NINEWA: CHRISTIAN IDPS FLEE MOSUL FOR SAFER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003373

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF MOPS PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: NINEWA: CHRISTIAN IDPS FLEE MOSUL FOR SAFER
NEIGHBORING COMMUNITIES; NEAR-TERM RETURNS UNLIKELY

Classified By: Ninewa PRT Leader Alex Laskaris, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message.


1. (C) Summary: Christian IDPs who fled Mosul in the last
two weeks are currently out of grave danger and there is
currently no humanitarian crisis. It appears that local
authorities in the safe-haven communities, with assistance
from UNHCR and NGOs, have the capacity to supply food, water,
and required non-food items, although stresses to local
communities may build over time. Our field work confirmed
the figures provided to us by local governments, the UN and
the International Medical Corps (IMC) -- at least 1,800
families departed Mosul, primarily between October 9 -13.
The GOI is trying to entice IDPs back to Mosul with cash
payments, and Coalition Forces (CF) and Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) are trying to enhance protection for the Christians
remaining in Mosul and nearby Christian communities. Neither
course of action is likely to offer sustainable security
absent a broader political settlement in Mosul and Ninewa.
IDPs told us they worry that a clumsily implemented American
response would risk further identifying of the Christians
with the USG and increase the threat to these communities.
It was not difficult for the attackers to provoke this IDP
flight; reversing it will be an order of magnitude harder.


2. (C) Christian political parties have focused on their
narrow partisan interests at the expense of the broader issue
of the future of minorities in Mosul. We heard reports that
many Moslawis responded in the finest tradition of a
once-proud cosmopolitan and tolerant city. Long term, the
fate of Mosul's Christians will depend on Moslawis
themselves, and a rekindling of the multi-ethnic,
multi-sectarian spirit of their city. With regard to the USG
response, we are responding aggressively but we also need to
be cautious to do no inadvertent harm to those we seek to
help. End summary.


3. (C) PRT Ninewa, joined by Embassy Baghdad political
officers, 1AD, and UNAMI representatives, toured IDP
concentrations in seven towns in northeast Ninewa on October
16-17: Al Qosh, Tel Uskuf, Batnaya, Tel Kayf, Qarakosh,
Keramalis and Bartalla. All are within areas of Ninewa under
the effective control of the KRG, and all are within 35 km of
Mosul city. We spoke with heads of household and family
members representing more than 500 people over two days,
using a standardized list of questions. We also met up with
GOI, UN and NGO officials on the ground. We kept our
participation to the working level, believing that the
presence of PRT leadership or senior CF personnel would have
skewed the results of this field work.

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What Happened?
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4. (C) Although accurate casualty figures remain elusive,
between eight and 16 Christians were reportedly killed in
Mosul, beginning between September 28 and October 1. A
relatively small number of IDPs were personally threatened;
some got SMS messages or saw photocopied leaflets and others
had unknown persons asking to see their identity card.
Others were warned by Moslem neighbors, and some were told to
leave by parish priests. The majority appear to have taken
flight out of fear stoked by the initial reports of murders
and then the subsequent departure of others. The numbers
provided to us by IMC and the local governments appear
accurate: at least 1,800 families departed Mosul, with most
leaving October 9-13. We cannot say with confidence how many
Christian families were in Mosul prior to the flight; one
contact -- whom we have found credible in the past ) told us
that the number was 2,500. IDPs appear to have come from all
parts of the city, but mainly from the east bank of the
river. We do not know the identity and purpose of the
killer(s). Most of the IDPs had theories, but none offered
eye-witness accounts or insights that would allow us to
determine conclusively those responsible or their motives.

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Current status of IDPs
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5. (C) The IDPs have reached safe havens. While we cannot
exclude the possibility of future attacks, IDPs are behind
KRG lines in smaller communities which have had significantly
better security than Mosul itself. Most of the IDPs found
accommodation with friends or relatives in nearby towns and
villages; others rented houses in safe areas. Some are
living in monasteries, parish halls, or other public
buildings. (Tents hastily erected on orders of the Ministry

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of Migration and Displacement (MODM),probably as a publicity
exercise, were never used and later removed.)
USAID/OFDA-grantee IMC, notified of the problem on October 9,
moved quickly starting October 10 to distribute non-food
items funded and /or provided by UNHCR and USAID/OFDA. They
have produced daily humanitarian situation reports since
then. KRG Finance Minister Sarkis Aghagjian made cash
payments to the families. MODM also delivered food and
supplies and promised cash stipends to the displaced.
Medical workers who traveled with the teams reported no
serious health problems, although the IDPs living in public
buildings will need better sanitary conditions if they
shelter in place. Food appeared to be in ample supply. The
most common complaints from public sector workers were loss
of salaries, and parents' worries about disruption of
children,s education.

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GOI response
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6. (C) The Government of Iraq has responded with the right
messages, but its policy response is circumscribed by the
limits of its tools: money, police and army. Despite his
responsibilities directing a major ongoing ISF offensive
(supported by CF) in Mosul, Ninewa Operations Command (NOC)
leader LTG Riyad Talal joined senior CF personnel at an
October 11 PRT-convened town hall meeting in Bartalla. This
was the first time that this group of Christian community
leaders had engaged Riyad. For his part, Riyad showed what
we believe to be a genuine concern for the Christian
community of his native city and pledged additional security
assets from both Iraqi Army and Police under his command.
Governor Kashmoula offered immediate cash benefits to IDPs;
both he and Vice Governor Goran reassured civil servants that
their salaries would continue to be paid. The Baghdad and
KRG Ministries of Return/Migration were on the scene pledging
assistance. However, IDPs we interviewed evinced no
confidence in either the government or the police; attitudes
towards the army were better, but insufficient to convince
IDPs to return. CF were also widely criticized as
ineffective on this issue.

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Christian political party response
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7. (C) Christian political party leaders were quick to
ascribe blame for the IDP flight, while our interviews with
IDPs revealed deep resentment toward the Christian political
leadership. Political party representatives portrayed the
events of the previous two weeks in a manner consistent with
their longstanding political views on key issues. Assyrian
Democratic Movement (ADM) officials ) who oppose membership
in the KRG ) were quick to lay the blame on Kurds. The
pro-KRG Assyrian Patriotic Party said that AQ/ISI, in
collaboration with the Iraqi Police, was responsible for the
violence, and the ineffectiveness of the GOI response
demonstrated that Christian interests were best served by
integration into the KRG. Other Christian political leaders
said that the violence was a result of Christian protests
over the CoR's rejection of Article 50 of the elections law;
still others said that the IDP flow demonstrated that an
autonomous Christian political entity was the community,s
only option. By contrast the IDPs we spoke with raised none
of these political issues, except to express anxiety that
Christian political activity (even seeking to have the GOI
hire more Christian Police) could further provoke those who
were attacking them.

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Moslawi Muslims take a stand
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8. (C) A common theme we heard from the IDPs was how their
Muslim friends and neighbors have supported them over the
last two weeks. We heard stories of Muslims warning their
Christian neighbors that strangers were asking questions in
their neighborhoods. One elderly man whose brother was
murdered told us that his Muslim neighbors all came to pay
their respects to his family. We heard stories of Muslims
who told strangers that there were no Christians in their
apartment buildings and who are taking food and supplies to
Christians who have remained in their homes. IDPs told us
that they are getting phone calls from their Muslim neighbors
assuring them that their homes and businesses are being
watched over. Some of these attestations may exaggerate
inter-communal ties. We also heard from some victims that
the terrorists relied on local Muslims to identify their
targets. Several said "Arabs" were told not to damage

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Christian properties, since they would inherit them after the
Christians fled. One factory owner who fled last year was
told by neighbors that he would be prohibited from removing
his factory equipment, although he was welcome to return.
Nevertheless, the overwhelming message our teams received was
that Muslim Moslawis were energized by the plight of their
Christian neighbors, even in the face of potential threat to
themselves.

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Two analyses that may have merit
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9. (C) Ninewa Vice Governor Keshro Goran (a Kurd) told us he
believed that the Christians were targeted because they had
organized political demonstrations in the wake of the
rejection of Article 50. He said that there has been
mandated minority representation in Iraq in the past that,
generally speaking, it was not objectionable. Goran noted
that radical Islamists were opposed to the notion of a
Christian political demonstration, and of any non-Islamic
political identity in Iraq. When asked who was responsible
for the crisis, Ninewa Deputy Governor for Administrative
Affairs Yussuf Lalo (strictly protect),a Bartalla Christian
said &we don,t know and we couldn,t say it if we did (
that would mean more attacks against us ( we are in
darkness, and all people fear the darkness.8 As to the
motive, Lalo said &to punish us, to punish you ( it,s the
same to them.8 He said that many believe that the
Christians support the coalition, and many more believe that
the coalition supports the Christians. &Killing us causes
you pain8 he said. Many IDPs said they had been directly
threatened also told us they were unwilling to speculate on
the identity of the culprits out of fear.

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Comment: Helping, and Avoiding Harm
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10. (C) With minimal effort, someone or some group provoked
the flight of at least 1,800 families from Mosul, perhaps
half of its Christian population. In contemporary Ninewa,
the most violent province in Iraq, the attacks and threats
against Christians have a political influence far in excess
of their statistical incidence. To get the IDPs to return
will require far more than the status quo ante (and more than
just the pledged GOI payments to returnees of one million
Iraqi dinars ($840) ) the same it pays to any returnee
nationwide). Perceptions of security will determine whether
and when people return, and that may await an underlying
political settlement. In the meantime, U.S.-funded
humanitarian organizations are responding to humanitarian
needs. Coalition Forces have significantly augmented
presence in Mosul in connection with the ongoing Operation
"Mother of Two Springs II." There are now Iraqi Security
Forces guarding many Christian facilities and houses in
Mosul. To return the Christians to fortified communities,
guarded temporarily by ISF and living behind T-walls,
however, could single them out for future attacks. We will
want to maintain contact with Christian IDPs to avoid taking
steps that could be counter-productive or inadvertently lead
to the extinction of the Christian community from Mosul.


11. (C) In the longer term, especially following the
withdrawal of U.S. combat power, the hope of the Christian
community will rest in large part on their fellow Moslawis.
We believe most Moslawis view their Christian brethren as
part of the social fabric of their once-proud city; essential
humanity and civic commitment has apparently survived intact
the depredations of recent times among many Moslawi. Jewish
life in Mosul was extinguished in the wake of Israeli
independence. The Shebak largely fled the city in 2004. The
Yezidi departed en masse in 2007. We will have to think
creatively and respond robustly to prevent history from
repeating itself. End Comment.

CROCKER