RRT ERBIL: ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT BARZANI CITES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003402

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT BARZANI CITES
IMPROVED KRG RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

Classified By: Regional Coordinator Lucy Tamlyn for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) cable.


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kurdistan Region's chief advisor on
Turkish matters believes that the recent killing of 15
Turkish soldiers by PKK forces increased public and military
pressure on the Turkish government and so precipitated the
revival of the dialogue between Turkey and the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG). As a follow-up to their October
14 meeting in Baghdad, KRG President Barzani agreed to meet
with Turkish Envoy Ozcelik and Foreign Policy Advisor Ahmet
Davutoglu in Erbil on October 24 before traveling to the
United States. Both sides have avoided pressing
over-ambitious agendas in favor of moving slowly to establish
better ties that could form the basis for future cooperation.
End summary.


2. (C) The Deputy Team Leader (DTL) of the U.S. Regional
Reconstruction Team (RRT) met with Safeen Dizayee, the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) International Relations
Chief and the party's primary advisor on Turkish matters on
October 22 in his office. Dizayee recalled that KRG
relations with Turkey had started off poorly this year with
the Turkish ground forces' advance into Kurdish territory in
February. The relationship had improved by May (partly due
to Dizayee's behind-the-scenes work) when Prime Minister
Nechirvan Barzani met with Turkish envoy Ozcelik and Foreign
Policy Advisor Ahmet Davutoglu. However the dialogue has not
advanced during the five subsequent months.


3. (C) According to Dizayee, the PKK violence of October 4,
in which 14 Turkish soldiers were killed, had increased
domestic pressure on Turkish leaders. He said the Turkish
"liberal media" attacked the military and accused them of
ineptitude. After having been given the green light by
parliament to conduct cross-border attacks, the military had
still not been able to fulfill its promise to corner the PKK.
This was responsible for the reinvigoration of the dialogue,
Dizayee claimed, and the Turkish decision to hold the October
14 meeting between Ozcelik, Davutoglu and President Barzani
in Baghdad. According to Dizayee, this was the first time
Masoud Barzani had met with these officials since assuming
the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region. The meeting itself
had not been convened with any specific outcome in mind;
rather it was agreed to consider a regular series of meetings
and setting up smaller groups to look at different sectors.


4. (C) Dizayee commented that concerns on the part of Prime
Minister Erdogan's party that it would fare poorly in
municipal elections in May 2009 might also be a factor in the
decision. Dizayee recalled that a recent visit by the
Turkish Prime Minister to the country's southeastern region
had been greeted by demonstrations and boarded up shops.
Rapprochement with the Kurdistan Region might be viewed
favorably by Turkish Kurds and help in the elections, he
offered.


5. (C) Dizayee reported that on October 21 the Turkish
National Security Council had blessed this approach and
agreed that the dialogue with the KRG should continue with
monthly meetings. A delegation from Turkey is expected on
Friday, October 24 to meet with Barzani in Erbil before his
visit to the United States. Dizayee reported these
developments with satisfaction. According to him there had
been a decision in Turkey to "get down to business -- with
the military's blessing." Queried as to specific confidence
building measures that might be on the table at these
meetings, Dizayee said that nothing specific had been
discussed. The task ahead is to persuade the PKK to agree to
a cease-fire and disarmament. But, he stressed, this is a
Turkish responsibility. Dizayee did mention that six weeks
ago twenty PKK members had agreed to defect from the movement
and had been given safe-haven in the Kurdistan Region.


6. (C) Asked how the renewed dialogue and possibly more
aggressive steps against the PKK would resonate with Kurds in
the Kurdistan Region, Dizayee stated that the public had an
innate sympathy for the plight of the Turkish Kurds; it would
not accept the KRG taking arms against the PKK -- but the KRG
had no intention of waging war on any neighbors. It had
assisted the Turks in the 90's and for its troubles had lost
3,000 pesh merga. Dizayee stated that there might be some
political groups (such as the PCDK) which were more
sympathetic to the PKK, but this was not an issue which would
get the Kurdish populace out on the streets in protest. What
might derail progress, however, would be another serious PKK
attack which would force the Turkish military to take
aggressive military action, he said.

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7. (C) Dizayee noted as well that any agreements with Turkey
would be discussed and adopted by the Kurdistan Region High
Political Council ) a body composed of leaders of the major
political parties. This body worked on the basis of
consensus - issues are discussed and agreed between the
governing coalition and "the opposition" before being
introduced to the Kurdistan National Assembly. Achieving
consensus in such a manner is one way of making the
opposition "bear responsibility" according to Dizayee.


8. (C) Asked whether he thinks the Turkish government has
taken meaningful steps to address the concerns of Turkish
Kurds, Dizayee dismissed efforts to date by saying they had
accomplished "perhaps 1 percent" of what was needed. He
quickly added, however, that this was not a KRG issue and it
would not get involved in internal matters of another
country. He mentioned the problem of the Mahkmour refugee
camp, which he believes should be closed. He acknowledged
concerns that the camp has PKK members, and noted that it
constitutes a "breeding ground" for young PKK sympathizers.
If camp inhabitants can be encouraged to return to Turkey,
and given incentives to do so, this would be a good sign.


9. (C) Dizayee informed DTL that there are no Turkish
diplomatic representatives in the Kurdistan region, but they
have had a military representative and an intelligence
officer in the region since 1991. In addition, 1,200 Turkish
soldiers have been stationed 40 kilometers inside the
Kurdistan Region border since 1997. Turkey still does not
recognize the entity known as the Kurdistan Region and the
term of art which they insist on using is "the Northern Part
of Iraq." Dizayee noted ruefully that any incoming shipments
to the Turkish free port addressed to the "Kurdistan Region"
ran the risk of being held up indefinitely.


10. (U) This cable has been cleared with Embassy Ankara.



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