly reacting to
the suggestion of Kurdish involvement in the incidents) said
that he was very disappointed with the report, as it called
for yet another technical investigation to determine who was
actually responsible. He reminded the NSC that creating an
autonomous region for Christian Assyrians was
unconstitutional, and said that findings must be based on
facts, not theories. He said the political analysis of the
report did not appear based on facts.


16. (S) PM Maliki said that the GOI needed to know if the
theory about Christian leaders fomenting fear to force
displacement was true, but also needed to know why the ISF
had performed so poorly and failed to recognize the
indicators of the catastrophe before it occurred. The PM
asked General Odierno what he knew about MNF-I's reaction to
the displacement of Christians from Mosul. The Commanding
General responded that there had been a lack of security and
oversight in Mosul. MNF-I had learned that at the end of
September, two Baathists met with AQI in Mosul and called for
raids on Christians, including thefts, rapes, kidnappings and
other forms of intimidation. Though the actual number of
attacks were few, it was sufficient to cause thousands to
flee. He said this was an extremely complex issue involving
many separate agendas to even include the Christians.


17. (S) A lengthy and animated discussion ensued between
Maliki, Bulani, Al Qadir, Rubaie, and Ali over who was
responsible for the failures in Mosul. The Ministers of
Defense and Interior defended the performance of their
respective Ministries, while the Ground Forces Commander
emphasized the extent to which a total lack of coordination
and cooperation between the military police, provincial
government, and even MNF-I made a bad situation worse. The
PM stated that the report contained thirteen recommendations
that could resolve the problem if followed. He said that the
Governor in Ninewa is weak and unqualified to run the
province, and that there was no cooperation between the
governor and the military command. Maliki stated that the
command would have to be changed. He called on the agencies
present in the meeting to work together to bring about the
defeat of AQI, which he said was making its last stand in
Mosul, perhaps with some Syrian help. He welcomed additional
suggestions, and stated that the GOI would now go forward
with the recommendations contained in the report.

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18. (S) The PM stated that no one entity was to blame for
the problems in Mosul, but that responsibility had to be
shared among the police, the military, the tribes, and even
MNF-I. Noting the poor performance of the ISF, he called on
all parties to work together, including the intelligence
services, to resolve the situation in Mosul. Acknowledging
that success there would not be had without a price, Maliki
stated "the sacrifice will be the size of the victory."
CROCKER