PM DEMANDS ACTION TO PROTECT CHRISTIANS IN MOSUL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003383

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: IZ KIRF MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: PM DEMANDS ACTION TO PROTECT CHRISTIANS IN MOSUL
AT IRAQI NSC MEETING OCTOBER 19, 2008

REF: BAGHDAD 3325

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (a),(b) and
(d)


1. (S) Summary. In an uncharacteristically short meeting of
the Iraqi National Security Council (I-NSC),Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki demanded quick action by the Government of
Iraq (GOI) to end the intimidation and fear that had driven
thousands of Christians from their homes in Ninawa Province
and said he wants measures taken to ensure that this will not
happen again. He expressed his concern that Iraq Security
Forces (ISF) commanders in Ninawa had played a role in the
involuntary displacement of Christians. With regard to the
difficult security situation in the province's capital,
Mosul, PM Maliki said that he wants to see the insurgency
there brought under control before he would entertain the
possibility of introducing awakening councils to the city.
He made clear his belief that Baathists operating with the
support of Syria are a serious threat in the Mosul area and
equal to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The meeting ended with an
additional installment in the continuing discussions within
the I-NSC on the deficiencies within and implementation of
the new Amnesty Law. End Summary.

PM Displeased over Plight of Christians in Ninawa.


2. (S) Returning to the issue that had dominated the I-NSC
meeting the previous week (REFTEL) the Prime Minister opened
the October 19 meeting by expressing his concern about the
plight of Christians in Ninawa, stating that he had received
several letters that charged that local commanders were at
best criminally negligent, and probably complicit, in the
violence and forced displacement of Christians that had
occurred there. Maliki said that the GOI must move now,
launch an investigation immediately, and that if his
government fails to take action, the Christians would never
return to their homes. He was vehement in his assertion that
precautions must be put in place to insure that this could
never occur again.


3. (S) In response to Maliki's remarks, Minister of Defense
(MinDef) Abdul Qadir Mohammed al-Mufraji expressed the view
that of the more than one thousand Christian families that
had fled, most had left their homes from fear rather than
actual acts of intimidation. He noted this fear was real and
said the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of the
Interior (MOI) are working together to respond. The MOD was
deploying an additional brigade to the area, to augment
troops already there, and these new troops would complete
their movement within 72 hours. He expected that most of the
displaced Christians would return in the wake of the rapid
GOI response that was already underway. Some twenty families
had reportedly returned in the past forty-eight hours.


4. (S) The PM reacted sharply to the Minister's presentation
pointing to several letters he had received from Christians
in Mosul specifically complaining about the situation and
naming military officers they accused of being involved in
allowing intimidation of Christians. Abdul Qadir replied
that an investigating committee had been formed and was being
dispatched, but Maliki retorted "so we wait?" The MinDef
responded that no, the GOI would not wait, and that new
troops are the answer because police are more susceptible to
infiltration by insurgents responsible for the threats to
Christians. He said that the investigation was already under
way, and the entire 2nd Iraqi division would be scrutinized.
The only thing to wait for would be the committee's final
report. Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bulani interjected
that the MOI had sent a committee to Ninawa that will work
closely with Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) to look at
changing the disposition of security forces in the province.
The MinDef added that the field commanders in Ninawa would
have to be replaced as well. The PM called for quick action
to investigate and deal with any inappropriate behavior by
the military.


5. (C) Continuing on the subject of what to do in Mosul, the
PM stated that the problem there is primarily political. The
Deputy Director of the Implementation and Follow-Up Committee
for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) Dr. Mohammed Salman made
an impassioned plea for active engagement at the political
level. He said that the situation in Mosul is different from
that in other Iraqi cities, and that the GOI needs to
"control the ground" before all else. Reassuring residents
in their neighborhoods is critical. He said if given
authorization he could &immediately8 establish at least
twenty support councils, which could provide basic municipal
services in addition to improving neighborhood security in
Mosul. Stating that it requires &more than just talk,8 he

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said he had been engaging with the different political trends
and believes the time is right for quick action. He said he
could establish temporary contracts for local &awakening
council8 type security groups in Mosul which would have an
immediate, positive impact.


6. (C) Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Barham Salih, stating
that he also thinks the problems in Mosul to be political in
nature, urged caution in establishing councils, as assistance
to one faction is likely to invoke the ire of others unless
the effort is carefully coordinated. Salman responded that
the issue is complex, but that local security organizations
have an advantage over the military in controlling
insurgents, as they are familiar with the areas in which they
operate and the people who live there. MOI Bulani noted that
local security forces had demonstrated the ability to fight
Al Qaeda in other locations, and that difficulties resulted
from the illegal actions of some of the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF). He said that Mosul suffers from both political and
economic problems, and that some insurgent groups benefit
from the chaos they create.


7. (S) Maliki stated that he had received reports indicating
that the situation in Mosul is complex, AQI and Baathists
having infiltrated "the very marrow" of the city. He
suggested that many of the institutions of government in
Mosul are infiltrated by insurgents. He said that informants
working for the ISF are easily targeted, and because the
people do not feel secure, they are unwilling to take action
against the insurgents. Further adding to the difficulties
there are sharp divisions between tribes in the urban core
and those living in the countryside. He said that while
reconciliation is necessary if Mosul's problems are to be
solved, conditions in the city are not currently favorable,
and premature efforts to achieve reconciliation are bound to
fail. The GOI would need to create the essential security
preconditions in Mosul first, and both the military and the
police would have to take a new and different direction. The
PM called for an increase in the GOI's intelligence efforts
as a means to counter AQI operations.


8. (C) DPM Barham Salih said that much of the problem in
Ninawa is that officials in the province are not cooperating
with the national government. Bulani agreed, stating that
there is no cooperation from local government. The DPM added
that there is no strong leadership in the province, and that
the problem is entirely within the executive offices of the
provincial government. NSA Rubaie said that with no strong
governor and no executive exercising authority the situation
is awful. The Minister of Defense concurred strongly,
stating that only two percent of the budget has been spent.
Barham Salih stated that the provincial elections in Ninawa
are absolutely vital.


9. (S) General Odierno informed PM Maliki that approximately
ten days previously, the Coalition had captured the
operational commander for AQI, and with him thousands of
documents that detailed AQI's operational plan. The latter
is based on developing the group's relationship with Sunni
Arabs in Mosul, who are vulnerable to AQI because of poor
governance, Arab-Kurd tensions, and the lack of groups such
as the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in the city. The General said that
the plan calls for continued recruiting of Sunnis in Mosul,
where AQI is making its last stand, and assured the PM that
we will continue to share information.

PM: &Baath Worrisome8


10. (C) Maliki said that SOI would be good for the
operational forces, but that the Baathists had also
infiltrated the city thoroughly, and if the GOI attempts to
establish awakening councils now, they would be dominated by
the same people who had created the problems in the city in
the first place. The PM stated that the GOI would need to
clear them out first, and efforts in Mosul would have to
proceed in two phases--remove those responsible for problem,
and only after that had been accomplished, establish
awakening councils. Bulani dissented, stating that the GOI
could move forward now with SOI in Mosul. Maliki responded
that "I am not against it, but we don't control the land
yet." He then called for additional study of the situation,
stating that the GOI needs more clarity.


11. (S) Expanding on his concerns about the Baath Party, the
PM said, "When I hear AQ, I think Baath." He said that Iraqi
Baathist meetings are still being held in Syria, and that
large quantities of explosives continue to flow in from that
country as well. According to Maliki, even the prisons in
Mosul have been infiltrated. The solution to this complex
problem, he explained, requires gathering intelligence,

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deploying the necessary forces, interdicting or arresting the
insurgents, and establishing effective control of the
Iraq-Syria border.

More on the Amnesty Law


12. (S) Turning to an item that was not on the meeting
agenda, the MinDef then noted a list of 160 names he said
illustrates the previous week's discussion on the problems
with the amnesty law (REFTEL). The Minister said the names
on the list are all related to corruption cases and those
involved are seeking to use loopholes in the amnesty law in
order to escape justice. Maliki noted that, as had been
discussed the previous week, the law is problematic in that
criminals seem to be able to escape justice. He hinted that
the law might reflect corrupt influences on the Council of
Representatives. The result was that criminals were
released who should have been prosecuted. Abdul Qadir said
that in some cases, the courts applied different paragraphs
of the law to similar crimes in order to facilitate amnesty
for suspects who could afford to pay bribes. The PM and the
MinDef concluded the meeting with a lengthy exchange on the
specifics of several cases that illustrated how deficiencies
in the Amnesty Law had created the potential for abuse.
CROCKER