OMS LEADER REQUESTS U.S. SUPPORT, MUQTADA CALLS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003503

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ IR
SUBJECT: OMS LEADER REQUESTS U.S. SUPPORT, MUQTADA CALLS
FOR RESISTANCE

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3144

B. BASRA 51

Classified By: Senior Advisor Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S/NF) Sheikh Mohammed al-Faraji, self-described Office of
the Martyr Sadr (OMS) representative for Basra and the
surrounding provinces, met with Senior Advisor Gordon Gray to
demand that the U.S. engage more directly with Iraqi-born
Shi'a clergy. In the October 28 meeting, Faraji argued that
the lack of emerging alternatives to foreign-born Shi'a
religious hierarchy in Najaf strengthens Tehran's hand and
pushes nationalist-leaning Sadrist/Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)
elements into Iran's orbit. While claiming approval from
Muqtada al-Sadr to hold the meeting, he showed
dissatisfaction with Muqtada and pushed for more contact with
OMS-linked cleric Qassem al-Taie. Faraji's primary aim may
be to strengthen his faction's hand in an upcoming intra-OMS
power struggle. While the sheikh said that he has instructed
local Sadrists to refrain from attacking Coalition Forces,
British forces in Basra intercepted a letter earlier this
month, signed by Muqtada, urging his followers to continue
resistance. End summary.

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A Hawza for Iraqis
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2. (S/NF) Describing himself as the OMS representative for
Basra, Maysan, Wasit, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna provinces, Faraji
emphasized to Gray that he is both Sadrist and nationalist.
Accompanied by Majid Asari, leader of the similarly
religious-nationalist Revolutionary Uprising Movement (Harkat
Thawra al-Intifada al-Shaabaniyah),he drove home points
similar to those made in meetings earlier this year with
Basra REO (ref B) and Force Strategic Engagement Cell(FSEC)
representatives:

- The U.S. must support Iraqi-born Shi'a religious
authorities to prevent increasing Iranian influence over
Iraqi politics and security;
- To further this relationship, the Embassy should help set
up an interview on al-Hurra television with Najaf-based
cleric Qassem al-Taie;
- The Embassy should broker meetings between leading Iraqi
figures (Jalal Talabani was mentioned by name) and Iraqi-born
Shi'a clerics. He mentioned Mohammed Sadiqi and Mohammed
al-Yacoubi (actually Iranian-born) in addition to al-Taie.


3. (S/NF) Faraji argued that the U.S. "did Iraq a favor" by
overthrowing Saddam, but then boxed itself into a corner by
elevating religious parties (ISCI, Da'wa) led by persons
trained in Iran. He expressed sharper criticism for the
international community's neglect of the broader Iraqi Shi'a
religious community in its unsuccessful efforts to appeal to
Iranian-born Ayatollah Sistani and, to a lesser extent,
Najaf-based Ayatollahs Ishaq al-Fayed (from Afghanistan) and
Mohammed Bashir Hussein Najafi (Pakistan). He lambasted the
recent UNAMI visit to Sistani and other overtures made toward
his office, saying they weakened local clerics without having
any strategic value on key issues regarding Iraqi security.
Regarding the SOFA, Faraji said that Sistani listens to
opinions from local leaders and then "asks Kazem al-Haeri in
Qom what to do."

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OMS Leadership Vacuum
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4. (S/NF) In addition to repeated charges about the malign
influence of the Najaf-born and trained Ayatollah Haeri (a
former Da'wa leader and reputed Muqtada advisor),and
criticisms toward Baghdad-based JAM leader Abdal Hadi
al-Daraji (now in CF custody) as a tool of Iran, Faraji
leveled some criticism toward Muqtada himself. He argued
that "Muqtada leaned on his father's reputation" to become
the voice of OMS after the invasion but "was not qualified."
Though he claimed that Muqtada approved his meeting with Gray
through contacts at the Najaf OMS office, Faraji showed
little
reverence toward his leader, saying that Muqtada is in Qom
now and will not be soon returning. He suggested that
JAM/Sadrist members -- many of whom fought against Iran in
the 1980s -- know there is an ongoing OMS power vacuum and
are looking for signals about where to turn next.

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BAGHDAD 00003503 002.2 OF 002


Keeping the Sadrists Away from Iran?
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5. (S/NF) Faraji made the case that he is working at great
personal risk to pry local Sadrist (including JAM) elements
loose from Iran's grip. He said that 40 percent of the
members who
fled after Charge of the Knights have returned to Basra, and
that his organization has provided them with some money to
cover basic needs. He lamented, however, that if he gives
100 USD per month, Iran will give 1,000 USD. Faraji claimed
to largely have control over whether local JAM elements
attack Coalition Forces (CF),saying that attacks on CF in
Basra and Maysan were greatly reduced after his
initial meeting with the Basra REO Director in May. He also
said that he had called off locally-planned attacks on CF
projects in the low-income Hyaniyah and 5-Mile Market
neighborhoods. Faraji posited that he could not control his
members much longer and said that he may have to return to
attacking U.S. forces at some point. To emphasize this,
Faraji at one point refused to accept a glass of water when
he was coughing on the grounds that it would be a false sign
of reconciliation.

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From Muqtada, To Whom It May Concern
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6. (S/NF) A letter intercepted by British Forces on October
18 in the swamp region near al-Faw indicates that the day
when Sadrist/JAM members again take up arms could be soon
approaching. The undated letter, apparently signed and
thumbprinted by Muqtada, calls on his followers to "remain
on your Jihad" and "continue your resistance." While the
letter's opaque writing style leaves it open to
interpretation, the call of "your blood for Hussein Imam
al-Mahdi" and various exhorations to "resist the occupiers"
strongly suggest that the letter is a call to renewed armed
struggle. The letter's message diverges significantly from
communications delivered to us recently by OMS contacts,
such as the September letter from Muqtada given to PRT Wasit
by Ahmed Hassan E'barah, which outlined plans to turn the
Sadrist movement into a social services organization. (Note:
in late October, Karbala police detained local youths
distributing fliers containing a similar "message from
Muqtada." End note.)


7. (S/NF) There has been no increase in attacks on Coalition
Forces since this letter was discovered; security conditions
continue in Basra have continued to improve. In an October
28 meeting with Gray, British Brigadier General Richard Iron
estimated that 80 percent of JAM's pre-Charge of the Knights
revenue came from Basra, most of it from control of the
ports. The actual amount that JAM was
receiving is unknown, but rough estimates by British forces
in Basra and Umm Qasr suggested between 5 and 10 million USD
monthly. Since Charge of the Knights, JAM has found no
alternative funding source within Basra.

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Comment
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8. (S/NF) It is difficult to argue with Faraji's basic thesis
that a stronger Iraqi-born clerical hierarchy would be more
protective of Iraq's security interests vis-a-vis Iran, and
that it would send a message to disaffected JAM members that
backing from Iran is not the answer. We will exercise
caution in responding to his specific requests, however,
especially given the unclear and likely unstable role that
Faraji and his benefactor al-Taie maintain in the OMS power
structure. Faraji's claims that he is risking his life to
meet with us are likely true, given his differences with
Iran, Muqtada, significant OMS/JAM figures, and Badr Corps
(which monitors visits to the REO). Given the need for the
U.S. to build stronger relationships with Shi'a religious
leaders in Iraq, we will seek to develop an appropriate and
effective means of outreach. End comment.
CROCKER